PROPERTY OF
LINCOLN CITY LIBRARIES
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA
JUL 1 9 1987

Political Science Quarterly

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

Summer 1987

Richard Ned Lebow — Is Crisis Management Always Possible?

Michael Rubner — Antiterrorism and the Withering of the 1973 War Powers Resolution

Francis E. Rourke — Bureaucracy in the American Constitutional Order

Kent M. Beck — What Was Liberalism in the 1950s?

Bruce Russett
Miles Lackey — In the Shadow of the Cloud: If There's No Tomorrow, Why Save Today?

Stephen R. Burant — The Influence of Russian Tradition on the Political Style of the Soviet Elite

John W. Garver — Chiang Kai-shek's Quest for Soviet Entry into the Sino-Japanese War

Book Reviews

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

HENRY J. ABRAHAM
University of Virginia

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

ALEXANDER DALLIN
Stanford University

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
Harvard University

LEWIS J. EDINGER
Columbia University

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

CHARLES V. HAMILTON
Columbia University

HUGH HECLO
Harvard University

ROBERT L. JERVIS
Columbia University

IRA KATZNELSON
New School for Social Research

EVERETT CARLL LADD
University of Connecticut

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

BURKE MARSHALL
Yale University

ALPHEUS T. MASON
Princeton University

GEORGE E. PETERSON
Urban Institute

JOHN R. PETROCIK
University of California, Los Angeles

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
The Brookings Institution

ROBERT D. REISCHAUER
The Brookings Institution

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
Columbia University

VIRGINIA SAPIRO
University of Wisconsin-Madison

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

GEORGE L. SHERRY
Occidental College

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025-7885. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $25.00 a year. Three years, $58.00. Students, $16.00 a year. Libraries and institutions, $35.00 a year. Foreign postage, $6.00 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and additional mailing offices. Volume 102 Number 2, Summer 1987. Postmaster—Send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Editor
DEMETRIOS CARALEY
Barnard College
Columbia University

Managing Editor
ISABEL M. SCANLAN

Manuscript Editor
JEAN HIGHLAND

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885. For classroom use, however, up to 50 copies of individual articles may be reproduced without specific permission and without charge.

Correct preparation of manuscripts expedites production and therefore contributors must observe the following requirements: Submit manuscripts in triplicate, all copy double-spaced including main text, quotations, and footnotes. Place tables, graphs, and numbered footnotes on separate pages at end of manuscript. Include an abstract of 100 to 200 words that specifies the article's main theme or conclusions. Manuscripts over 40 pages will not be refereed. Authors who want their manuscripts returned must enclose postage.

Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index.* Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci,* the *International Bibliography of Political Science,* and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents, The International Political Science Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Urban Affairs Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life.* Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals, Book Reviews Index,* and *Book Review Digest.* A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

Back issues prior to 1976 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Co., Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $6.25. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Toll free number: 800-521-0600. One copy, $7.50. Additional copies, $2.50 each. Complete issue, $0.35 each plus $0.25 per page over 200 pages. All prices are subject to change.

Copyright © 1987 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Volume 102
Number 2
Summer 1987

Contents

Is Crisis Management Always Possible? RICHARD NED LEBOW 181

Antiterrorism and the Withering of the 1973 War Powers Resolution MICHAEL RUBNER 193

Bureaucracy in the American Constitutional Order FRANCIS E. ROURKE 217

What Was Liberalism in the 1950s? KENT M. BECK 233

In the Shadow of the Cloud: If There's No Tomorrow, Why Save Today? BRUCE RUSSETT MILES LACKEY 259

The Influence of Russian Tradition on the Political Style of the Soviet Elite STEPHEN R. BURANT 273

Chiang Kai-shek's Quest for Soviet Entry into the Sino-Japanese War JOHN W. GARVER 295

Book Reviews 317

Reference Books and Source Materials Received 354

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Steamer, Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court
HENRY J. ABRAHAM 317

Redford and **McCulley,** White House Operations: The Johnson Presidency
JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR. 318

MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy
RICHARD NED LEBOW 319

Pierre, ed., The Conventional Defense of Europe: New Technologies and New Strategies PHILIP W. DYER 321

Furgurson, Hard Right: The Rise of Jesse Helms A. JAMES REICHLEY 323

Peterson, Rabe, and **Wong,** When Federalism Works
RICHARD P. NATHAN 324

Schorr, Common Decency: Domestic Policies after Reagan
ROBERT I. LERMAN 325

Elazar with **Rothman, Schechter, Stein,** and **Zikmund,** Cities of the Prairie Revisited: The Closing of the Metropolitan Frontier
DAVID A. CAPUTO 327

Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Road to Victory, 1941-1945
BARRY MCGILL 328

Isaacson and **Thomas,** The Wise Men, Six Friends and the World They Made: Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy
ROGER HILSMAN 329

Menon, Soviet Power and the Third World FRANCIS FUKUYAMA 330

Conquest, ed., The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future
ALEXANDER J. MOTYL 331

Kamel, The Camp David Accords: A Testimony by Sadat's Foreign Minister
WILLIAM B. QUANDT 332

Dibb, The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower
GORDON B. SMITH 333

Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain; **Gunther, Sani,** and **Shabad,** Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System
THOMAS D. LANCASTER 335

Jeffrey, What's Happening to India? Punjab, Ethnic Conflict, Mrs. Gandhi's Death and the Test for Federalism SANJIB BARUAH 337

Burns, The United States and Germany: A Vital Partnership
GERARD BRAUNTHAL 338

Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization JACK E. REECE 339

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hsiung, Human Rights in East Asia: A Cultural Perspective
JAMES D. SEYMOUR 341

Jockel and **Sokolsky,** Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out
JEAN EDWARD SMITH 342

Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority
W. HOWARD WRIGGINS 343

Rangel, Third World Ideology and Western Reality JAMES PETRAS 344

Smith, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Defender of Liberty and Law
BURKE MARSHALL 346

Lofgren, "Government From Reflection and Choice": Constitutional Essays on War, Foreign Relations, and Federalism C. HERMAN PRITCHETT 347

Rose-Ackerman, The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions
SUSAN V. BERRESFORD 348

Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media
SIDNEY KRAUS 349

Morone and **Woodhouse,** Averting Catastrophe: Strategies for Regulating Risky Technologies DUDLEY J. BURTON 351

Dror, Policymaking Under Adversity PAUL HUTH 352

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

RICHARD NED LEBOW poses the dangers of American perceptions that crisis management can always resolve superpower conflicts and discusses the serious obstacles to peaceful resolution of a future superpower crisis.

MICHAEL RUBNER examines the extent to which the Reagan administration complied with the 1973 War Powers Resolution in the two military encounters with Libya in March and April of 1986. He concludes that both the letter and spirit of the law were violated in the two cases and that the probabilities for securing strict presidential adherence to the law in the future remain low.

FRANCIS E. ROURKE explains why bureaucracy has not become as dominant a force in modern American politics as many expected. But while bureaucracy has not overwhelmed American institutions and has even won grudging acceptance as an indispensable instrument of government today, Rourke argues that the legitimacy of its role still remains suspect.

KENT M. BECK attempts to refute the notion that liberalism in the 1950s represented a decisive break with the New Deal and Fair Deal tradition.

Using a variety of public opinion survey data from many countries, BRUCE RUSSETT and MILES LACKEY examine the proposition that fears of nuclear war are depressing individuals' willingness to save money for the future.

STEPHEN R. BURANT looks at the political style of the Soviet Communist party elite. He finds that this elite, which has committed itself to cultural revolution, continues to display several cultural characteristics whose source is in the prerevolutionary Russian peasantry.

JOHN W. GARVER draws on the recently declassified Chiang Kai-shek archives to examine Chiang's diplomacy toward the Soviets during the first year of the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese war. Garver argues that hope of Soviet entry into that war as an ally was an important factor persuading Chiang to risk war with Japan in 1937.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is Crisis Management Always Possible?

RICHARD NED LEBOW

After the Cuban missile crisis had been resolved, President John F. Kennedy confessed that the odds of the Soviets going to war seemed to him at the time "somewhere between one out of three and even."[1] Kennedy's judgment has remained a matter of controversy among scholars and members of the "Ex Com," the informal working group the President assembled to help him manage the crisis. Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy contend that it may have been a reasonably accurate estimate of the risks at the time.[2] Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, by contrast, argued that the President greatly exaggerated the prospect of war.[3] Even if he did, Kennedy's judgment nevertheless reflects an undisputed political reality: the Cuban missile crisis was, relatively speaking, the closest the superpowers had ever come to nuclear war. It was not an experience that any of the participants looked forward to repeating.

Whether by skill or by circumstance, or both, the superpowers have managed to avoid war-threatening confrontations since. There have been crises, to be sure, but none of them of the magnitude of Cuba. Even the 1973 Middle East crisis, the most serious superpower clash after 1962, was by all accounts a faint echo

[1] Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 705.

[2] Personal communications with Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy.

[3] Dean Acheson, "Homage to Plain Dumb Luck," *Esquire*, February 1969, 44–46, 76–77; Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, *Facing the Brink: An Intimate Study of Crisis Diplomacy* (New York: Scribner's, 1967) 54–55, quoting the official crisis postmortem prepared by Walt Rostow and Paul Nitze in February 1963.

RICHARD NED LEBOW is professor of government and director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University. This article is drawn from his recently published book, *Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of its famous predecessor. The participants never seem to have doubted that it would be resolved by diplomacy.[4]

But our good fortune cannot be taken for granted. As long as the East-West conflict continues, there is always the possibility that one of the superpowers, by design or miscalculation, will do something that the other is unwilling to tolerate. In recent years the probability of a war-threatening crisis may actually have increased as a result of the demise of détente and the revival of the Cold War.

No one knows how such a crisis would occur, although many of us have a favorite scenario. Mine concerns weapons in space. The United States is committed to developing a space-based defense against ballistic missiles, something the Soviets strongly oppose. Moscow has already dropped hints that it is prepared to interfere with the deployment of such a weapons system. Suppose the United States, deeply committed to the project, disregards Soviet warnings and at some point begins to put important components of a missile defense system into space. To show their displeasure, the Soviets orbit space mines in the vicinity. The United States, in turn, sends up a shuttle mission to remove or disarm the threat. But the mines, having been salvage fused (set, that is, to go off if tampered with), explode and kill six astronauts. . . .

The point about this or any other scenario is not its inherent plausibility but the fact that such hypothetical situations are taken seriously by the U.S. foreign policy and defense establishments. Such possible futures form the basis of political-military simulations used for planning and training purposes. The prevalence of these simulations implicitly recognizes that a serious superpower confrontation remains a real if disturbing possibility. So it is important to inquire how such a confrontation could occur, how the superpowers would be likely to respond to it, what our chances are of emerging unscathed, and what, if anything, can be done to enhance them.

The Cuban missile crisis is an obvious starting point for an analysis of this kind. It is our best example of an acute superpower confrontation. However, Cuba is also misleading in important ways. Kennedy's success in avoiding war *and* getting the Russians to back down has encouraged the belief that this is a feasible objective in future confrontations. It has also led responsible political analysts to exaggerate the efficacy of military capability and demonstrations of resolve. In the decade following Cuba, American scholars legitimized both expectations. Political scientists enshrined the need for resolve at the core of widely accepted theories of deterrence and compellence, while decision-making theorists idealized Kennedy's handling of the crisis and held it out as proof that confrontations of this kind could be managed ably and successfully.[5]

[4] See Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 575–90; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), 374–84; and Scott Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985): 99–139.

[5] See, for example, Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, *Controlling the Risks in Cuba*, Adelphi Paper no. 17 (London: Inter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even without these questions of interpretation there would be important structural differences between Cuba and any future superpower crisis of the same magnitude. These differences would make such a crisis very much more difficult to resolve. In 1962 the United States had overwhelming nuclear superiority and conventional superiority in the Caribbean, the arena of the confrontation. Cuba was all one-sided in terms of military escalation. The United States brought its nuclear and conventional forces up to a high level of readiness; the Strategic Air Command was put on Defense Condition II, the only time any component of U.S. forces has ever been ordered to go to this level of readiness.[6] The Soviet Union, by contrast, refrained from any buildup, perhaps because of its disadvantage and the fear that a strategic alert on its part could trigger American preemption. But a future crisis will take place in an environment of strategic parity. The Soviets may be the ones to have the conventional advantage next time, depending on where the crisis occurs. If they do, they might not feel as constrained as in Cuba. A Soviet alert, conventional or nuclear, matching or matched by an American alert, would make any crisis more acute and correspondingly difficult to resolve. It would also make it more difficult to control.

Cuba took place in a much less sophisticated institutional environment. Many communication links were entirely ad hoc, the number of players was relatively small, and their roles were often undefined. Strategic weapons, mostly bombers, were slow and recallable. In the years since, the command and control systems of both superpowers have grown enormously in size and complexity. They have also become tightly coupled. Strategic weapons put more stress on these systems. They are capable of striking the adversary's political leadership and strategic forces in a matter of minutes instead of hours. They are also less tolerant of error, because missiles, unlike bombers, cannot be recalled. All of these developments mean less tolerance for the kinds of incidents and mishaps that plagued Kennedy's handling of Cuba. But there is reason to believe that the organizational complexity of the 1980s nevertheless makes mishaps more rather than less likely.

Today's strategic environment requires a significant shift in our ways of thinking about international crises. Leaders must show more profile and less courage. They must be less concerned with "winning" and more concerned with controlling crises, because the principal danger is no longer that the adversary will get his way but that one or both of the protagonists will set in motion a chain of events that will lead to an undesired and catastrophic war. But a conceptual shift of this kind has not occurred. Political leaders and their advisers still give every indication of believing that crisis management consists of controllable and reversible steps up a ladder of escalation, steps taken to moderate an adversary's behavior. Even as well-

---

national Institute of Strategic Studies, 1965); and Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

[6] U.S. alerting procedure and U.S. and Soviet military preparations during the Cuban missile crisis are discussed in detail in Richard Ned Lebow, *Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

known a "dove" as Edmund Muskie, who played the president in a nationally televised crisis game in 1983, demonstrated his willingness to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons and, presumably, to carry through on the threat if necessary. This is precisely the kind of behavior which, whether by accident or design, increases the likelihood of war.

This dangerous political orientation is complemented by an equally fruitless and counterproductive technical approach to the problems of crisis management. Crisis management in the United States bears a disturbing resemblance to the ancient art of alchemy. Alchemists of old sought to transmute base elements into gold by simple chemistry and magical incantation. They failed because their quest was based on a false premise; elements cannot be transmuted by chemical processes. The transmutation of metals requires alteration of their nuclear structure, something that has become technically feasible only in the last fifty years. Even today, it requires vast amounts of money and energy to produce even the tiniest amount of a heavy element.

Government officials, and many academic researchers, have embarked upon a similarly fruitless quest for the secret keys to nuclear crisis management. Convinced, as were the alchemists before them, that their goal is attainable, they search for the modern day equivalent of the philosopher's stone: the organizational structures and decision-making techniques that will transmute the dark specter of nuclear destruction into the glitter of national security. Once again, the task is hopeless. Good crisis management cannot be fabricated from communication nodes, computer software, and special action groups. It requires fundamental changes in the force structures, the doctrines, and the target sets that define contemporary nuclear strategy. Like transmutation, crisis stability is theoretically possible, but for the foreseeable future it lies beyond the power of political alchemists.

Nuclear crisis management may be an oxymoron, but this does not mean that the behavior of leaders is irrelevant to what happens in crises—only that a narrow focus on the techniques and technology of crisis management is unlikely to result in significantly improved performance. Good decision making is associated with certain underlying conditions. The most important of these are a relatively open decision-making environment, a consensus within the policy-making elite with regard to fundamental political values and institutional procedures, and freedom of the kinds of domestic political pressures which compel leaders to pursue risky foreign policies. Good decision making in crisis also demands that leaders have a working knowledge of the details of military planning and operations. None of these conditions can be created by fiat while a crisis is unfolding. If they exist at all, they are the product of extensive precrisis efforts that leaders initiate to educate themselves and to build an environment conducive to vigilant information processing and responsive policy implementation. All too often, success in this regard depends on fortuitous historical and political circumstances over which leaders have relatively little control.[7]

[7] See Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). For other characterizations of good decision-making environ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A shift is also required, therefore, in the focus of contemporary research and planning for crisis management. Too often, such efforts are directed at improving only the external environment in which policy makers operate, by providing greater or more rapid access to key information and individuals. Even those efforts which focus on the actual process of decision making and implementation tend to limit their horizons to the course of the crisis itself. By doing so, however, they look only at the tip of the proverbial iceberg. How a political system performs in crisis is a function of personal, group, institutional, and cultural patterns and interactions that were established long before the onset of the crisis. The most pressing task for those who study crisis management, therefore, is to delineate more clearly the precise nature of the links between performance and these underlying factors. Only then can really productive efforts be made to improve the quality of decision making.

We must also recognize that good decision making is not the same thing as successful decision making. The two are related but not synonymous; a host of other conditions also affect crisis outcomes. Among the most important are the degree of concern of leaders on both sides to avoid war, the latitude leaders have to explore a wide range of possible settlements, the time pressures they confront, the nature, gravity and compatibility of the issues at stake, and the level of military escalation and the threat of war associated with it. Any one of these conditions can compel leaders to settle for a less than favorable outcome or prevent resolution of the crisis altogether—whatever officials on both sides might desire.

Stress, organization complexity, and time pressure are likely to characterize any future superpower confrontation. They will certainly make good decision making essential—but at the same time, it will be less of a determinant of the outcome. The reason for this apparent contradiction lies in the particular strategic, political and psychological factors that would shape superpower interactions. Those factors will make it very difficult for leaders to resolve such a confrontation *regardless* of their skill and mutual commitments to avoid war.

This is not the first article to expound the dangers of superpower crises and some of the structural reasons for it. Most of these studies have emphasized the critical vulnerability of strategic command and control and the unsettling dilemma this creates for leaders.[8] This critical aspect of nuclear strategy has been until quite recently neglected. In 1981, Desmond Ball wrote the first work to describe the architecture of the U.S. strategic command, control, and communication (C^3) system and to demonstrate its extreme vulnerability to sabotage and nuclear attack. Since

---

ments, see Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink*, rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 260–71; and Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980), 10.

[8] John Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," *Foreign Policy* 45 (Winter 1981–82): 16–28; Desmond Ball, *Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?* Adelphi Paper no. 169 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981); Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce G. Blair, *Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

then Bruce Blair has documented the vulnerability of C^3 to Soviet attack from the early 1960s to the present day. Both authors wanted to influence strategic policy. By demonstrating the vulnerability of American C^3 to nuclear assault, Ball hoped to demonstrate the absurdity of controlled, protracted nuclear war, a capability deemed essential by current U.S. strategic doctrine. Blair had an even more far-reaching objective in mind: he sought to shift American attention away from its decades-old fixation on the possible vulnerability of its strategic forces to the greater and more significant vulnerability of the command and control of those forces. He thereby hoped to win support for extensive measures to enhance the survivability of C^3.

John Steinbruner and Paul Bracken have been more concerned with the implications of C^3 vulnerability for war-prevention in crisis. In an article published in 1981, Steinbruner drew attention to one of the policy dilemmas created by C^3 vulnerability, and in particular by the vulnerability of the political leadership to destruction at the outset of hostilities. If policy makers feared they might not be able to retaliate to nuclear attack, he argued, they would have a strong incentive to shoot first in circumstances where nuclear war appeared likely. Bracken highlighted another destabilizing aspect of contemporary command and control: the difficulty of controlling nuclear forces once alerted, and the risk of accidental war that such alerts accordingly entail. In his 1983 study he described the evolution and growing complexity of U.S. strategic C^3. Drawing upon insights from organization theory, Bracken warned that the American-Soviet strategic warning and response systems had a propensity to perform in crisis situations in unanticipated and possibly catastrophic ways.

These several works have based their analyses on an examination of the physical machinery and organizational structure of American command and control. They go on to describe strategic imperatives these give rise to and the ways in which such imperatives could hinder resolution of a crisis. Studies of this kind constitute an important first step toward understanding the causes of crisis instability. It would be wrong, however, to suppose that strategic problems can be entirely, or even best, understood in terms of engineering or organizational criteria. There is more to command and control than its technical aspects and more to crisis management than command and control. Like all strategic issues, crisis management has critically important political and psychological dimensions. To date, these remain largely unexplored.

At least some of the "strategic realities" responsible for crisis stability are as much political and conceptual as they are structural. The prince aptly opines in *Hamlet* that "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so." This is to a marked degree true of nuclear strategy. Strategic force vulnerability is an obvious case in point. Minuteman vulnerability has not decreased one iota in recent years; presumably it has become worse as Soviet missiles have improved their accuracy. But the problem has receded in importance, to a large degree because of the successful effort of the Scowcroft Commission in 1983 to disparage its strategic significance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An example more specific to the realm of crisis concerns the attractiveness of preemption in a confrontation in which war appears imminent. A thorough examination of the pros and cons of preemption reveals that there are no circumstances in which preemption is an advisable policy. Both the fear that retaliation would be impossible and the advantages that preemption, some allege, confers can be shown to be greatly exaggerated. Conversely, faulty and incomplete understanding of the problems of loss of control and miscalculated escalation has led strategists in and out of government to underestimate the threats these problems would pose to crisis resolution.

There are things that can be done to reduce crisis instability, and with it the likelihood of war. Better understanding of the dynamics of crisis could reduce the attractiveness of preemption and of the kinds of policies that court loss of control or miscalculated escalation. It could also sensitize policy makers to the need to prepare themselves and their subordinates to cope with the possibly debilitating stress that superpower nuclear crisis would generate. My primary goal is to encourage a conceptual shift in thinking about the nature of crisis and the appropriate means of coping with it.

The policy recommendations that grow out of my analysis are not offered as any kind of panacea. There are important structural causes of crisis instability that would be not the least bit affected if both superpowers were to adopt more enlightened approaches to crisis. The threat to peace by crisis instability can be overcome only by far-reaching changes in force structure, strategic doctrine, and targeting policy—the structural factors primarily responsible for the problem. Unfortunately, the current political climate does not appear conducive to the kinds of measures, unilateral or negotiated, that crisis stability would require. All the more reason, then—at least for the time being—to focus attention on conceptual aspects of the problem which may be more amenable to influence.

The Causes of War

No serious student of strategy believes that World War III will start as a gratuitous act of nuclear aggression.[9] Only in paperback adventures does the leader of one of the superpowers wake up one morning, decide that the correlation of forces is highly favorable, and give the order to push the button.[10] The incredible destruction that nuclear war would bring about, even to the side that struck first, is far too great to warrant its consideration as a rational act of policy. Leaders

[9] Even Richard Pipes, strategic Cassandra *par excellence*, does not believe that World War III would begin this way. He told Michael Getler of the *Washington Post*: "I personally do not believe that the Soviet Union would launch a preemptive [*sic*] nuclear strike against the United States out of the blue, no matter what the balance of power is. I just don't think that is in the cards." 22 July 1982.

[10] Douglas Terman, *First Strike* (New York: Pocket Books, 1980), is typical of this genre. The Soviets continually feed all information pertaining to the relative military strength of the superpowers into a computer that determines the numerical correlation of forces between them. The evil masters of the Kremlin are committed to launching a first strike when they achieve a given level of advantage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on both sides know this. So do their national security advisers and military establishments. They are all in accord that nuclear war would constitute the greatest disaster in the history of mankind.

Nor is a superpower nuclear war likely to come about as the result of an accident, an act of terrorism, or the efforts of a third party to start one. The prospect of an accidental launch when forces are on day-to-day alert is exceedingly remote. Nuclear terrorism is an even more unrealistic scenario. Despite the appeal the subject has for popular fiction writers, nuclear weapons and delivery systems are not easy objects to steal. Terrorists who overcame this basic hurdle would still have to find some way of arming the weapons in the absence of the necessary code. Even if they managed to do so, it is unclear how an act of nuclear terrorism would prompt one superpower to attack the other.

Nuclear war orchestrated by a third party also seems improbable, although the idea has from time to time aroused the concern of the superpowers.[11] The usual scenario involves a nuclear attack on one superpower by another power that attempts to make the attack appear the work of the second superpower. The deception would be difficult to achieve, however, because the United States and the Soviet Union can track incoming reentry vehicles (RVs) and bombers and determine where they came from. A better possibility would be a submarine launched missile, but even that would be likely to have a telltale MIRV separation pattern. Moreover, a limited nuclear attack, regardless of what form it took, would be certain to arouse suspicions because it is the very last thing that either superpower expects the other to do.

If there is a World War III, it is most likely to be the result of either a miscalculation or an act of desperation in a crisis or conventional war. The paradigm of such a situation is 1914. World War I was brought about more by accident than by design; it was the largely unanticipated outcome of a series of amplifying miscalculations by Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and Britain. It might have been prevented by a greater realization on the part of European leaders of the consequences of mobilization. At the same time, we would be wrong to suppose that the war was entirely attributable to poor leadership; more astute statesmen would also have found it difficult to control the cascading events of July 1914. The domestic political situation of several of the powers generated strong pressures in the direction of war while their elaborate military plans imposed severe constraints on the power and imagination of leaders.

Although there are important differences between 1914 and today, the origins of World War I hold significant lessons for hawks and doves alike. For hawks, the Great War offers insight into how and why an adversary can be tempted to exploit his perceived political-military advantages. The crisis began as an attempt by Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany, to use the assassination of Archduke

[11] H. R. Haldeman, *The Ends of Power* (New York: Times Books, 1978), 90, reports that during the SALT negotiations the Soviets expressed concern that China would be tempted to try to provoke a nuclear war between the superpowers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Franz Ferdinand as a pretext for destroying Serbia. German and Austrian leaders expected that Russia, Serbia's principal backer, would stand aside rather than confront their combined military might. If Russia nevertheless entered the fray, they were convinced that France, Russia's ally, would remain neutral. The July crisis was therefore envisaged as the catalyst for a localized Balkan war.

In point of fact, Germany and Austria made a grievous miscalculation. Not only did Russia back Serbia to the hilt, but France proved steadfast in its support of Russia. Because of this, Austria's démarche triggered a European war. Germany, much to its horror, had to fight Britain as well as Russia and France, because of its ill-advised invasion of Belgium. For doves, 1914 accordingly sheds light on how attempts at coercion can have unforeseen and disastrous consequences.

Better understanding of the dynamics behind both brinkmanship and miscalculation would help us manage adversarial relationships and the conflicts they spawn in a more sophisticated and successful manner. One way to do this would be to explore the role of both phenomena in 1914 in an attempt to mine that case for more widely applicable lessons of conflict management. As I have previously done with regard to brinkmanship, I focus here on miscalculation and its causes.

The first causal sequence to war is *preemption*. It occurs when one of the protagonists in a crisis goes to war because its leaders believe that their adversary is on the verge of doing so. When hostilities appear unavoidable, preemption can be an attractive option if it is believed that striking first will confer a significant or even decisive advantage. It is entirely conceivable that mutual recognition of this asymmetry could prompt one or other of the protagonists to go to war even though both would prefer to keep the peace. Thomas Schelling has called this "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack." He reasons:

> If surprise carries an advantage, it is worthwhile to avert it by striking first. Fear that the other may be about to strike in the mistaken belief that we are about to strike gives us a motive for striking, and so justifies the other's motive. . . . It looks as though a modest temptation on each side to sneak in a first blow—a temptation too small by itself to motivate an attack—might become compounded through a process of interacting expectations, with additional motive for attack being produced by successive cycles of "He thinks we think he thinks we think . . . he thinks we think he'll attack; so he thinks we shall; so he will; so we must."[12]

Until quite recently, most of the literature conceived of crisis stability in terms essentially similar to Schelling's.[13] Analyses of this kind for the most part ignored

[12] Early theoretical treatments of preemption include Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 207–54, and *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 221–48; Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), 97–114. The quotation is from *Strategy of Conflict*, 207. Schelling's view of this problem has not changed. In a recent article, "Confidence in Crisis," *International Security* 8 (Spring 1984): 55–66, he asserts that "the greatest danger in a nuclear crisis is the potential self-fulfilling prophecy that mutual suspicion has reached an intolerable level at which preemptive action is inevitable."

[13] Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981),

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the possibility that war could break out in the absence of any deliberate decisions by leaders on either side to fight it. They failed to consider a second sequence to war, *loss of control.*

Loss of control can take a variety of forms and can have diverse causes. It can result from fragmented political authority, domestic pressures that leaders are powerless to resist, or an institutional malfunction or breakdown. It can also be the inadvertent and unanticipated outcome of military preparations taken to protect oneself in a crisis or to convey resolve to an adversary. As 1914 revealed, interacting organizational routines can lead to war in a quasi-mechanical manner. Luigi Albertini and A. J. P. Taylor, two of the eminent historians of that conflict, considered this to have been one of its most important proximate causes. Political leaders, they argued, in effect "made" decisions for war without realizing at the time that they were doing so.[14]

Contemporary organizational theorists argue that World War III could start in the same way. Paul Bracken warns that an amplifying feedback loop could develop between the warning and response systems of the superpowers as a result of any significant military preparations by either one of them. Suppose the United States went on strategic alert in order to demonstrate resolve in a crisis; "the Russians would monitor some of the changes taking place in American monitoring operations and in reaction might speed their preparations for attack. America might respond in kind. What started as mere brinkmanship," Bracken fears, "might end in nuclear war."[15]

A third sequence to war is *miscalculated escalation*, when one of the adversaries crosses the other's threshold to war in the false expectation that his action will be tolerated. The Russian mobilization is a classic example. In the opinion of most historians, it was the step that made war all but unavoidable. However, Russian political leaders mobilized in 1914 in the belief that mobilization would be a deterrent to war. The American decision to invade and occupy North Korea in 1950, Nasser's remilitarization of the Sinai in 1967, and Argentina's occupation of the Falklands in 1982 have also been described as instances of miscalculated escalation.[16] In each of these confrontations, the initiator took action unlikely, he thought,

---

163–65, the most highly respected work of its kind, limits its discussion of crisis stability entirely to an analysis of the pressures for preemption.

[14] Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 3 vols., trans. Isabella M. Massey (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 2: 253; A.J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848–1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 444. The most extreme claim for the role of loss of control in bringing about World War I is F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 296, who argues that "the dice had been set rolling for all the Powers well before Russia mobilized. . . . All the evidence goes to show that the beginning of the crisis, which has been studied so largely with a view to discovering and distributing human responsibility, was one of those moments in history when events passed beyond men's control."

[15] Quoted in W. J. Broad, "Experts Say Satellites Can Detect Soviet War Steps," *New York Times*, 25 January 1985. For a fuller treatment of the subject see Bracken's pathbreaking *Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.*

[16] In the case of Korea, scholarly opinion is nearly unanimous. See for example, Allen S. Whiting,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1

Possible paths to war in crisis



to provoke a violent response. All three led to war. Little of a theoretical nature has been written about the phenomenon of miscalculated escalation, even though it is probably the most important cause of inadvertent war.

These three sequences to war are conceptually distinct. Any of them can be described separately but to demonstrate their practical effect, they must be analyzed in conjunction with another. The relevant analogy here is to epidemics, which also have multiple and interrelated causes. Among the most important of these are the presence of a pathogen, a mechanism for its spread among humans, and low human resistance because of the absence of antibodies or the debilitated state of the population. Sanitary conditions and the nature and rapidity of any institutional response will also influence the progress of the disease. It is the totality of these conditions which determine whether the disease becomes an epidemic.

So it is with crisis; the collective interaction of the three causal sequences, each with its own individual probability, determines whether war breaks out (see Figure 1). In 1914, for example, Russia's miscalculated escalation prompted Germany's decision to preempt. Loss of control, in turn, was a cause contributing both to Russia's miscalculated escalation and to Germany's preemption.

Efforts to minimize the risk of war in crisis are also interrelated. Preemption, loss of control, and miscalculated escalation have some distinctive but also some common causes. Civilian ignorance of war plans, to cite one example, can be shown to contribute to all three. Successful efforts to educate political leaders about the

---

China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960); Martin Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back" in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), 569–642; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 184–234; Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, 148–228. With regard to 1967, opinion is divided. Some analysts of the crisis believe that Nasser was intent on war from the outset. See, for example, Theodore Draper, *Israel and World Politics: Roots of the Third Arab-Israeli War* (New York: Viking, 1967), 70–82, who argues that Nasser deliberately set up a situation that he knew would compel Israel to attack. More prevalent is the view that Nasser was not out to provoke a war but misjudged Israel's response; he may also have lost control over events to domestic opinion after he expelled the United Nations Emergency Force from the Sinai. So argues Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948–1967* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), 271–302; and Walter Laqueur, *The Road to War: The Origin and Aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Conflict of 1967–68* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 122–25, 254–72. On the Falklands war, see Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War" in Robert Jervis, Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 89–124.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

process of escalation and the details of military alerts would constitute an important step toward reducing the likelihood that some future superpower crisis will erupt into war. There are other measures that would have a similar ameliorating effect across the board.

Unfortunately, some of the most important ways of preventing particular sequences to war would also make other sequences more likely. This is true of many measures designed to cope with preemption or loss of control. We can reduce pressure to preempt in a crisis, for example, by reliance on a launch-on-warning (LOW) capability, predelegation of launch authority, or prepackaged targeting options to be executed automatically in response to a breakdown in the chain of command. But all three policies court loss of control; they increase the likelihood that war will start in circumstances in which a president or premier remains committed to keeping the peace.

Many measures designed to reduce the chances of loss of control entail similar trade-offs. The installation of Permissive Action Links—physical locks to prevent weapons aboard bombers and missiles from being armed in the absence of an Emergency Action Message from the National Command Authority—and the probable decision of any president to remain in Washington throughout a crisis, all make retaliation more difficult to carry out. Uncertainty about the nation's ability to respond to nuclear attack in turn generates pressure to preempt once war appears unavoidable.

Clearly, any comprehensive attempt to build greater crisis stability involves difficult trade-offs. Before decisions can be made, however, we must know more about the causes and mechanisms of each sequence to war, the relative danger that each would pose in a future crisis, and the likely impact upon all three sequences of any measure designed to reduce the chances that any one of them will lead to war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Antiterrorism and the Withering of the 1973 War Powers Resolution

MICHAEL RUBNER

In an article published in *Foreign Affairs* shortly before his untimely death, former Senator Jacob K. Javits lauded the enactment of the War Powers Resolution, because "it was the first legislation in our history to establish a statutory framework in which Congress and the president could function so as to give meaning to the constitutional authority over war."[1] Passed over President Richard Nixon's veto on 7 November 1973, the law contains various procedures to insure that both the legislative and executive branches participate in decisions that may involve the United States in war or hostilities.[2]

Specifically, Section 3 of the resolution stipulates that "The President in *every possible instance* shall consult with Congress *before* introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."[3] Under Section 4(a)(1), the president must submit to the speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate within forty-eight hours a written report that identifies the circumstances compelling the deployment of armed forces, the constitutional and legislative authority under which such deployment is taking place, and the estimated scope and duration of the military involvement. Section 5(b) stipulates that within

[1] Jacob K. Javits, "War Powers Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Fall 1985): 130.

[2] Sec. 2(a), Public Law 93-148. The full text of the War Powers Resolution is reproduced in Robert F. Turner, *The War Powers Resolution: Its Implementation in Theory and Practice* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1983), 143-147.

[3] Ibid., 143. (Emphasis added.)

MICHAEL RUBNER is professor in the international relations program at James Madison College, Michigan State University. A specialist in American foreign policy formulation, his latest book is *The Palestinian Problem and United States Policy* (with Bruce Kuniholm).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sixty days after submission of the initial report, the president must terminate deployment of the U.S. forces, unless Congress had declared war or has specifically authorized such deployment, extended the sixty-day period by law, or is unable to meet as a result of an attack on the United States. The sixty-day period may be extended up to thirty additional days if the president determines and certifies to Congress in writing that such extension is necessary for the safe and prompt removal of troops. The president must terminate such deployment at any time if Congress so directs him by concurrent resolution, which is not subject to a presidential veto.

While arguing that the aim of the legislation fully accords with the Founders' intent to check and balance the president's authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces with the congressional power to declare war, Javits noted with regret that Congress has been very reluctant to assert its constitutional and legal prerogatives following enactment of the 1973 resolution. Writing shortly after the release of forty Americans who had been held as hostages by terrorists in Beirut, the late senator viewed the failure of Congress to insist on strict enforcement of the law with particular alarm because President Reagan was at the time "under extraordinary pressure to take action—some kind, any kind—that will validate the effectiveness of U.S. power to protect our citizens in the world beyond our shores." Rejecting the notion that we are "citizens of a republic in which the chief executive may risk American lives at any time, at any place on earth, at his own discretion," Javits exhorted Congress to "find the will to bring the people to conscious and active support of the War Powers Resolution" and to strengthen the legislation that he had helped to shape while serving as key member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[4]

These views have been challenged by officials in the executive branch and by some congressional leaders who have expressed serious doubts about the wisdom and constitutionality of various parts of the War Powers Resolution and about its applicability to new situations involving the use of U.S. forces that were neither contemplated nor foreseen at the time of its adoption. For example, testifying before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, State Department Legal Adviser Abraham D. Sofaer claimed that the law was not meant to apply to deployment of "antiterrorist units, where operations of a traditional military character are not contemplated and where no confrontation is expected between our units and forces of another state."[5] He also asserted that the 1973 resolution was not intended to require prior consultations in situations involving the conduct of American military maneuvers in international waters or airspace, even if such exercises result in a military confrontation with another state.[6] While conceding that deployment of U.S. forces against another state in retaliation against its sponsorship of terrorist

[4] Javits, "War Powers Reconsidered," 132, 139.

[5] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "The War Powers Resolution and Antiterrorist Operations," *Current Policy*, no. 832 (Washington, D.C., 1986), 2.

[6] Ibid., 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actions against Americans clearly falls within the consultation and reporting provisions of the law, Sofaer nevertheless emphasized that "in some instances, the President might have to act without prior consultations."[7]

In a similar vein, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R.-Kans.) has argued recently that when it drafted, debated, and enacted the War Powers Resolution, Congress had been concerned primarily about ensuring for itself a role in decisions involving conventional warfare, as it failed to anticipate the emergence of terrorism as a state-sponsored form of aggression against U.S. citizens, both military and civilian.[8] Because it was envisioned as a framework for only those situations involving an American response to attacks against U.S. territory or armed forces, but not against U.S. citizens, the 1973 law, according to Dole, unwisely deprived the president of the authority to initiate preemptive and retaliatory military strikes against suspected sources of terrorism without, or prior to, congressional authorization. Furthermore, in requiring prior consultations with Congress, drafters of the legislation allegedly underestimated the danger of leaks regarding planned military responses, nor did they pay sufficient heed to the possibility that reports about the occurrence of consultations might in and of themselves alert an adversary to an impending American counterterrorist strike. Dole also insists that the forty-eight-hour reporting requirement imposes on the president an unrealistic time frame that ensures transmission of an incomplete report. Thus, in marked contrast to Javits, Senator Dole has stressed the need for new legislation that would supersede the 1973 War Powers Resolution in those instances when the president might use or contemplate deployment of American military forces to deal with terrorism. In his judgment, "We do not fight our military adversaries with 1973 weapons. Let us not try to cope with our terrorist adversaries hobbled by restrictions built into 1973 laws. Let's give the President the authority, the flexibility and—above all else—the support he needs in 1986 to fight this grave threat to our Nation and our people."[9]

The debate between the defenders and critics of the law assumed a concrete dimension and greater importance in the wake of the two military confrontations between American and Libyan forces in late March and mid-April 1986. This article addresses three questions: To what extent did the Reagan administration comply with the requirements stipulated in the War Powers Resolution when it resorted to the use of military force in these two instances? How did Congress respond to the administration's interpretations of its obligations under the 1973 law? What can be learned from these episodes about the utility of the War Powers Resolution as a vehicle for ensuring legislative participation in future decisions involving deployment of American forces in the ongoing battle against international terrorism? By raising these issues in the aftermath of the American-Libyan clashes, we con-

[7] Ibid.

[8] Dole's speech on terrorism and the War Powers Resolution may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 30 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:5041–5042.

[9] Ibid., 5042.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

firm Senator Javits's prescient observation that "there can be no more critical, no more agonizingly difficult political vantage point from which to examine the question of who makes war."[10]

Operation "Prairie Fire"

The seeds for the military confrontation between American and Libyan forces in March 1986 were sown in October 1973, when Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi claimed as Libyan territorial waters the 150,000 square miles of the Gulf of Sidra south of the 32nd parallel. The newly declared boundary or so-called "Line of Death," extending approximately 90–150 miles north of the Libyan coast, has never been recognized by the United States and most other nations, because it well exceeds the normally accepted twelve nautical mile limit. In order to challenge the Libyan claim and to preserve freedom of navigation in what is widely regarded as international waters, American forces conducted eighteen naval exercises near the disputed Gulf between 1981 and early 1986. Seven of these operations took place inside the "Line of Death," and in one instance in August 1981 two Libyan fighter planes fired missiles at two U.S. F-14s in an area approximately sixty miles north of the Libyan coast. In the ensuing encounter, the two Libyan SU-22s were shot down.[11]

After assembling in the Mediterranean a massive naval task force that included thirty ships carrying nearly 26,000 troops, the Pentagon disclosed on 21 March 1986 that the navy intended to fly combat aircraft on routine training exercises over the Gulf of Sidra during a ten-day period beginning the following day.[12] During the night and early morning hours on 23–24 March, three American vessels and several aircraft taking off from carriers crossed the "Line of Death" to a point within forty miles of the Libyan coast, and the Libyans responded by launching six long-range surface-to-air missiles against U.S. reconnaissance planes, all of which missed their targets.[13] In retaliation against the Libyan attack that was described in a 24 March White House statement as "entirely unprovoked and beyond the bounds of normal international conduct,"[14] American planes fired Harpoon antiship missiles that eventually destroyed two Libyan patrol boats and launched two separate attacks with HARM missiles against the Libyan radar-guided missile installation at Surt, taking it out of action temporarily.

On 27 March, five days before the previously announced end of the exercise,

[10] Javits, "War Powers Reconsidered," 131.

[11] Pat Towell, "Military Strikes Against Libya Receive Capitol Hill Support," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 March 1986, 701.

[12] *New York Times*, 22 March 1986.

[13] Accounts of the military clashes in the Gulf of Sidra may be found in Richard Stengel, "Sailing in Harm's Way," *Time*, 7 April 1986, 16–24; Russell Watson, "Kaddafi's Crusade," *Newsweek*, 7 April 1986, 20–24; and *New York Times*, 25–27 March 1986.

[14] "White House Statement, 24 March, 1986," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of 31 March, 1986*. Reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 86 (May 1986): 76–77.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Pentagon declared that the naval task force had completed its maneuvers in the gulf and that it had moved north of the Sidra region.[15] The augmented Sixth Fleet armada began dispersing in the Mediterranean on 2 April.[16] While U.S. forces incurred neither damage nor casualties, Operation "Prairie Fire" inflicted a heavy toll on the Libyans. According to American estimates, thirty-eight Libyan sailors were killed in the confrontations.[17] However, Brigadier Abu-Bakr Yunis, the commander-in-chief of the Libyan armed forces, reportedly acknowledged that fifty-six Libyans had been killed in the Sidra fighting.[18]

Although Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution requires the president to consult with Congress whenever possible *before* introducing U.S. forces into hostilities or "into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," there is no evidence that the Reagan administration made any effort to solicit congressional advice and opinions prior to the deployment of troops in the Gulf of Sidra. According to one report, following a National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 14 March 1986, during which the decision to go ahead with "Prairie Fire" had been reached, National Security Adviser (NSA) John Poindexter had agreed to brief congressional leaders on the impending operation. However, he failed to follow through, allegedly because the matter "slipped his mind."[19] The eventual briefing thus took place on 24 March, *after* the initial wave of attacks against Libyan vessels and the radar installation at Surt, when House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D.-Mass.), House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R.-Ill.), Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D.-W. Va.), and Senate President Pro Tempore Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.) were summoned to the White House to be informed of the latest developments.[20]

In a pattern reminiscent of the decision to invade Grenada,[21] the available evidence suggests that in this instance the Reagan administration again violated both the spirit and letter of Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution. It should be recalled that during debate on the 1973 resolution, the House Foreign Affairs Committee unequivocally rejected the idea that consultation was equivalent to mere

[15] *New York Times*, 28 March 1986.

[16] *New York Times*, 3 April 1986.

[17] Since no authoritative figures have been released by the Libyan or U.S. governments, the number of casualties can only be estimated. On 27 March, Spanish officials acknowledged that a Spanish vessel had picked up sixteen Libyan survivors at sea. Since each of the two Libyan patrol boats sunk by the United States is believed to have carried crews of twenty-seven, it was initially believed that thirty-eight Libyans lost their lives. *New York Times*, 29 March 1986. However, a memorial roster posted in the Benghazi naval barracks listed seventy-two drowned sailors and some Libyan naval officials have acknowledged an even higher number of casualties. See Edward Schumacher, "The United States and Libya," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Winter 1986-87): 335.

[18] *New York Times*, 9 April 1986.

[19] Watson, "Kaddafi's Crusade," 24.

[20] Stengel, "Sailing in Harm's Way," 20.

[21] The administration's failure to consult Congress before the 1983 invasion of Grenada is described in Michael Rubner, "The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada," *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (Winter 1985–86): 630–636.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transmission of information. In its 1973 report, the committee clarified that "consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a problem and that members of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice and opinions."[22] Furthermore, since the explicit intent of the law is to secure the collective judgment of both Congress and the president in decisions involving the introduction of U.S. troops into hostilities, it cannot be reasonably argued that a mere post-facto briefing qualifies as applying the judgment of Congress to such decision.

In defense of the Reagan administration, it might be argued that the wording requiring consultation "in every possible instance" was deliberately included in Section 3 in order to give the president maximum flexibility with respect to the feasibility, form, and timing of consultation with Congress. Indeed, it has been claimed that the physical inability to communicate with key legislators, the need for an immediate reaction to an emergency, and the danger that sensitive information would be leaked might render prior consultation with Congress impossible or undesirable and that the ultimate decision in such cases ought to rest with the president.[23] However, none of the circumstances that might have reasonably recused President Reagan from the obligation to consult Congress was present in the case at hand.

First, Congress was in session in March 1986 and legislative leaders were physically available in Washington for meetings with the President and his aides. Furthermore, since the final decision to undertake the naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra had been made more than one full week before it was actually implemented, there can be no doubt whatsoever that there had been ample opportunity and sufficient time for meaningful executive-legislative deliberations before the onset of Libyan-American military encounters on 24 March. In addition, it is also clear that the administration's fears about leakage of secret information were limited and superseded by concerns that a U.S.-Libyan clash in the gulf might escalate to a more perilous confrontation between the superpowers. Such concerns account for the willingness of the White House to inform Moscow of its military moves in advance while Congress was being kept completely in the dark. According to two sources, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Washington was summoned to the State Department before American aircraft had launched their initial strike against the radar base at Surt and was provided with information that convinced the Soviets to remove their military advisers from the installation prior to the attack.[24] The transmission of secret American plans to the Russians may have occurred even earlier in the planning process. According to one U.S. Navy spokesman, "we told

[22] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. House Rep. 287, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973. Cited in Robert Zutz, "The Recapture of the S.S. *Mayaguez*: Failure of the Consultation Clause of the War Powers Resolution," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 8 (Winter 1976): 468.

[23] John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Dilemma*, 3d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 69–70. See also Zutz, "Recapture of S.S. *Mayaguez*," 465.

[24] *New York Times*, 3 April 1986; Watson, "Kaddafi's Crusade," 24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviets explicitly what we intended to do, including transiting below the 32nd parallel. They did not have to read between the lines."[25] It thus appears that in the administration's curious judgment, the Kremlin could, and Congress could not be entrusted with highly sensitive details about American military moves against Libya.

Anticipating criticism against its bypassing of Congress, the White House sought in advance the views of legal experts about the applicability of the War Powers Resolution to the conduct of peaceful and lawful naval exercises that result in a hostile response. However, in a 28 March letter to the House Foreign Affairs Committee signed by presidential assistant William L. Ball III, the administration rejected the claim that "the resolution was intended to require consultation before conducting naval maneuvers in international waters or air space" because "such operations did not place United States forces into hostilities or into a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities was clearly indicated by the circumstances."[26] The same argument was advanced by State Department Legal Adviser Abraham D. Sofaer in congressional hearings on 29 April 1986, when he asserted:

> . . . we have every right to expect that neither Libya nor any other country will take hostile action against U.S. forces while they are lawfully in and over areas of the high seas. The threat of a possible hostile response is not sufficient to trigger the consultation requirement of section 3, which refers only to actual hostilities and to situations in which imminent involvement in hostilities is "clearly indicated" by the circumstances.[27]

However, the administration's central claim that American forces were not likely to encounter hostilities upon entering the Gulf of Sidra is strongly refuted by overwhelming evidence that the naval exercise had been deliberately planned by the White House to contrive a situation in which deployment of U.S. troops in battle would be not only "imminent" but a virtual certainty.

The record indicates that secret planning to engage Libyan forces in the Gulf of Sidra began in early January 1986, after U.S. intelligence agencies had uncovered indirect links between Libya and the terrorist massacres at the Rome and Vienna airports that took place in December 1985. The initial plans called for the stationing in late January of two aircraft-carrier battle groups north of the gulf and for the eventual movement of U.S. planes and vessels across the "Line of Death." The move was intended to provoke Colonel Qaddafi to initiate hostilities, thereby providing the legal justification for a U.S. military response in self-defense. However, the operation was called off in late January because navy officials became convinced that a third aircraft carrier was essential to provide the necessary degree of safety for the task force.[28]

The administration's determination to instigate a military clash with Qaddafi's forces was reinforced during the following weeks by intelligence reports that Libya

[25] Stengel, "Sailing in Harm's Way," 23.
[26] *New York Times*, 29 March 1986.
[27] "The War Powers Resolution and Antiterrorist Operations," 3.
[28] Stengel, "Sailing in Harm's Way," 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was seeking to target American diplomats for possible terrorist attacks.[29] The revised three-carrier plan, code-named Operation "Prairie Fire," was presented to and approved by President Reagan at a National Security Council session on 14 March. It is clear that the participants in the meeting – the President, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., and National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter – anticipated the likelihood of a military confrontation, since much of the discussion focused on the proposed rules of engagement and strategies for military retaliation against Libya.[30] According to several sources, the President approved the plan after he was advised by his top aides that upon entering the Gulf of Sidra U.S. forces would in all probability be fired upon by Libyan surface-to-air missiles.[31] Reagan was also assured that the probability of Soviet intervention in the event of a Libyan-American clash was close to zero.[32]

What ultimately emerged from the 14 March NSC meeting was a triple decision: to lay a trap for Colonel Qaddafi, to exploit enforcement of freedom of navigation on the high seas as a pretext for engaging U.S. forces in the gulf, and to hide the anticipated battle scenario from Congress and the American public. The difficulty of orchestrating such a complex plot accounts for the apparent contradictions between the public statements and private disclosures that emanated from Washington both before and immediately after the clash in the Gulf of Sidra. Thus, while Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes insisted that "we went in not attempting to make a provocation, simply exercising our right to operate in international waters,"[33] and Secretary Shultz claimed that the purpose of the naval maneuver was "to exert the U.S. right to conduct naval and air exercises in every part of the globe,"[34] White House aides, including some who had taken part in the 14 March NSC meeting, were privately conceding that "we wanted to provoke Kaddafi into responding so we could stick it to him, and we knew he would oblige us,"[35] that "of course we're aching for a go at Gaddafi,"[36] and that if the Libyan leader "sticks his head up, we'll clobber him; we're looking for an excuse."[37]

Ironically, after the clash in the gulf even the President and the Secretary of State abandoned the facade that the naval exercises were routine. Upon arriving at Athens airport on 25 March, Secretary Shultz did not feign surprise at the Libyan attack against American planes, acknowledging that "obviously we were prepared for it and we knew what we were going to do about it."[38] Three days later, Shultz

[29] *New York Times*, 26 March 1986.

[30] Details of the 14 March NSC meeting may be found in Stengel, "Sailing in Harm's Way," 16–18; Watson, "Kaddafi's Crusade," 24; and *New York Times*, 26 March 1986.

[31] *New York Times*, 26 March 1986. See also "Drawing the Line," *New Republic*, 21 April 1986, 5.

[32] Stengel, "Sailing in Harm's Way," 16.

[33] *New York Times*, 25 March 1986.

[34] Watson, "Kaddafi's Crusade," 24.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ed Magnuson, "To the Shores of Tripoli," *Time*, 31 March 1986, 26.

[37] Ibid.

[38] *New York Times*, 26 March 1986.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

admitted that the administration had long sought to "blow the whistle" on Colonel Qaddafi because he "is doing things that are against our interests."[39] And in a session with newspaper editors on 9 April, President Reagan conceded that "we knew that we were risking, knowing the nature of Qaddafi, that there might possibly be something."[40]

There are at least two additional reasons why it is difficult to quarrel with the argument advanced by Representative Dante B. Fascell (D.-Fla.) that "any reasonable person would have concluded that there might be hostilities" that ought to have triggered the consultation requirement of Section 3 in the War Powers Resolution.[41] First, as noted earlier, Libyan and American forces had battled over the disputed gulf once before in August 1981. Second, when the Sixth Fleet conducted maneuvers near the gulf in January 1986, Colonel Qaddafi personally sailed into the gulf aboard an armed Libyan patrol vessel to stage a confrontation with the U.S. and publicly vowed to retaliate against the next American incursion into Libyan-claimed territory.[42] In the context of these circumstances, the administration's claim that the presence in Sidra of the largest U.S. naval force ever assembled since World War II constituted anything but a clear indication of imminent involvement in hostilities remains totally unpersuasive.

The administration also failed to adhere strictly to the reporting requirements outlined in Section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution. That provision stipulates that in any case in which American armed forces are introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," or "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat," or "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation," the president must submit within forty-eight hours a written report to the speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate. Such report must identify the circumstances compelling the deployment of troops, the authority under which such deployment is taking place, and the estimated scope and length of the hostilities or military involvement.[43]

On 26 March 1986, within the specified forty-eight-hour requirement, the White House did indeed forward letters to Speaker O'Neill and to Senate President Pro Tempore Thurmond which essentially included all the information stipulated by the resolution. However, to make it clear again that he did not feel bound by the 1973 law, President Reagan's letter contained no reference whatsoever to the War Powers Resolution and merely stated that he was sending it "in accordance with my desire that Congress be informed on this matter."[44] The omission of reference

[39] Ibid., 3 April 1986.

[40] Ibid., 10 April 1986.

[41] John Felton, "In Wake of Libya, Skirmishing Over War Powers," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 10 May 1986, 1024.

[42] *New York Times*, 25 March 1986.

[43] Turner, *War Powers Resolution*, 144–145.

[44] Towell, "Military Strikes Against Libya Receive Capitol Hill Support," 702.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the resolution was deliberate in that it enabled the administration to perpetuate the myth that U.S. forces in the Gulf of Sidra were not being introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." Furthermore, since it did not refer to any section of the law, the President's letter could not trigger the sixty-day deployment limit, which starts automatically only upon submission of a "hostilities" report under Section 4(a)(1).

To clarify its position, the administration maintained that "where a peaceful, lawful exercise does, in fact, result in hostile action to which U.S. forces must respond in immediate self-defense, such an isolated engagement should not normally be construed as constituting the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into a situation of actual or imminent hostilities for the purpose of the reporting requirement of section 4 of the resolution."[45] This line of reasoning, however, remains totally unpersuasive, again because it rests exclusively on the pretense that American forces were merely acting in "self-defense" while in the Gulf of Sidra in late March 1986.

Unfortunately, in stark contrast to the criticism generated by the administration's failure to comply with the consultations and reporting requirements in the invasion of Grenada, in this instance an almost unanimous Congress accepted the President's circumvention of its constitutional and legal prerogatives with incredible equanimity. After the Libyan-American clashes below the "Line of Death," only two legislators, both of whom had ironically endorsed the U.S. military actions, publicly defended the continued viability of the War Powers Resolution. On 24 March 1986, Representative Dante B. Fascell, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and one of the original sponsors of the 1973 law, sent a letter to the President, claiming that the U.S. naval presence in the Gulf of Sidra "constituted from the very outset a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities was a distinct possibility clearly indicated by the circumstances." Concluding that "prior consultation with Congress was required under the War Powers Act," Fascell urged Reagan to "respect and abide by our laws and constitutional procedures," and to comply fully with the law "before the situation evolves further."[46] Senator Sam Nunn, (D.-Ga.), the most influential member of the Armed Services Committee and a frequent administration supporter, concurred with Fascell's argument that a formal report to Congress was required in this instance.[47]

However, these admonitions fell on deaf ears both in the White House and in Congress. In a demonstration of overwhelming bipartisan unity, all of the legislative leaders who had been briefed on 24 March immediately rallied behind the President. For example, House Minority Leader Michel declared that "as far as I am concerned, Libya engaged in an act of provocation that warranted our re-

[45] "The War Powers Resolution and Antiterrorist Operations," 3.

[46] The entire letter is reprinted in U.S. Congress, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 8 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:E1017.

[47] Towell, "Military Strikes Against Libya Receive Capitol Hill Support," 699.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sponse," and Speaker O'Neill stated that "the administration's handling of this matter is on the right course," and that "its actions in protecting America's armed forces in international waters are justified."[48] Likewise, Senator Thurmond claimed that "the United States has acted responsibly in retaliating against acts of aggression,"[49] and Senate Minority Leader Byrd went further in asserting that the War Powers Resolution was inapplicable in this instance because he did not believe that "we had any reasons to expect those attempted attacks upon our ships and planes in international airspace and waters."[50] Unqualified support for the President was also evident in every speech made by Democrats and Republicans on the subject of Libya in both the House and the Senate.[51] Not one member of Congress rose to challenge the process through which the decision to confront Libya had been made, and with the singular exception of Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R.-Oreg.), no legislator dared to question the wisdom of the decision.[52] The only initiatives taken by Congress consisted of the introduction in the House of two concurrent resolutions, both of which were sent to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The first, drafted by Representative Ken Kramer (R.-Colo.), called for supporting the assertion by the United States of its legitimate right of self-defense against hostile attacks by Libya in international waters; the other, introduced by Representative Connie Mack (R.-Fla.), urged the expulsion of Libya from the United Nations.[53]

Congressional acquiescence in the usurpation of the war power can be attributed in large measure to the prevalent perception that in this instance America's might was successfully brought to bear against an immensely unpopular, militarily weak, and politically isolated foe. Legislative timidity was undoubtedly reinforced by the recognition that public opinion aligned itself solidly behind the President. Although 43 percent of the respondents in a national Gallup poll conducted on 26–27 March suspected that the naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra were a deliberate attempt to provoke an attack from Libya, 75 percent nevertheless agreed that U.S. strikes against Libyan ships and military sites were justified. In addition, 56 percent concurred that President Reagan was making wise use of military force to solve foreign policy problems, the highest positive rating given to the President on this question since the 1983 invasion of Grenada.[54] Likewise, a *USA Today*

[48] *New York Times*, 25 March 1986.

[49] Ibid.

[50] U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 25 March 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:3284.

[51] Ibid., 3283–3284. See also U.S. Congress, House, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 25 March 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:1578–1580.

[52] Dissenting from Reagan's policy, Senator Hatfield argued that U.S. actions in the Gulf of Sidra seriously eroded America's ability to bring about negotiated settlement of conflicts in the Middle East and other regions. U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 26 March 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:3454.

[53] U.S. Congress, House, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 9 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:1644, 1737.

[54] "Fearing Trouble: A Newsweek Poll," *Newsweek*, 7 April 1986, 23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

poll found that 67 percent of those surveyed supported American actions in the Gulf of Sidra.[55]

Thus, the Libyan-American imbroglio below the "Line of Death" confirms the lessons drawn from the rescue of the S.S. *Mayaguez* and the invasion of Grenada: namely, in low-intensity and low-risk conflict situations that produce quick and seemingly favorable military outcomes, the political power of Congress to limit the chief executive through strict enforcement of the War Powers Resolution is very feeble if it is not dead altogether. This episode also suggests that Congress is loathe to assert its war power whenever the deployment of this country's military might is justified as a necessary response in the battle against international terrorism.

Operation "El Dorado Canyon"

Within days after U.S. intelligence agencies had secured substantial evidence of direct Libyan involvement in the 5 April 1986 bombing of a West Berlin discotheque that killed an American serviceman and a Turkish woman and injured more than 200 patrons, and following allegations that Libyan agents had been deployed around the world for terrorist attacks against thirty U.S. embassies, American forces were again unleashed against Libya.[56]

On 14 April, in an eleven-minute operation dubbed "El Dorado Canyon," thirteen F-111 fighter bombers flying out of Royal Air Force bases in Britain, accompanied by twelve A-6 attack planes launched off carriers in the Mediterranean, simultaneously struck five military and intelligence targets in and around Libya's capital Tripoli and the coastal city of Benghazi.[57] The attack against the Bab al-Azzaziya compound, the Libyan President's residence and command center, killed Quaddafi's fifteen-month old adopted daughter and seriously injured two of his sons. Although the administration insisted that the targets were carefully selected for their linkage to Libyan terrorist activities and to minimize collateral damage and injuries to innocent civilians, the Pentagon eventually confirmed on 8 May that U.S. planes inadvertently hit civilian areas in the vicinity of the French Embassy in Tripoli and near the military barracks in Benghazi.[58] While the United States lost one F-111 with a crew of two, Libya's second in command, Major Abdul Salam Jalloud, announced on 18 April that thirty-seven Libyans were killed and ninety-three were injured in the bombing raid, most of them civilians in the residential neighborhood of Bin Ashur in Tripoli.[59]

[55] Gerald Parshall, "Spring of '86: A Nation on a Roll," *U.S. News and World Report*, 7 April 1986, 29.

[56] *New York Times*, 15 April 1986.

[57] Details of the strike can be found in William R. Doerner, "In the Dead of the Night," *Time*, 28 April 1986, 28–31; see also Russell Watson, "Reagan's Raiders," *Newsweek*, 28 April 1986, 26–31.

[58] *New York Times*, 9 May 1986.

[59] Ibid., 19 April 1986. According to another source, "estimates based on burials around the country put the number of Libyan deaths, mostly military, between 50 and 100." Schumacher, "United States and Libya," 335.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In marked contrast to the Gulf of Sidra incident, the air strike against Libya generated more intense controversy over the administration's compliance with the consultation clause of the War Powers Resolution. As a matter of fact, congressional concern over White House intentions to adhere to the letter of the law was evident several days before the aerial bombardment was carried out. On 11 April, shortly after the Pentagon had announced that the Sixth Fleet was being augmented by another carrier and following disclosures by administration officials that they were considering plans for military retaliation against Libya, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard G. Lugar (R.-Ind.) sent a message to Secretary Shultz, urging him to consult with the committee "as soon as possible" in accordance with the law. A similar request was transmitted to President Reagan by a group of House members, led by Matthew F. McHugh (D.-N.Y.).[60] While the administration eventually asserted that it had fully met these expectations, a careful review of the record suggests that the White House again failed to comply with the spirit, if not also the letter of the law.

On Monday, 14 April at 4:00 P.M., *after* the President had given final approval to the raid and four hours *after* the F-111s had taken off from the British base at Lakenheath for the seven-hour flight to Libya, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders was summoned to the Executive Office Building for "consultations" with the President, Vice President George Bush, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, CIA Director William Casey, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Admiral Crowe, and National Security Adviser Poindexter.[61] The delegation included Senators Robert Dole, Robert C. Byrd, Claiborne Pell (D.-R.I.), Richard G. Lugar, Sam Nunn, and Strom Thurmond, and Representatives Dante B. Fascell, William S. Broomfield (R.-Mich.), Robert H. Michel, Les Aspin (D.-Wis.), and William L. Dickinson, (R.-Ala.). Others who were invited but did not attend included Senator Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.), and Representatives Thomas P. O'Neill, Jim Wright (D.-Tex.), and Thomas S. Foley (D.-Wash.).[62]

According to those present at the session, the President joined the meeting at 4:10 P.M., described the imminent operation by reading from typewritten notes, and left at approximately 5:00 P.M.[63] Shultz then reportedly issued a "strong and emphatic" appeal for congressional support, and Weinberger outlined the risks involved and the measures taken to reduce them.[64] The remainder of the meeting, which lasted until approximately 6:30 P.M., was apparently dominated by NSA Poindexter, who provided evidence linking Libya to the West Berlin bombing and to an allegedly imminent series of terrorist attacks against American diplomatic

[60] Ibid., 12 April 1986.

[61] George J. Church, "Hitting the Source," *Time*, 28 April 1986, 26-27.

[62] Ellen C. Collier, Congressional Research Service, *War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance*, Report No. IB81050 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 7 July 1986), 4. Speaker O'Neill, who was out of Washington at the time, was reportedly briefed by telephone. See Pat Towell, "After Raid on Libya, New Questions on Hill," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 19 April 1986, 839.

[63] See *New York Times*, 15 April 1986; and Church, "Hitting the Source," 26.

[64] *New York Times*, 15 April 1986.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

targets. While none of those present raised objections against the raid, Representative Michel asked whether the administration had contemplated delaying the military response until the next terrorist attack had occurred. Poindexter responded that this option had been rejected, and Shultz assured a worried Senator Byrd that the United States would respond to future terrorist acts on a case-by-case basis.[65]

According to Senator Dole, Poindexter informed the lawmakers at 6:20 P.M. that "this is consultation" and assured them at that point that the aerial bombardment mission, slated to begin within about 40 minutes, could still be cancelled if the congressmen objected "unanimously and strongly."[66] While Senator Lugar and Representative Dickinson subsequently concurred that the briefing had begun early enough so that the operation could have been scratched, Senator Byrd took the more realistic view that "it was obvious it [the raid] would not have been called off,"[67] and House Minority Leader Michel wondered "if I had some serious objection, how could I make it now?"[68]

Administration officials insisted that what had transpired at the 14 April meeting – an eleventh hour briefing during which congressmen were placed under extreme duress to assent to an imminent military action after operational deployments had already begun – was tantamount to "extensive consultations," satisfying the legal requirement that consultations with Congress occur prior to the introduction of troops into hostilities or a situation of imminent hostilities.[69] In a similar vein, Senator Dole claimed that the timing and circumstances under which the 14 April session occurred were far less important than the need to deter international terrorism, and expressed hope that "there will not be any dispute or hairsplitting over whether or not we had enough notice or that it should have been 5 hours, 7 hours, or the day before yesterday."[70]

However, as the critics of the administration were quick to point out, what Dole had dismissed as mere "hairsplitting" in fact raised fundamental questions about executive compliance with the Constitution and the 1973 War Powers Resolution. Senator Byrd, for example, reminded his colleagues that notifying Congress of a decision that had already been made vitiates the basic intent of the law which is "to seek the best possible advice so that the actions of this Nation on the weighty matter of conducting hostile action is [sic] given the benefit of thoughtful consideration by responsible officials in both branches of the Congress."[71] Similar sentiments were expressed by Senator Nunn, who complained that the War Powers Resolution is "not adhered to by the executive branch," and by Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R.-Conn.), who charged that "there's a feeling on the part of the

[65] Church, "Hitting the Source," 26–27.
[66] *New York Times*, 15 April 1986.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Church, "Hitting the Source," 27.
[69] "The War Powers Resolution and Antiterrorist Operations," 3.
[70] U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 15 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:4236.
[71] Ibid., 4317.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

White House to say, the hell with consultation and deliberation."[72] And Representative Don Edwards (D.-Calif.) found it curious that an administration professing allegiance to the Founding Fathers' original intentions would in this instance ignore "their judgment about who should decide to commit our military forces to war."[73]

It is also clear that the White House had ample time and opportunity to solicit congressional advice long before the commencement of military action against Libya. Actual planning for an attack began in late March 1986, after the discovery of Libyan plans to undertake additional terrorist acts against American civilian targets abroad. On 7 April, two days after the discotheque bombing in West Berlin, the National Security Council held a meeting (without Vice President Bush and Secretary Weinberger, who were travelling abroad at the time) during which President Reagan tentatively approved a plan by the Joint Chiefs for surgical bombing strikes against Libya.[74] The plans were then placed on hold to enable the administration to strengthen the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, build up the case for the alleged Libyan culpability in the Berlin bombing, and secure logistical and political support for the operation from NATO allies.[75]

On Tuesday, 8 April, the President reportedly sent a message to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher requesting permission for using F-111s based in Britain in the strike.[76] Following another NSC meeting at the Oval Office the next day, a joint security-intelligence team prepared a list of five targets.[77] However, because of disclosures of operational details in the media, Reagan decided to postpone the strike for an indefinite duration at a hastily convened NSC session on Friday, 11 April.[78] After being assured by JCS Chairman, Admiral Crowe, that the bombing mission could be scratched as late as ten minutes before the scheduled attack, the President gave final approval to the raid at a full NSC meeting on Sunday, 13 April.[79] Congress was thus brought into the picture only at the very end of a protracted decision-making process.

It is also evident that the administration was willing to share sensitive information about its military planning with several foreign officials, while it was simultaneously determined to withhold it from Congress. For example, a few days before the attack, the West German and several other allied governments were being supplied by Washington with what one official called "absolutely convincing evidence" linking Libya to the bombing in West Berlin.[80] At the same time, the White House secretly contacted the French government to seek permission for the use

[72] *New York Times*, 16 April 1986.
[73] Ibid., 23 April 1986.
[74] George J. Church, "Targeting Gaddafi," *Time*, 21 April 1986, 21.
[75] *New York Times*, 15 April 1986.
[76] Ibid., 16 April 1986.
[77] Doerner, "In the Dead of the Night," 29.
[78] Church, "Targeting Gaddafi," 21.
[79] Doerner, "In the Dead of the Night," 29.
[80] *New York Times*, 9 April 1986.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of French airspace by the British-based F-111s.[81] Furthermore, a statement released by the office of Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney acknowledged that "the government of Canada has been fully consulted by the United States all along and was notified in advance of its intentions with respect to Libya."[82] In addition, when queries were raised about the purpose of the visits to London, Madrid, Bonn, Paris, and Rome by U.N. Ambassador Vernon Walters between 11–13 April, one administration official replied that "basically, we want to tell allies where we are and what could happen."[83] Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes admitted that the allies "were told that the President had decided on the military option."[84]

Some critics of the War Powers Resolution believed that they had finally found incontrovertible evidence to support their allegation that Congress cannot be entrusted with secret information. On 23 April 1986, Representatives Newt Gingrich (R.-Ga.) and Dan Burton (R.-Ind.) charged that immediately after the "consultation" session of 14 April broke up, "some legislative leaders from the other body" leaked confidential information to the media that the President would address the nation at 9:00 P.M. that evening. This detail, which was the only potentially harmful piece of information disclosed to the media by Minority Leader Byrd and Senator Claiborne Pell, accompanied by descriptions of the latest U.S. military movements, was aired by ABC-TV Nightly News at 6:35 P.M., approximately 30 minutes before the start of the raid. Claiming that "ABC had outlined everything a Libyan defense planner would need to know," Representative Burton warned that "Members of Congress must learn to keep their mouths shut, at least where national security is concerned."[85] Referring to the same incident, an editorial in the *National Review* noted that White House officials were "exasperated" by the Byrd-Pell leak because they suspected that it had tipped Libyan officials about the probable timing of the strike, as it was likely to occur before the President's address. The editorial concluded that "not only can't members keep their mouths shut when a microphone looms, but the ones who gripe most about not being consulted are the very ones who abuse consultation most."[86]

While it can be argued that the two senators probably exercised poor judgment when they revealed the timing of the President's speech, the seriousness of this

[81] Church, "Hitting the Source," 26. The French government turned down this request, a decision that extended the route of the F-111s by 1,200 nautical miles each way. See *New York Times*, 24 April 1986.

[82] *NEWSCAN* (News letter of the Canadian Embassy), Ottawa, 15 April 1986. Cited in U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 13 May 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:5806.

[83] Church, "Targetting Gaddafi," 22.

[84] U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 13 May 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:5806.

[85] U.S. Congress, House, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 23 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:2136–2137. It should be noted that when they voiced their concerns, Representatives Gingrich and Barton were unaware that air-traffic controllers in Malta had warned their Libyan counterparts, about 30 to 45 minutes before the raid, that a large number of unidentified planes were approaching the Libyan coast. There is no indication that Libyan air defenses had been activated, either by the Byrd-Pell leak or by the warning from Malta. Pentagon officials have maintained that the United States attained "tactical surprise" in the 14 April raid. *Chicago Tribune*, 6 August 1986.

[86] Cato (pseud.), "Letter from Washington," *National Review*, 9 May 1986, 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disclosure pales by comparison to the torrent of leaks emanating from unidentified administration officials that inundated the media several days before the raid. A few examples suffice to support Senator Byrd's claim that the most potentially damaging disclosures about the nature of the retaliatory strike, its timing and likely targets, and the supportive role of U.S. allies originated in the executive branch and not in Congress.[87] On 9 April, the Pentagon announced that the carrier *Coral Sea* would remain in the Mediterranean for an "indefinite period" instead of returning to the United States as previously planned, in order to keep open the option of a retaliatory strike against Libya.[88] One the same day, an authoritative White House source confirmed to the *Washington Post* that the President had tentatively approved a military operation against Libya.[89] On 10 April, Pentagon officials disclosed that the *Coral Sea* had left Malaga, Spain, for the eastern Mediterranean and acknowledged that Libyan air bases near the coast were being considered as prime targets for retaliation.[90]

When the administration decided to delay the raid on 11 April, even a top intelligence official was compelled to admit that "we knew that we were doomed. Too many people were talking freely about the operation and too many operational details were already out. We had to postpone."[91] Yet the leaks continued to the very end. On 12 April, an administration official refused to deny, and thereby appeared to confirm a Reuters report out of London that Prime Minister Thatcher had agreed to the use of American planes based in Britain.[92] On the following day, senior White House officials revealed to the *New York Times* that the President was close to a final decision on whether to order a military attack against Libya.[93] What was described accurately by Senator Byrd as the "hemorrhaging of vital military information" was also evident in a *Time* article published before the attack, describing in detail various likely scenarios for a strike, including the one that eventually materialized.

Finally, even before the relatively harmless disclosure by Senators Byrd and Pell, the White House itself helped to create rumors about the timing of the raid by requesting television networks for time for the President's address.[94] Since the imminence of the strike was publicly telegraphed to Colonel Qaddafi by the administration well in advance, its claims that it had been reluctant to consult with legislative leaders earlier in the process due to the danger of leaks lack credibility.[95]

Questions may also be raised about the administration's alleged compliance with

[87] U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 13 May 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:5802.
[88] *New York Times*, 10 April 1986.
[89] Cited in U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 13 May 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:5803.
[90] *New York Times*, 11 April 1986.
[91] Church, "Targetting Gaddafi," 21.
[92] *New York Times*, 13 April 1986.
[93] Ibid., 14 April 1986.
[94] John Felton, "Sounding Off Over Who Isn't Keeping Quiet," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 10 May 1986, 1022.
[95] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the reporting provisions of Section 4(a). On 16 April, within the 48-hour limit, the President sent a report to Senator Thurmond and Speaker O'Neill in which he described the air strikes as "self-defense measures" that were undertaken "pursuant to my authority under the Constitution, including my authority as Commander-in-Chief of United States Armed Forces."[96] However, like Ford and Carter, Reagan was determined not to concede the validity of the War Powers Resolution and to prevent establishment of a potentially restrictive precedent. Therefore, borrowing the phraseology of his predecessors, Reagan made it clear that he was filing the report "in accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution," thereby again refusing to acknowledge that he was reporting *under* the War Powers Resolution.

Although it clearly circumvented the intent of the law, neither the President's decision nor the faulty process through which it was produced generated much congressional criticism. Even those few lawmakers who had raised questions about executive adherence to the law, including Representative Fascell, Senator Byrd, and Senator Alan Cranston (D.-Calif.), accepted Reagan's claims that the raid was justified due to Libyan complicity in terrorist acts and because of the reluctance of NATO allies to join the United States in economic warfare against Libya. The depth of bipartisan outpouring of legislative support for Reagan is manifest in the fact that on 15 April alone, twelve Democrats and six Republicans applauded in speeches on the House floor what Representative Jim Chapman (D.-Tex.) described as "the President's decisive measured response against a mindless mad dog."[97] In the Senate on the same day, expressions of unqualified support for the raid were voiced by four Democrats and five Republicans.[98] Of the 535 members of Congress, only three—Republican Senators Weicker and Hatfield and Representative George E. Brown, Jr. (D.-Calif.)—publicly challenged the wisdom of the armed response.[99] Clearly more concerned about the behavior of American allies than about the erosion of the congressional war power, the House passed a resolution expressing gratitude for "the assistance provided by the Government and people of the United Kingdom."[100]

The reluctance of Congress to reassert its legal and constitutional prerogatives in this instance can be attributed again in large measure to the swiftness of the operation and to its apparent military success. Lawmakers were also aware that the decision to avenge the deaths of American victims of terrorism was immensely popular with their constituents. For example, in a *New York Times*/CBS poll con-

[96] U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 16 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:4334.

[97] See U.S. Congress, House, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 15 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:1815–1820, E1165, E1173, and E1178.

[98] See U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 15 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:4236, 4237, 4241, 4242, 4248, 4269, 4270.

[99] Ibid., 4280. See also U.S. Congress, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 17 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:E1220; *New York Times*, 16 April 1986.

[100] U.S. Congress, House, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 5 May 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:2341.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ducted 15 April 1986, 77 percent of the respondents approved of the bombing and only 14 percent registered opposition. Furthermore, backing for Reagan's handling of foreign policy had increased dramatically, from 51 percent before the attack to an all-time high of 76 percent after the raid.[101] Likewise, a Gallup poll conducted 17–18 April found that 71 percent supported the military action against Libya, and that 62 percent believed the President was making wise use of the armed forces to solve foreign policy problems.[102] Similarly, an overwhelming 71 percent of those polled for *Time* by Yankelovich/Clancy, Shulman approved the strike, and approximately 60 percent agreed that the raid "made me feel proud to be an American."[103] Despite the occurrence of several terrorist incidents after the attack against Libya, a *New York Times* poll conducted between 29 April and 1 May found that 65 percent still approved of "El Dorado Canyon."[104] That the raid was as popular as any foreign policy action ever undertaken by the Reagan administration is also evidenced in the fact that it was endorsed by editorials in the *Washington Post* and *New York Times*, and in resolutions passed by various state legislatures, including the South Carolina General Assembly and the Oklahoma House of Representatives.[105]

Implications and Conclusions

In the wake of the American-Libyan encounters in March and April 1986, Congress remains deeply divided as its members move in four different directions on the war power issue. At one extreme there are those, led by Senator Goldwater, who want to do away entirely with the War Powers Resolution because they believe that the president cannot and should not "be hamstrung by legislative restrictions that attempt to regulate foreign policy with narrow specificity."[106] However, while those who support bills to repeal the 1973 Resolution contend that such a move would avoid a "grave Constitutional crisis that may endanger the Nation at a time when immediate, decisive action is demanded," the fact remains that the War Powers Resolution is the only potentially effective legal vehicle currently available to secure a modicum of legislative participation in decisions to deploy American forces in battle. Hence, there is little support in Congress for the two measures calling for repeal of the 1973 legislation (S. 305, reintroduced by Senator Goldwater on 29 January 1985, and H.R. 3551, introduced by Representative Bob Livingston (R.-La.) on 10 October 1985) that have been languishing in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee for several months.[107]

[101] *New York Times*, 17 April 1986.
[102] "A Poll: Europe Vs. the U.S.," *Newsweek*, 28 April 1986, 22.
[103] Church, "Hitting the Source," 23.
[104] *New York Times*, 4 May 1986.
[105] U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 6 May 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:5404, 5408.
[106] U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:4613.
[107] Collier, *War Powers Resolution*, 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second camp includes several conservative congressmen who, while sharing Goldwater's concerns, would prefer to emaciate the existing law by enacting new legislation that would supersede the War Powers Resolution in those instances when the president might use U.S. military forces to deal with terrorism. Thus, on 17 April 1986, three days after the raid against Libya, identical versions of the Antiterrorism Act were introduced in the Senate by Majority Leader Dole and Jeremiah Denton (R.-Ala.), and in the House by Representatives Joe Barton (R.-Tex.), Duncan Hunter (R.-Calif.), and Bob Livingston. This measure, which includes a broad definition of terrorism,[108] would require no prior consultation with Congress, extend the reporting period from forty-eight hours to ten days, and remove the sixty-day limit on the duration of U.S. troop deployment in those situations in which armed forces are used to combat terrorism.

While intended to clarify presidential authority and enhance the flexibility of the executive when dealing with international terrorism, the Dole-Denton bill rests on weak and unpersuasive premises. For example, Representative Barton's claim that the president should not be required to consult with Congress prior to acting, because "terrorists do not have to conduct committee meetings before they decide to strike,"[109] utterly fails to appreciate the genius of the American Constitution that deliberately mandated the sharing of the awesome war power between the legislative and executive branches. It also fails to recognize the important role that genuine consultations can play in establishing and legitimizing broad consensus between the president and Congress on the need for an appropriateness of planned military responses against terrorism.

Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever to support Senator Dole's contention that the report submitted to Congress after the bombing raid against Libya was incomplete because of the forty-eight-hour stricture contained in Section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution.[110] On the contrary, by giving the president ten days to file a report that must only specify "the terrorist threat or terrorist act" which justified his resort to use of force, the proposed bill ensures that Congress would not be able to secure those details about the scope and duration of military deployment that must be forwarded under the current reporting requirements. Furthermore, since both of the military actions against Libya were terminated shortly after they had begun – the first within two days, the second within eleven minutes – any extension of the forty-eight-hour reporting period would guarantee that Congress would simply be left in the dark and that it would be confronted with *fait accomplis* in future counterterrorist actions envisioned in the proposed law.

While asserting that the bill does not confer on the president any new powers that he does not already enjoy as commander-in-chief, supporters of the Antiterrorism Act are reluctant to acknowledge the obvious conclusion that it "would

[108] The entire bill is reproduced in U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 17 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:4425.

[109] U.S. Congress, House, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 17 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:1931.

[110] U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 30 April 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:5042.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remove all limits on Presidential authority to use American forces for counterterrorism purposes."[111] In fact, as pointed out by Archibald Cox, chairman of Common Cause and former Watergate Special Prosecutor, the Dole-Denton bill must be regarded as a "rash and highly dangerous overreaction" to the 1986 encounters with Libya, because it would allow the president to use military forces "at any time and on any scale that the president may say is useful to deter terrorism."[112] In retrospect, the proposed legislation makes the fateful and ill-advised Gulf of Tonkin Resolution look puny by comparison, because it gives the executive a carte blanche to wage war on a global scale, not only against individuals and organizations suspected of perpetrating terrorism but also against any states that allegedly organize or support such acts. Since our study clearly suggests that the consultation and reporting requirements of the present law could and should have been meticulously observed in the two confrontations with Libya without endangering national security interests, Congress should resist the temptation to abdicate its constitutional and legal war powers.

Alarmed by the Reagan administration's failure to comply with the War Powers Resolution in the two cases at hand, a third group of Democratic lawmakers has sought to strengthen the law by establishing a "permanent consultative body to which the President can look in situations similar to that with which we were confronted with Libya."[113] On 8 May 1986, Senators Robert Byrd, Claiborne Pell, Sam Nunn, and Patrick J. Leahy (D.-Vt.) introduced S.J. Res. 340 that would amend Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution and create a bipartisan body of eighteen members for purposes of consultation with the executive. The group would be comprised of the speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate; the majority and minority leaders of both chambers; and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, and the House and Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees.

By specifying the identity of those with whom the president is required to consult under Section 3, the proposed amendment removes one glaring defect in the current law. In subsequent hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Matthew F. McHugh (D.-N.Y.) suggested that the consultative group be created by changes in the House and Senate rules rather than through formal amendment, and that its membership be sufficiently flexible to allow inclusion of members with specialized expertise in a particular geographical region, as the occasion may demand.[114] However, Congress remains divided over the wisdom of creating a large, formal consultative committee that would presumably have its own staff. For example, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar has been reported as favoring designation of an informal and small group,

[111] U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 8 May 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:5599.

[112] Felton, "In Wake of Libya," 1024. Not surprisingly, on 1 May 1986, Cox proposed "to shorten from sixty to thirty days the period for which the president may use the Armed Forces in a manner short of making war without specific authority from Congress." See Collier, *War Powers Resolution*, 13.

[113] U.S. Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 8 May 1986, *Congressional Record* 132:5597.

[114] Collier, *War Powers Resolution*, 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

containing as few as two members from each chamber, that would be appointed by the leadership for consultations in advance of any future counterterrorist action.[115]

Unfortunately, both proposals leave untouched the terse wording in Section 3 that allows the president excessive discretion on such crucial questions as when consultation must occur and what actions constitute consultation. Congress can close such loopholes in at least two ways. First, instead of mandating consultation "in every possible instance," Section 3 could be amended to require consultation "at least twenty-four hours prior to any presidential decision to commit U.S. forces under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 4(a)(1)."[116] Second, to insure that executive-legislative dialogue is substantive – rather than perfunctory, as it surely was in the two decisions concerning Libya – Section 3 could be further amended by adopting Senator Thomas Eagleton's proposal that requires the president to "discuss fully and seek the advice and counsel" of the designated group, instead of merely "to consult."[117]

As matters now stand, the overwhelming majority of Congress comprises the fourth camp that is determined not to rock the boat on the war powers issue, a sentiment that it apparently shares with the White House. There is no doubt that the Reagan administration's views most closely approximate those of Senator Goldwater and that the White House would prefer repeal of the present law. For example, in an address before the American Jewish Committee on 15 May 1986, Secretary of State Shultz renewed his opposition to the War Powers Resolution, claiming that it "practically invites an enemy to wait us out" and that it "undermines support from allies who might be more willing to go along with us if they were convinced that America would stay the course."[118] While recognizing that repeal of the law is unlikely, administration officials have also been reluctant to endorse the Dole-Denton bill, first because they believe that it is superfluous, and second because they fear that it would spark a stormy controversy in Congress that might produce additional restraints on the president's war-making authority.[119] The White House is also opposed to the creation of a formal consultative body and is reportedly leaning toward the much weaker alternative offered by Senator Lugar.[120]

Given the disagreements within Congress and between the two branches, no drastic changes either in the substance of the War Power Resolution or in its enforcement are likely to occur in the foreseeable future. But a victory for the status quo at a time when presidents will be increasingly tempted to deploy American

[115] *New York Times*, 16 April 1986.

[116] Thomas M. Franck, "After the Fall: The New Procedural Framework for Congressional Control Over the War Power," *American Journal of International Law* 71 (October 1977): 638.

[117] Zutz, "Recapture of S.S. *Mayaguez*," 472.

[118] *New York Times*, 16 May 1986.

[119] Felton, "In Wake of Libya," 1024.

[120] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military forces in the popular battle against international terrorism means that the executive will continue its successful assault on both the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution with amazing impunity. Our inquiry clearly indicates that unless Congress helps to safeguard the delicate constitutional balance envisioned by the Founding Fathers, its already diluted war power will eventually become the ultimate victim of international terrorism, rapidly withering away.*

* The author is grateful to Michael E. Christopher of James Madison College, Michigan State University, for his indefatigable research assistance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bureaucracy in the American Constitutional Order

FRANCIS E. ROURKE

The development of national bureaucracy in the United States since the 1930s in what can be called its modern era has been a truly remarkable phenomenon. Many more people now work for the government than did then. Bureaucratic organizations in Washington spend far more money today than was the case fifty years ago. They provide more services and their rules and regulations affect a much wider range of human activities. The impact of the decisions made by government agencies upon the lives of ordinary citizens covers not only the familiar trip from the cradle to the grave, but extends even beyond those traditional limits of the human experience, as survivors of the deceased struggle with the Veterans Administration or the Social Security system over death benefits, or as government officials begin to concern themselves with what happens to the fetus before he or she even becomes a citizen.[1]

This growth in the size of bureaucracy and the simultaneous expansion in the scope of its involvement in human affairs has generated a very strong resentment against bureaucrats and the agencies in which they work. There has been a general assumption that what is very big must also be very powerful, the lesson of the dinosaurs to the contrary notwithstanding, and the myth of an all-powerful bureaucracy has become firmly fixed in the American political imagination since

[1] For an analysis of the changes that have taken place in American bureaucracy since World War II, see Matthew A. Crenson and Francis E. Rourke, "American Bureaucracy Since World War II" in Louis Galambos, ed., *The New American State* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, forthcoming).

FRANCIS E. ROURKE is professor of political science at The Johns Hopkins University and is serving this year as O'Neill Professor of American Politics at Boston College. Among the books he has written are *Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy* and *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World War II. It has been increasingly reflected in those television spectaculars through which American society is periodically "born-again," the election of a president every four years. After being nominated as presidential candidates, Richard Nixon and George Wallace in 1968, Jimmy Carter in 1976, and Ronald Reagan in 1980 all ran against the bureaucracy or in Wallace's phrase, "pointy-headed" bureaucrats. Nixon, Carter, and Reagan won election after such a campaign, and Wallace established himself as the strongest third-party candidate in modern American history. In short, opposition to bureaucracy and its power has been a winning strategy in recent national elections in the United States.

The hostility toward bureaucratic power has been bipartisan, and it has been highly visible in all segments of the ideological spectrum. On the right is has been a product of the traditional animosity of conservatives toward government intervention in the domestic economy—whether in the form of extensive and expensive welfare programs to help the needy and the disadvantaged or the enforcement of regulatory statutes that private individuals or business organizations regard as a burdensome infringement upon their inalienable right to make their own decisions. On the left the resentment against bureaucracy is focused on the national security apparatus where invisible bureaucrats in the Pentagon, the CIA and more recently the National Security Council (NSC) ply their trade. Perhaps just because so much secrecy prevails in national security matters, it is possible to believe virtually anything about what bureaucrats are doing in this sector of government. And sometimes, as in the case of the secret arms dealings with Iran during the Reagan administration, reality outruns even the wildest imaginings of bureaucracy's critics.

But what is commonly overlooked in these hostile reactions to the growth of bureaucracy in the American constitutional order is that this development has triggered other changes in the character and operation of the national government, and that many of these changes have worked to limit the extent to which the expanding scope of bureaucratic activity has actually brought about a commensurate increase in the power of bureaucrats themselves. Indeed, it can be argued that the growth of national bureaucracy in the United States since the 1930s has been a far less important phenomenon than the simultaneous emergence of new ways by which the traditional institutions of American national government—the presidency, Congress, and the courts—have been able to meet and contain the challenge of a bureaucracy that many people prior to World War II anticipated would actually become a fourth branch of government in the postwar period.[2]

Hence, the real story of contemporary American bureaucracy is not, as widely expected to be the case, about the emergence of an imperial government of career officials threatening constitutional norms. It is rather the story of how a traditional political system modified itself to cope with the arrival of a new competitor for power—a set of bureaucratic organizations that was created to carry out the

[2] In this regard, see S.N. Eisenstadt, *Essays on Comparative Institutions* (New York: John Wiley, 1965), 207. Eisenstadt argues that the process of bureaucratization "also creates 'counter-vailing' forces which may impede or control the purposes of bureaucratic organizations and mechanisms."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

directives of the president and Congress but which had the promise of becoming a power in its own right. This modification process has resulted in major changes in the ways in which American political insititutions now function, and these changes represent the most significant impact that the arrival of a large-scale bureaucracy has had upon the American political system in modern times. The change most often predicted in the aftermath of World War II—that the arrival of a large-scale bureaucracy would derange the American constitutional order in fundamental ways—has not occurred at all.

Reshaping the Presidency

Consider, for example, the case of the presidency. During recent decades there has been constant apprehension in the White House that the bureaucracy will obstruct presidential plans and programs and substitute its own preferences for those of a president chosen in a free election to put into effect the policies and programs for which the people have just voted. Fear of bureaucratic usurpation of power was most pronounced at the White House during the Nixon years, but in one form or another it has been a conspicuous feature of all administrations since World War II.

This fear has endured in spite of the fact that genuine cases of bureaucratic challenge to presidential authority since the war have been a rare occurrence—so much so as to command widespread attention when they become public knowledge. Such cases have commonly been regarded as deviating from the norm—justified, if at all, only by the exceptional circumstances in which they occurred. Witness, for example, General Douglas MacArthur's defiance of President Harry Truman during the Korean War, or the unauthorized bombing runs conducted by the air force in Vietnam during the Johnson administration. These cases of bureaucrats acting independently or in opposition to presidential orders only drew what limited justification they possessed from the fact that they occurred during controversial wars, when the legitimacy of presidential authority itself came into question in American society.

But regardless of whether the record supports these White House fears of bureaucratic sabotage, what cannot be denied is the fact that many of the ways in which the presidency has changed in recent years represent adaptations designed to cope with the growing presence of bureaucracy within the governmental structure in the United States. Not the least of these changes has been the shift toward a collegial or collective presidency—a White House in which the chief executive's power to decide and to act is exercised not only by the president, but also by a host of other White House aides and assistants lodged within the White House staff or the executive office of the president. Thus, a power that the framers of the constitution thought they were placing in the hands of a single person has now been parcelled out among a varied set of individuals who serve on the White House staff.

The principal factor forcing this pluralization of the presidency—its transfor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mation into a collegial office—has been the desire of the White House to maintain the hegemony of the president within the executive branch in the face of what it perceives as a bureaucracy threatening constantly to spin out of control. Hence, a major task of the White House staff, and of the many offices into which this staff is now clustered, is to provide the president with information and advice about how to deal with the wide range of problems that executive institutions now confront. Otherwise the president would be entirely at the mercy of whatever data or policy suggestions the administrative agency most directly involved in a policy operation might choose to supply. During the Nixon administration it became standard practice for White House staff members rather than Cabinet officials to draw up major policy proposals affecting individual executive departments. Nixon and his chief advisers assumed that Cabinet members would be far too much under the influence of their own bureaucrats to be trusted with responsibility for the development of major administration policies.[3]

So while it may narrow the circle of his advisers in disadvantageous ways, the White House staff can protect the president from becoming the prisoner of any bureaucratic information system in shaping his policy initiatives. The pluralized presidency also provides the chief executive with a cadre of aides whose policy suggestions are sensitive to his own interests, rather than simply reflecting the goals and needs of some administrative agency or of the outside groups in whose behalf that agency generally acts. On occasion—as was true in both the Nixon and Reagan presidencies—his staff may even serve the chief executive as an instrument for taking actions that he does not want the rest of the government or the public to know about. History suggests that this use of the staff may lead a president to glory—as in Nixon's opening to China—or to catastrophe—as in Nixon's Watergate caper.

In addition to the assistance it provides in policy development, the White House entourage also plays a major role for the presidency today in monitoring the actions of bureaucratic organizations and officials within the executive branch charged with carrying out policy decisions. This monitoring is designed to insure that the policies that agency bureaucrats are pursuing on a daily basis are those of the president, and that they have not been altered to conform to the preferences of the bureaucracy or its clients. It also enables the White House to identify emerging issues with which they may have to deal in the future, or "big-ticket" items that are being handled in a dilatory way by the bureaucracy when they should be receiving priority attention from the White House.

Such monitoring activity may also have incidental political value for a president. The Office of Public Liaison (OPL) within the White House has the responsibility for cultivating good relations with the various national organizations and groups on which the president depends for political support. From the knowledge

[3] Richard Nathan has provided us with an invaluable account of the impact that fear of bureaucracy had upon the presidency during the Nixon years. See Richard P. Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency* (New York: John Wiley, 1983), esp. 28–56.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this White House office gleans about pending bureaucratic decisions through its monitoring role, the OPL can be used to alert outside groups that the administration is cultivating to the fact that certain decisions affecting their interests are about to be made by a government agency. Providing this kind of advance information can help to bind these groups even more tightly to the president's cause.[4] As is the case with individual members of Congress, the White House can thus derive considerable political benefit from its ability to play an intermediary role in the relations between the public, or at least the organized segments of it, and the bureaucracy.

Changing Presidential Styles

Over the course of recent history, individual presidents have varied a great deal in the way in which they have tried to use the collegial presidency. But they have all shared a common purpose—to create in their staffs an effective counterweight to the power of the departmental bureaucracies. John F. Kennedy, for example, in a strategy that was later to be imitated by Lyndon B. Johnson, tried to bring what he regarded as highly talented people into the White House, a group that David Halberstam was later to describe somewhat sardonically as "the best and the brightest." Kennedy and his associates made a point of denigrating the executive office system that they inherited from Dwight Eisenhower on the grounds that its highly organized structure impeded its effectiveness. He believed that it was the people in the White House who determined the success of public policy and not the character of the organizational system in which it was made. This initial Kennedy disdain for proper organization and procedure contributed to the disaster early in his administration at the Bay of Pigs, since it led him to eliminate organizational procedures that might well have generated warnings sufficent to prevent the error of ever launching this ill-fated expedition.[5] The possibility that elaborate organizational procedures for making decisions might have an error-correction function is not always clear to activist presidents like Kennedy when they take office.

But behind Kennedy's strategy of bringing talented people to the White House lay the belief that the permanent government was stodgy and unimaginative and that new ideas would have to come from outside the bureaucracy. If the White House staff could not by itself generate such innovative approaches to the social and economic problems that beset American society, then experts in the private sector would also have to be recruited to help the president cope with these problems. The institution that was created to forge cooperation between the White House staff and outside experts was the presidentially appointed task force. During the Kennedy and to an even greater extent the Johnson administrations, presidential

[4] See Martha J. Kumar and Michael B. Grossman, "The Presidency and Interest Groups" in Michael Nelson, ed., *The Presidency and the Political System* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984), 305–306.

[5] In this regard, see Garry Wills, *The Kennedy Imprisonment* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1981), 230.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

task forces wrestled with issues that under prior presidents the bureaucracy itself would have handled.[6] This novel approach to the task of making public policy was described by Henry Fairlie as "guerilla government"—a kind of "hit-and-run" warfare by outsiders upon the permanent government.[7]

This strategy of trying to develop public policy with a minimal reliance on the bureaucracy was adopted and refined by the Nixon administration. While the Kennedy White House had looked upon the bureaucracy as being far too timid in its approach to tough public policy issues, too reluctant to strike out in the bold new directions that Kennedy's New Frontier philosophy demanded, the Nixon administration saw the problem from a quite different perspective. In its eye the permanent bureaucracy was a wily and aggressive champion of policies and programs that the voters had repudiated in the 1968 election. Bureaucracy was forever trying to nullify White House initiatives by dragging its feet in implementing presidential directives, or, even worse, by leaking information to the outside world in an effort to rally public opposition to plans or policy changes that the administration was considering.

In any event, the bureaucracy was certainly regarded as an enemy by the Nixon White House—perhaps not at the top of the "enemies list" compiled by the White House that the Watergate investigations brought to light, but certainly well up on the list along with the television networks and the other news organizations that were so odious to the administration. There is a striking resemblance between the negative attitude that White House courtiers in the Nixon administration, like John Ehrlichman and H.R. Haldemann, took toward departmental bureaucrats and the contempt or hostility toward bureaucracy visible in the memoirs of Kennedy aides like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. or Theodore Sorensen.

From Nixon's perspective, it made sense to concentrate control over policy development in the White House whenever possible. This strategy was most prominent in the field of foreign affairs, where the White House National Security staff achieved an ascendancy over foreign policy decision making that no NSC staff has attained before or since the Nixon days. This ascendancy embraced not only the framing of foreign policy but even its implementation, as evident in the leading role that NSC Adviser Henry Kissinger played in executing the opening to China or carrying on peace negotiations with North Vietnam in Paris. It relegated the national security bureaucracies at the State and Defense departments to their lowest estate in the foreign policy process during the postwar period.

The Nixon administration made several attempts to achieve a similar kind of domination over domestic policy making, but without any notable success. The chief of these attempts was the establishment of the Domestic Council in the White House in 1970. It was intended to be the domestic equivalent of the NSC—a van-

[6] For a discussion of the Kennedy and Johnson task forces, and some of the differences between them, see Hugh D. Graham, "The Transformation of Federal Education Policy" in Robert A. Divine, ed., *Exploring the Johnson Years* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 163–169.

[7] As quoted by Wills, *Kennedy Imprisonment*, 170.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tage point from which the President and his staff could oversee the development of policy in areas other than foreign affairs.[8] Unfortunately for Nixon, however, domestic policy proved highly resistant to such operation by remote control from the White House. The opposition came not only from the bureaucracy, which the Nixon people had anticipated, but also from the very executives they had chosen to run these domestic agencies. These political appointees tended to see the involvement of White House aides in their agency's activities as an infringement upon their own executive prerogatives.

In addition, these agencies were closely tied to the congressional committees under whose jurisdiction they fell, as well as to a variety of domestic constituencies for whom they provided services or whose interests were affected by their decisions. They were thus locked into "iron triangles"—the coalition of executive agencies, interest groups, and congressional committees that have historically dominated major sectors of domestic policy making. It was not easy for a White House institution like the Domestic Council to move into an area of policy already occupied by these formidable political coalitions. It was especially difficult when, as was true under Nixon, Congress was controlled by the Democrats and the iron triangles were centers of power in which the opposition party was strongly entrenched.

The Nixon administration was no more successful when it abandoned its effort to attain comprehensive control over all domestic policy making through an institution like the Domestic Council and sought instead to shape the development of a single area of policy through a White House office. One policy area that greatly interested and at times seemed to obsess Nixon was the field of communications policy. This field lies under the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), a highly independent regulatory agency that has among its responsibilities the task of overseeing the operation of radio and television stations. Throughout its years in office the Nixion administration was firmly convinced that a chief source of its political troubles was the strong bias against it within the media organizations that reported the news about the administration's activities. This fear of the power of the media over its own political fortunes gave the Nixon administration a strong incentive to move control over communications policy from the FCC to the White House, where the President could then use threats like antitrust suits to stifle media criticism.[9]

In 1970, the administration made what many of its critics regarded as a strong move in this direction. Through a presidential reorganization plan, it established an Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP)—an organization created ostensibly to administer some traditional White House responsibilities in the communications area, but also assigned the mission of monitoring decisions in all other

[8] For the best account of the work of the Domestic Council, see John H. Kessel, *The Domestic Presidency* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1975).

[9] For an analysis of Nixon's strategies in dealing with the media, see William E. Porter, *Assault on the Media: The Nixon Years* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government communications agencies. The director of the OTP ultimately became a thorn in the flesh of the media when he began to launch broadsides against what he alleged was their ideological slant in a liberal direction, "ideological plugola" as he put it; but his office never succeeded in exercising much influence over the FCC itself, the agency with the real regulatory power in the communications field. The chairman of the commission, Dean Burch, was a staunch conservative and a Nixon loyalist, but he was also a strong chairman, who wanted to run his own agency and was not about to allow any White House aide to override his authority.[10]

When the Carter administration took office in 1977, it tried in many ways to distance its own governing style from that of the Nixon White House. As part of this strategy, Carter went out of his way to underline the fact that in his presidency Cabinet members rather than the White House staff would be at the center of policy making. However, as time wore on in his administration, Carter—like his predecessors—discovered that many problems could not be dealt with by a single department and the even more painful fact that many departments did not approach policy issues with his own political priorities in mind.

So power inevitably gravitated toward the White House staff during the Carter years, especially to the Domestic Policy Staff (DPS), which Carter had established as a successor agency to Nixon's Domestic Council. To be sure, Carter's DPS never attained the hegemony over policy development that the White House staff enjoyed in Nixon's first term. But its power was certainly greater than Carter initially anticipated would be the case. The DPS played a major role in prodding departments into action on issues the President considered important. It also tried to settle disputes between departments—as, for example, the conflict that erupted between the Health, Education and Welfare Department (HEW) and the Labor Department over the direction that welfare reform should take.

The Reagan administration followed the lead of the Carter presidency in accenting the role of the Cabinet in policy development and downplaying that of the White House staff. Except in the case of the arms deal with Iran in 1986, the NSC staff never reached the heights of power under Reagan that it enjoyed in previous administrations. The fact that Reagan has had so much more success than Carter in diminishing the role of the White House staff can be traced in good part to the much shorter length of his policy agenda as president. He had many fewer promises to keep than Carter. The constituency from which Reagan drew his support by and large wanted the government to do less rather than more. However, it should be noted that it was a presidential agency, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), that led the way in the achievement of Reagan's chief

[10] An account of the rise and fall of the Office of Telecommunications Policy may be found in Francis E. Rourke, "The Presidency and the Bureaucracy" in Nelson, ed., *Presidency and the Political System* 353–356; also Linda L. Fisher, "Appointments and Presidential Control." (Paper delivered at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.) Surveying the experience of the past twenty years, Fisher found that presidential appointees reported having received good cooperation from agency employees in carrying out administration programs but had great difficulty in dealing with the White House staff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy goal when he took office—a drastic cutback in the growth of the national government's domestic expenditures. The director of the OMB, David Stockman, served as the administration's point man in its ultimately successful effort to prune domestic spending programs.[11] There is also the revealing fact that when Reagan began to involve himself in Middle Eastern policy during his second term, because of his personal and political concern over the plight of the American hostages held in Lebanon, he suddenly revived the NSC staff and gave it a major role in the foreign policy process.

What the experience of the White House in modern times strongly suggests is that a president's ability to practice as well as preach Cabinet government largely depends on how active a role he intends to play in the development and implementation of national policy. The more a president wishes to shape the character of his administration's policy goals, the more likely he is to accent the role of the White House staff rather than the Cabinet in the governing process, however pious may be his protestations about the virtues of Cabinet government when he first takes office. This ascendancy by the White House staff has the inevitable effect of reducing bureaucratic influence over national policy decisions, since bureaucrats have much better access to Cabinet officials and much more opportunity to shape their views of policy issues than they do with respect to the president's own staff aides, who are usually isolated in the remote precincts of the White House. The lesson of the last half-century of American politics has thus been unmistakable—as the power of the White House staff grows, the power of departmental bureaucrats recedes.

Bureaucracy as Change Agent

The central conclusion that emerges from this analysis of the operation of the presidency in modern times is that bureaucracy's unsung role in the evolution of modern American government has been that of an unwitting change agent. As we have seen, the expansion in the number and activities of bureaucratic organizations within the executive branch has been a major factor underlying the ascending power of the presidency in the contemporary constitutional order. A variety of efforts have been made during this period to help the president cope with an ever-expanding bureaucracy, and each of these efforts has added another increment of power to the presidential office. This is true of all the reorganizations the executive branch has experienced since the late 1930s, the changes that have been made in the budgetary system, and the reforms that have taken place in executive personnel procedures.[12] The position of the imperial presidency today is in no small measure a product of a widely perceived need to prevent the emergence of an im-

[11] Stockman has provided us with his own account of his role as architect of the Reagan administration's budgetary strategy. See David A. Stockman, *The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan Revolution Failed* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).

[12] A discussion of these changes may be found in Crenson and Rourke, "American Bureaucracy."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perial bureaucracy. Moreover, presidents themselves have been quite willing to play on fears of bureaucracy to justify expanding the power of their own office. The real power of bureaucracies today thus lies not with bureaucrats but with the members of a new "political class"—the policy entrepreneurs the president has appointed to run these organizations and to shape their programs in his behalf.

The influence that bureaucracy has exerted as a change agent has been very visible in the development of the legislative and judicial as well as the executive branches of government in modern times. In the case of Congress one of the most significant changes that a proliferating bureaucracy has triggered is an expansion in the size and proficiency of the legislative staff.[13] This expansion has taken a variety of forms—in the size of the staffs that now serve individual members of Congress, in the number of professional experts presently attached to legislative committees in both the House and the Senate, and, finally, in the establishment or strengthening of four staff agencies that currently serve Congress as a collective body: the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Office of Technology Assessment.

The chief purpose, as well as the most important result, of this development has been to enable Congress to close the "expertise" gap that had opened up between itself and the presidency in the years immediately preceding and following World War II, when presidents began to benefit enormously from the bureaucratic apparatus that emerged at the White House during that period of time. Members of Congress are now able to draw upon the same high level of professional staff assistance that presidents command in handling complicated technical issues in both foreign and domestic policy making. Noteworthy also is the extent to which the reports and forecasts of the Congressional Budget Office are now given as much if not more credence than those of the president's own Office of Management and Budget. In net effect, therefore, the rise of bureaucracy can be said to have led not to a usurpation of legislative power, as many members of Congress feared would be the case when bureaucratic expansion first began, but to an enhancement of the legislature's capacity to do its own job.

Moreover, as Morris Fiorina has shown, the growth of bureaucracy has been of benefit to individual legislators as well as to the overall position of Congress as a legislative institution.[14] Members of the House of Representatives have come to enjoy increased success in running for reelection, and Fiorina attributes this success to the fact that they are able to solidify political support in their own districts by helping to resolve problems that their constituents are having with the Social Security system, the Veterans Administration, or other government agen-

[13] The rise of congressional staff is traced in Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan W. Hammond, *Congressional Staff: The Invisible Force in American Lawmaking* (New York: Free Press, 1977); and Michael Malbin, the *Unelected Representatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1980). It can of course be argued that all the legislature is doing in expanding its staff is putting itself under the control of its own bureaucratic apparatus in order to escape domination by executive bureaucrats.

[14] Morris P. Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cies. (According to the *Congressional Quarterly*, the number of House incumbents defeated in 1986 in both the primary and general elections was the smallest in history.) The rise of bureaucracy has thus enabled legislators to provide valuable services for the people in their districts, even if, as some critics contend, such casework activity distracts Congress from playing the part it should play in attacking major national policy issues.

The impact that the growth of bureaucracy has had upon the judicial system has been no less striking. In a variety of areas, but particularly in the field of social regulation, judges have now become major actors in the policy process, largely as a result of statutes that provide broader opportunities for private parties to challenge the decisions of executive agencies in the courts in such areas as environmental and civil rights policy. Thus agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) frequently find themselves being either prodded into action or having their decisions reversed by the courts. Through *Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus* and other decisions, the courts have pushed EPA toward framing a much more stringent policy to prevent significant deterioration in air quality than the agency originally intended to pursue.[15] In the case of EEOC, court decisions helped persuade the agency to take much stronger action in defense of the position of women in the workplace than it seemed initially prepared to undertake, since the EEOC originally viewed its mission as primarily that of dealing with the employment problems of blacks and other disadvantaged minorities.

In any case, there are clearly areas of policy today in which the old-fashioned iron-triangle paradigm no longer serves to explain the way in which policy is made. Hugh Heclo makes a very compelling argument that in many highly technical policy areas—arms control, for example, or the field of monetary policy—the iron triangle has been supplanted by an "issue network," where expertise rather than economic interest determines who participates in decision making.[16] It can also be argued that even in fields where the old-fashioned iron-triangle structure still stands, it has been greatly altered by the arrival of the courts as major actors in the policy process. Martin Shapiro suggests that this development has created a new iron-triangle system made up of "agency, court, and interest groups" in areas of policy where statutes have created rights or entitlements to governmental assistance for groups like the aged or physically handicapped.[17] Alternatively, in fields of social regulation like civil rights and environmental protection, the iron triangle appears to have broadened into a quadrilateral, as the courts join pressure groups, Congressional committees, and executive agencies as partners in these highly autono-

[15] See R. Shep Melnick, *Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983).

[16] Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

[17] Martin M. Shapiro, "The Presidency and the Federal Courts" in Arnold J. Meltsner, ed., *Politics and the Oval Office* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mous subgovernment compartments within which public policy is so frequently made in the United States.

But whether it is part of a triangular or a quadrilateral policy-making structure, there can be no denying the fact that the judiciary has extended its authority and stature as an institution because of its ability to monitor and reverse the decisions of administrative agencies in numerous fields of social regulation. In the eyes of some critics, the courts have actually become an imperial judiciary in carrying out this task, as sweeping in the exercise of arbitrary power as any bureaucracy could ever hope to be. In their view, it is from the jurocracy and not the bureaucracy that the constitutional order has the most to fear.[18]

But there is perhaps nowhere in American political life where the rise of bureaucracy has been accompanied by more changes than in the operation of the federal system. Since the 1930s state, local, and national agencies have been laced together by intricate bureaucratic networks carrying on domestic programs that are federally financed and locally administered. Some observers see this development as centralizing in its effect—transferring power from state and local to national agencies. Others argue that it has opened up authentic opportunities for decentralization, as opposed to the illusory opportunities that had previously existed, by providing states and localities with the resources to undertake many activities they could not otherwise afford. But both sides would certainly agree that the bureaucratization of intergovernmental relationships within the political system represents a fundamental change in the character of American federalism.

Legitimizing American Bureaucracy

Clearly, the evolution of modern American politics has not borne out the worst fears of those who saw the emergence of large-scale bureaucracy in the 1930s as a grave danger to constitutional government. Bureaucracy has, however, been a signficant instrument of change in the structure and operation of the three national institutions specifically established by the constitution: the presidency, Congress, and the courts. And many of the changes it has wrought have strengthened these traditional institutions in ways that reduced the likelihood that bureaucracy would ever threaten their power. It is not unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that looked at in terms of institution building, bureaucracy in the United States has done far more for the other institutions of government in this country than it has done for itself. In so doing, it has reinforced the ability of the American constitutional system to cope with the burdens of modern government.

In light of these developments, what is the constitutional status of bureaucracy today? How, if at all, does it fit into the tripartite scheme of government that the framers of the Constitution devised? Is the power that bureaucracies wield legiti-

[18] See Donald L. Horowitz, *The Courts and Social Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977) and *The Jurocracy: Government Lawyers, Agency Programs and Judicial Decisions* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mate power, in the sense that it is accepted by those subject to it as being rightfully exercised? In our day, bureaucracy has become an indispensable instrument of government in action. Virtually all government policies depend upon some bureaucratic organization for their enforcement. While bureaucracy does not enjoy the status of explicit mention in the constitutional document itself, this is a deficiency it shares with other institutions and practices that are integral parts of the unwritten Constitution in the United States, including the preeminent position of the Cabinet and the White House staff in the executive branch, the role of political parties in the election process, and the power of judicial review that the Supreme Court has come to exercise. Certainly the written Constitution does assume the presence of a bureaucratic apparatus in government sufficient to carry out the varied tasks it assigns to the president, Congress, and the courts.

Nevertheless, there is a certain aura of illegitimacy about bureaucracy—a suspicion that its presence and activities in the governmental structure are not altogether in accord with the American constitutional order.[19] Partly, this has been a procedural concern—focused on the way bureaucracies do things. Prior to the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and to a lesser extent since then, a great deal of criticism has been directed at bureaucracy on the grounds that the administrative role in both adjudication and rulemaking frequently violates the constitutional rights of individuals affected by the agency decisions that flow from these processes. While passage of the Procedure Act and the growing role of administrative law judges in agency adjudication have done much to dispel that fear, it has never been completely dispelled.

But quite apart from these long-standing doubts about the constitutional propriety of the procedures that bureaucratic organizations follow in enforcing government policies, there has also been strong criticism of bureaucracy on the grounds that the policies it carries out are unconstitutional in their very nature. Critics on the right who regard the free-enterprise system as part of the American constitutional convenant have questioned the legitimacy of a wide range of government policies regulating the affairs of business organizations or distributing financial or other benefits to a variety of domestic groups.

Critics on the left are equally vehement in their objections to many bureaucratic activities in the national security sector that in their view are carried on by executive agencies like the CIA in violation of constitutional norms. Bureaucracies can thus be attacked on both the right and left as lacking in constitutional legitimacy in the United States because they perform governmental functions that are themselves regarded as inappropriate for the government to undertake. At the root of bureaucracy's problem in this regard is the fact that an expansive role for the national government in the affairs of society still lacks a certain constitutional credibility in American political culture.

[19] For a comprehensive examination of the role that legitimacy plays in sustaining political systems, see William Connolly, ed., *Legitimacy and the State* (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1984).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Efforts have been made in modern times to relieve bureaucracy of this burden of illegitimacy. James O. Freedman has written "that governmental power in a constitutional democracy can be legitimated in only two ways: Either it must be created by the Constitution or it must be exercised by officials directly accountable to the people through the political process."[20] It is a little late in the day for any effort to be made to repair bureaucracy's omission from the written Constitution and highly questionable whether it would succeed. So that particular door to legitimation can be regarded as permanently closed as far as bureaucracy is concerned.

The other door, however, remains at least half open. Bureaucracy can be said to make a significant contribution to the process of self-government in the United States by providing opportunities for groups of citizens to be more intimately involved in government decision making than the traditional election system permits. Norton Long, for example, makes the argument that "important and vital interests in the United States are unrepresented, under-represented, or mal-represented in Congress. These interests receive more effective and more responsible representation through administrative channels than through the legislature."[21] Long comes to this conclusion because the bureaucracy more closely mirrors the country from a purely demographic perspective. As he puts it: "through the breadth of the interests represented in its composition, the bureaucracy provides a significant constitutionalizing element of pluralism in our government." In Long's view many interests that are neglected in the legislature find their only voice in the bureaucracy.[22]

In a recent and very comprehensive analysis of the legitimate place of bureaucracy in the American constitutional order, John Rohr makes a similar and very persuasive argument.[23] In his view "the administrative state heals a defect in the constitution"—the fact that it does not make adequate provision for public participation in government decision making. The growing role of bureaucracy in government opens an opportunity for many more people to become actively involved in the work of government. They may do so as civil servants, as citizens attending public hearings, or by taking advantage of other opportunities to participate in the everyday activities of administrative agencies.

The weight of this argument was greatly reinforced when citizen participation in government became the order of the day in the 1960s during President Lyndon Johnson's administration as part of the overall design of Great Society programs. When citizen participation democratized bureaucracies by allowing ordinary people to have more influence over their decisions, it also served to legitimate the role

[20] James O. Freedman, *Crisis and Legitimacy* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 126.

[21] Norton Long, "Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism," *American Political Science Review* 46 (September 1952): 811.

[22] Ibid., 816.

[23] John Rohr, *To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 40–53.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of these organizations in the governmental process. Equally important in this regard was the tendency of Great Society programs to be decentralized—directly administered by state and local rather than national agencies.

Since then even longer steps in this direction have been taken by handing programs over to private organizations or groups for their administration. This is the "third-party" or "private-federalism" approach to the implementation of government policies that has become increasingly fashionable.[24] Of course, as it develops, this democratization movement not only legitimizes bureaucracy but also diminishes its power. It thus represents another of the "countervailing forces," which, as previously indicated, have helped American democracy weather the challenge posed by the rise of bureaucracy.

But in any case, what all these varied efforts to involve the public more directly in the administration of government programs reflect is a deep-seated belief on the part of legislative and executive officials that bureaucratic power can best be legitimized by being democratized, by bringing the decisions of public bureaucrats much more closely under the control of private citizens.

A somewhat different approach to legitimizing the role of bureaucracy in the constitutional order was initiated by Woodrow Wilson in the late nineteenth century. In his celebrated essay on the *Study of Administration*, Wilson avoided any claim that bureaucracy has attributes that contribute to the achievement of democratic values.[25] Paralleling the view of Max Weber, he argued that bureaucracy could become as useful a tool in democratic as it already was in nondemocratic societies—helping to make each of these very different political systems more efficient as instruments of governance than they might otherwise be. What bureaucrats actually provide in the governmental process are technical skills that can be used to run any society. As far as political systems are concerned, bureaucracy was value-neutral in Wilson's view. It did not further the values of democracy, but neither did its presence in the governmental structure jeopardize any of these values.

The Wilsonian view, as enunciated in the 1880s, ultimately became a central article of faith in the reform creed in the United States. At the turn of the century the Progressives in Wisconsin and elsewhere saw administrative experts as the saviors of democracy, insofar as they provided the people with a means of offsetting the growing power of giant business organizations in American society. Among New Dealers in the 1930s, belief in the saving power of administrative expertise was as pronounced as it was in the Progressive era. At the state and local level of government, faith in such expertise is still very strong in some parts of the United States. It underlies the strong support given by civil-service reform groups to the proposi-

[24] See in this regard Lester Salamon, "Rethinking Public Management: Third-Party Government and the Changing Forms of Government Action," *Public Policy* 29 (Summer 1981): 255–275.

[25] Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 2 (June 1887): 197–222. For a recent reexamination of Wilson's argument, see Jameson W. Doig, "'If I see a Murderous Fellow Sharpening a Knife Cleverly . . .': the Wilsonian Dichotomy and the Public Authority Tradition," *Public Administration Review* 43 (March/April 1983): 292–304.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion that even leadership and policy-making positions in state or local bureaucracies should be filled on the basis of merit rather than election or political appointment.

The courts at first resisted the notion that administrative agencies were endowed with any knowledge superior to their own, but during the early years following World War II they came increasingly to see the legitimate role of bureaucracy in government from precisely this Wilsonian or Weberian perspective. A growing number of judges began to reason that administrative agencies brought a high level of expertise to the task of making or carrying out public policies that the courts could not provide and that effective government required. In their view bureaucrats performed an indispensable function in twentieth-century American government, and the courts were obliged to give a measure of respect and even finality to decisions that rested on their expertise.[26] Divisions and disputes among experts, and the somewhat diminished stature of expertise in contemporary American society have begun to weaken this judicial deference to bureaucrats in recent years. Yet to take hold is the argument Nelson Polsby makes that power is only exercised in a legitimate way in the United States when it rests on a consensus among a variety of elites including the higher civil service.[27] But there can be no disputing the fact that the knowledge and skills that bureaucrats bring to the policy process have given them an indispensable place, if not a legitimate role, in the American constitutional order. The central paradox of modern American bureaucracy thus lies in the fact that it is at one and the same time altogether indispensable and, at least in the eyes of many citizens, somewhat illegitimate.*

[26] An excellent analysis of the way the courts have regarded administrative expertise may be found in Freedman, *Crisis and Legitimacy*, 44–57.

[27] Nelson W. Polsby, "Presidential Cabinet-Making: Lessons for the Political System," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Spring 1978): 25.

* The research on which this article is based was supported by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation, for which the author would like to express his gratitude.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What Was Liberalism in the 1950s?

KENT M. BECK

Ronald Reagan's landslide reelection has given a new relevance to previous assessments of 1950s liberalism. Democratic strategists who now contemplate the ruins of their first successive presidential debacles in thirty years must ponder how best to revitalize their party at the national level—much like their earlier counterparts did after Dwight D. Eisenhower's second triumph in 1956. Specifically, today's Democrats must decide how much to change in the future: whether to stand by traditional principles and allies until the political winds shift or to heed the call for new ideas and tactics more in tune with changing circumstances and voter preferences.

Unfortunately, what historians and political scientists have said about 1950s liberalism does not offer a straightforward answer to the present Democratic dilemma. Earlier scholarship disagrees on how liberal Democrats found their way back to power and on whether or not 1950s progressives paid too high a price for electoral victory. The orthodox theory portrays 1950s liberalism as a cleverly updated version of the New Deal and insists that classical liberal-conservative battlelines endured past midcentury. According to this theory, liberal activists eventually achieved a political revival by mixing revamped proposals and different spokesmen with old values. In contrast, other authors dismiss the notion of a continuing ideology rooted in the Great Depression. Instead they locate the essence of 1950s liberalism in a national consensus related to the era of prosperity and global involvement after 1945. Whereas the orthodox school stresses traditional political conflict as a prelude to renewed reform in the 1960s, the revisionist persuasion sees liberal cold war militancy as a briefly attractive but otherwise misplaced outgrowth of the 1950s consensus that had disastrous consequences in the following decade.

KENT M. BECK is a staff historian with Headquarters, Strategic Air Command History Office. This article is a byproduct of research on liberals who were associated with Harry Truman and Adlai Stevenson.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now that Democratic liberalism is once again at a low ebb, it is appropriate to resurrect the older emphasis on ideological continuity and partisan strategy. While frequently uncritical, the traditionalists were right to fit a new progressive cast and some adjustments in doctrine into the same old political play. In opposing the Republicans, Harry Truman and Adlai Stevenson sustained the New Deal legacy of using the federal government to stabilize the economy, regulate business, expand the welfare state, and help the disadvantaged. Moreover, the revisionist notion that Stevenson's stewardship led to an erosion of Truman's Fair Deal program underestimates the extent to which activist Democrats kept their liberal faith after 1952. Though some criticism is warranted, Stevenson's specific, often political actions have been condemned by an absolute moral standard indifferent to electoral pressures.[1]

It is also crucial to recognize that the 1950s consensus did not stop liberal tendencies toward ambivalence and internal divisions. This insight poses a basic problem for those authors claiming a profound departure in liberal ideology, since they do not agree on the extent to which progressives accepted the reigning popular mood. Most revisionists argue that 1950s liberals fully shared the central assumptions of the era and only selectively opposed specific policies. However, other revisionist studies describe the 1950s liberal ideology as persistently troubled or skeptical despite progressive support for the post-1945 status quo.

The difficulty is that scholars have filtered the theoretical choice between underlying continuity or basic change through a range of methodologies that approach liberalism by considering leaders, ideology, and a spectrum of progressive opinion or political tactics. In this instance, theoretical preference generally determines methodology. Guided by a notion of ideological continuity, orthodox historians and political scientists proceed to study the actions of major leaders associated with the New Deal-Fair Deal tradition. For revisionists, in contrast, the premise of a transformed ideology necessitates that the world view or general ideas of leading liberal politicians or intellectuals command primary notice. Another methodology implicitly incorporates many orthodox assumptions, but is not tied to the two competing theories. This perspective (also called internal or bureaucratic politics) examines a spectrum of acknowledged liberal opinion considering

[1] For the nature of New Deal liberalism and its impact, see William E. Leuchtenberg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1932–1940* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 337–347; Robert Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," *American Historical Review* 82 (June 1977): 551–553; also James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 157–160. The continuity thesis was stated briefly by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in 1965. Some who argue that the post-1945 period was a watershed nevertheless find some merit in the traditional view. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett Publications, 1967), 14–15. Barton J. Bernstein, "America In War and Peace: The Test of Liberalism" in Bernstein, ed., *Towards A New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 289–291. Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 294–305, 499–500, 503, 513–514.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

several individuals or points of view in contrast to the individually oriented crucial-leader (or presidential-synthesis) approach. While interested in ideas, the group-spectrum emphasis elevates policy options above a general ideological framework. By presenting a range of progressive views, this notion highlights liberal diversity or conflict rather than consensus or ambivalence. A final methodology (overtly orthodox in its theoretical orientation) also gives an inside view but concentrates on the political strategy of liberals as candidates and campaign planners.[2]

Too often historians and political scientists studying 1950s liberalism have proceeded in isolation, sometimes making immodest claims for a leadership or an ideological mode of interpretation while ignoring the group-spectrum or tactical perspectives. This lack of synthesis or debate can be corrected by exploring and assessing each of the perspectives mentioned above. In each instance, we will review how each model describes 1950s liberalism, evaluate its findings, and suggest possible avenues for comparative analysis.

Leadership: Two Flawed Versions

Just as an election may turn into a referendum on the individual merits of the candidates, the personal perspective on 1950s liberalism has become a contest between positive and negative assessments of Adlai Stevenson and his associates. What began in the 1960s as a vibrant appreciation of warmth, courage, and innovation has been replaced in recent years by a wary perception of mediocrity, complacency, and error. Unfortunately, both the earlier celebration of 1950s liberalism and the subsequent downward revision foster a stereotyped view of liberals in the early postwar era.

After his sudden death in July 1965, Stevenson was remembered as a charismatic personality and a political prophet. He was, as Herbert J. Muller put it, "a rare person," a combination of style, idealism, and humility. Richard J. Walton and Hans Morgenthau agreed that he had pursued power with extraordinary civility. Other observers pointed to specific contributions. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., among others, hailed Stevenson as a political John the Baptist who inspired liberals and prepared the way for the New Frontier and the Great Society. In this connection, the *New York Times* recalled the "New America" domestic program of "his much under-valued second campaign." At the same time, others also remembered Stevenson's controversial 1956 call for an end to atmospheric nuclear testing, a goal largely achieved in the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.[3]

[2] This article has been inspired by three other studies. They are Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little-Brown, 1971); Jerald A. Combs, ed., *Nationalist, Realist and Radical: Three Views of American Diplomacy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Keith L. Nelson and Spencer C. Olin Jr., *Why War? Ideology, Theory and History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

[3] Herbert J. Muller, *Adlai Stevenson: A Study in Values* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), xi-xiii, 1-17; Richard J. Walton, *The Remnants of Power: The Tragic Last Years of Adlai Stevenson* (New

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Aside from Stevenson's acknowledged stature, these tributes were persuasive because they corresponded with a traditional progressive view of American reform and a contemporary disdain for the Eisenhower presidency. With the Great Society at high tide in 1965, Stevenson's career appeared to fit neatly into an established cyclical model of American politics based on alternating periods of reform and conservatism. A would-be Roosevelt or Wilson seeking power in the 1950s, Stevenson from this perspective was regrettably the right man in the wrong decade. By the mid-1960s, Stevenson's misfortune was widely perceived as America's loss, since Eisenhower was dismissed as little more than a latter day Calvin Coolidge. Muller spoke for many when he complained that while Eisenhower initially "had helped to quiet the worst in the American people, he had failed to bring out the best in them. . . ." To paraphrase Morgenthau, the vanquished shone more brightly than the victor.[4]

The image of gallantry that surrounded Stevenson's memory in the 1960s has survived in later studies of the governor and congressional liberals of the 1950s, but the heroic version of 1950s progressivism has declined in the years since 1965.[5] Under the relentless pressure of jarring events, contrary ideas, and new evidence, the previous standing of Stevenson and Eisenhower has largely been reversed and 1950s liberalism has been subjected to a sustained critique. Reacting to a series of favorable studies of the Eisenhower era in 1979, Schlesinger was forced to admit that Eisenhower was "a much abler man than his critics, this writer included, supposed in the 1950's." Reviewing the first volume of John Bartlow Martin's authoritative Stevenson biography three years earlier, John Milton Cooper belittled the once imposing loser as "an upper crust, basically conservative suburbanite and corporation lawyer of modest abilities and limited vision."[6] In a similar environment,

---

York: Coward, McCann, 1968), 7–8; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 136, 132–137; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days*, 14–15, 30–31; Alden Whitman and *The New York Times, Portrait: Adlai E. Stevenson: Politician, Diplomat, Friend* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 280–281; Kenneth S. Davis, *The Politics of Honor: A Biography of Adlai E. Stevenson* (New York: Putnams, 1967), 389–392.

[4] For classic examples of the progressive view see Benjamin P. DeWitt, *The Progressive Movement* (New York: Macmillan, 1915); John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961); Arthur M. Schlesinger detailed the cyclical theory in *Paths to the Present* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 77–92; also see Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The American as Reformer* (New York: Atheneum, 1968); Muller, *Adlai Stevenson*, 12, 105–112, 204–211; Morgenthau, "Adlai E. Stevenson," 132.

[5] Examples of the heroic version are John Bartlow Martin, *Adlai Stevenson and the World* (New York: Doubleday, 1977), 3–4; Joseph B. Gorman, *Kefauver: A Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), v-vi, 370–374; Paul H. Douglas, *In the Fullness of Time* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1972). Two respectful revisionist works are Bert Cochran, *Adlai Stevenson: Patrician Among the Politicians* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), 8–9; Mary S. McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals, 1947–1954* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), 1–32, 80–81, 134–142.

[6] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "The Eisenhower Presidency: A Reassessment," *Look*, 14 May 1979, 42, 40–49. For reviews of the literature on Eisenhower, see the following: Vincent P. DeSantis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," *Review of Politics* 38 (April 1976): 190–207; Gary W. Reichard, "Eisenhower as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two able academic protagonists, Barton J. Bernstein and Alonzo L. Hamby, have agreed that sometime after 1945 American liberalism suffered a failure of imagination and declined into contentment.

Bernstein's and Hamby's comments about 1950s liberalism cannot be understood without referring to their now familiar debate over the domestic and foreign policies of the Truman administration. In contrast to the traditionalists, these two historians have agreed that progressive ideology changed after 1945. They clash on the wisdom of that transition.[7] Bernstein and other radical historians have portrayed the Truman years as a time when the intrinsic flaws of liberal reform (mainly an acceptance of corporate capitalism) were magnified by a loss of audacity brought on by the cold war, a climate of moderation, and growing affluence.[8] In turn, orthodox scholars like Hamby have vigorously defended Truman's policies as a necessary response to Soviet totalitarianism abroad and as an imaginative adjustment to the new reality of abundance at home.[9]

Given these distinctive positions, it is astonishing that Bernstein and Hamby have come to agree that the liberal center *did* lose its vitality in the immediate postwar era and that on domestic issues progressives became shallow and weak. "Exaggerating the accomplishments of past reforms and believing that widespread prosperity had been achieved," liberals, Bernstein argues, "lost much of their social vision: they came to praise big business, to celebrate pluralism, to ignore poverty."[10] In an abrupt switch from liberal defender to liberal critic, Hamby accepts Bernstein's indictment while seeking to restrict it to Stevenson and the period after 1952. Whereas criticism from the progressive movement had kept Truman's administration on a positive liberal path, Hamby holds that without such "creative tension" liberalism sank into "flabbiness and complacency" during the Eisenhower presidency.[11]

President: The Changing View," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 77 (Summer 1978): 265–281; Stephen Ambrose, "The Ike Age," *New Republic*, 9 May 1981, 26–34; Mary S. McAuliffe, "Commentary/Eisenhower, the President," *Journal of American History* 68 (December 1981): 625–632; John Milton Cooper review of John Bartlow Martin, *Adlai Stevenson of Illinois* (New York: Doubleday, 1976), *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 60 (Autumn 1976): 73–74. For a view similar to Cooper's, see Richard T. Ruetten, "Adlai Stevenson and the Rhetoric of Moderate Liberalism," *Reviews in American History* 3 (September 1975): 389–393.

[7] The growing historiography of the 1945–1953 era is reviewed in Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974); Robert Griffith, "Truman and the Historians: The Reconstruction of Postwar American History," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 59 (Autumn 1975): 20–50; Geoffrey S. Smith, "'Harry, We Hardly Know You:' Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954," *American Political Science Review* 70 (June 1976): 560–582.

[8] Bernstein, "America In War and Peace," 289–291.

[9] Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, 505–516.

[10] Bernstein, "America in War and Peace," 290.

[11] Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Clash of Perspectives and the Need for New Syntheses" in Kirkendall, ed., *Truman Period*, 119, 143–144. For other variations on the same theme, see Jack Newfield and Jeff Greenfield, *A Populist Manifesto: The Making of a New Majority* (New York: Warner, 1972),

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This interpretation oversimplifies and distorts the liberal experience in the 1950s. The Bernstein-Hamby concept of liberal complacency is mistaken, incomplete, and superficial. Bernstein intends to summarize the ideology of 1950s liberalism, but the result is a personal condemnation that relies on a generalized "typical" liberal and stresses qualities like uncritical support for corporations or indifference to economic misery. Furthermore, this simple characterization is largely wrong. An examination of progressive attitudes toward poverty, big business, and civil rights proves that Adlai Stevenson and his supporters were both more dynamic and more traditional than the stigma of complacency would imply.

From a critical vantage point, the complacency thesis, like the congratulatory depiction previously introduced, is more rhetorical and polemical than substantive. Both the accusation and the eulogy inhabit a symbolic realm where statements and gestures are taken as definitive. Whatever its benefits, analyzing leaders obscures valid points that can be more effectively explained by other perspectives such as general ideology, a spectrum of group opinion, or political strategy.

Bernstein's 1967 assertion that liberals "ignored poverty" (a claim repeated in works published by other authors in 1977 and 1978) is definitely inaccurate in terms of progressive attitudes and activities in the second half of the 1950s.[12] The second volume of Martin's exhaustive Stevenson biography, which appeared in 1977, stressed that the existence of poverty and the need to combat it formed a recurring theme in the governor's second presidential campaign. As early as April 1956, in a Harrisburg, Pennsylvania talk, the candidate claimed that the plight of economically depressed areas was "getting all too little attention." From his nomination acceptance speech to election eve, Stevenson made at least eleven direct references to the problem of economic deprivation. Furthermore, as James L. Sundquist has shown, liberal Democrats did undertake a limited but persistent attack on poverty in the drive to pass Illinois Senator Paul Douglas's Area Redevelopment Bill between 1956 and 1960. Douglas's proposal was a modest $100 million package aimed at depressed areas like Appalachia. Having passed the Senate in 1956, the Douglas bill won the approval of both houses in 1958 and 1960, only to be vetoed twice by President Eisenhower. According to Sundquist, John F. Kennedy mentioned the fate of the Depressed Areas Bill in sixty-one speeches or statements in 1960. Echoing Stevenson in 1956, Kennedy declared, "I am not satisfied that 17-million Americans go to bed hungry every night."[13]

25–40; Richard Parker, *The Myth of the Middle Class* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 18–34. Hamby has since muted his biting criticism of 1950s liberalism without surrendering his strong preference for the Fair Deal. See Alonzo L. Hamby, *The Imperial Years* (New York: Weybright & Talley, 1976), 176–177, 186. Hamby's latest book was not included in this analysis. Alonzo L. Hamby, *Liberalism and its Challengers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

[12] Douglas T. Miller and Marion Novak, *The Fifties: The Way We Really Were* (New York: Doubleday, 1977), 223; Henry Fairlie, *The Parties: Republicans and Democrats in this Century* (New York: Pocket Books, 1978), 189.

[13] Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 307; Adlai E. Stevenson, *The New America* (New York: Harper, 1957), 6, 11; also see "Shakedown Cruise," *Time*, 17 September 1956, 24. The eleven comments about

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Impressive at first glance, Hamby's 1973 polarity between the "militant reform program" of the Truman liberals and the softer "qualitative liberalism" of the Stevenson liberals shrinks into insignificance upon closer scrutiny. Hamby makes his case for creeping complacency largely on the basis of a much quoted 1956 article by Schlesinger, a major figure in the intellectual circle around Stevenson, and a critical response by Leon Keyserling, influential as Truman's chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1950 to 1953.[14]

A quick reading of the Schlesinger and Keyserling pieces seems to confirm Hamby's point, since Schlesinger appears generally satisfied and Keyserling adopts a much more critical stance. "Instead of talking as if the necessities of living . . . were still at stake," Schlesinger argued that liberals "should be able to count that fight won and move on to the more subtle and complicated problems of fighting for individual dignity, identity and fulfillment in a mass society."[15]

In a spirited reply, Keyserling took Schlesinger to task for underestimating the number of relatively deprived people. In terms of America's economic potential, Keyserling boldly held that more American families could "properly be called 'poor' . . . than two decades ago." Moreover, compared to the general well-being, the overall number of deprived and disadvantaged might be "as glaring as in the early 1930's." The real choice, Keyserling insisted, was between courage and equivocation, "effective liberalism and its pale imitation."[16]

A close analysis reveals that Schlesinger was not in fact as timid as Keyserling's retort and parts of his own rhetoric implied. If the Harvard historian held that "both poverty and reaction have receded from the forefront of our national life," he also observed, "there are unhappily still broad areas of poverty in our land," and that "there is still much to be done in completing the battle against poverty." He decried the fate of low-income families and deplored the existence of depressed areas in the Northeast, as well as rural poverty in the Farm Belt.[17] Even as he urged

---

poverty are cited in Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 361, 365; also in Walter Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Toward a New America 1955–1957*, vol. vi (Boston: Little Brown, 1976), 186, 216–217, 236–237, 242–243, 246, 253, 262, 276; James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968), 59–73. Also see Douglas, *In the Fullness of Time*, 512–522; Carl M. Brauer, "Kennedy, Johnson and the War on Poverty," *Journal of American History* 69 (June 1982): 98–101; "Candidate in Orbit," *Time*, 7 November 1960, 26. For a further sample, see Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 917.

[14] Hamby, "The Clash of Perspectives," 119, 143–144; Hamby also refers to John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent Society*. I have chosen to focus here on the Schlesinger article and to examine his argument regarding Galbraith at another time.

[15] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "The Future of Liberalism: The Challenge of Abundance," *Reporter*, 3 May 1956, 9.

[16] Leon Keyserling, "'Liberal' Government is Not Enough," *Reporter*, 31 May 1956, 17–18.

[17] Schlesinger, "The Future of Liberalism," 9. Schlesinger was implicitly comparing the America of the 1950s with the far worse conditions of the Great Depression. Also see Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., "Where Does the Liberal Go From Here?" *New York Times Magazine*, 4 August 1957, 7. In the later article, Schlesinger explicitly stated that while some poverty remained, the achievement of "something approaching full employment" and steady economic growth marked a decisive break with previous circumstances.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less preoccupation with economic problems and more emphasis on social questions, Schlesinger advocated an across-the-board increase in government spending to improve public services.[18] In contrast to Keyserling, concern over poverty was not at the core of Schlesinger's thought in 1956. However, it is both unfair and misleading to infer that Schlesinger was self-satisfied or indifferent to human suffering.[19]

Hamby's 1973 argument that Stevenson was more moderate and less aggressive than Truman is somewhat persuasive on the level of campaign oratory. Whereas Truman in 1948 assailed "gluttons of privilege" and "Wall Street reactionaries," Stevenson in 1952 claimed that the Democrats were the "truly conservative party of this country." Going farther in 1955–1956, Stevenson published a friendly article in *Fortune* and told corporate leaders that "the Democratic party is the best friend American business has. . . ."[20] On civil rights, in 1952 Stevenson only belatedly and half-heartedly endorsed Truman's stand for a strong federal Fair Employment Practices Commission and for reform of the filibuster.[21]

After 1952, as Hamby might emphasize, the rhetorical contrast between Truman's relative courage on civil rights and Stevenson's consistent expediency became more pronounced. The President had bluntly told a 1947 NAACP rally that "we can no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely attack upon prejudice and discrimina-

[18] Ibid., 10. Two recent comments on Schlesinger's 1956 article reach varying conclusions. Depicting underlying continuity, Carroll Engelhardt in 1981 concluded that Schlesinger's priorities amounted to the "unfinished business of the New Deal wrapped in an attractive new slogan." Three years later, Allen J. Matusow identified Schlesinger with a "liberalism in retreat" in the late 1940s, a loss of vigor that reduced belief in reform to a "ritual" by the mid-1950s. On the other hand, Matusow cited Schlesinger's 1956 essay as a forerunner of the more aggressive progressive stance manifested in the Sputnik mood. See Carroll Engelhardt, "Man in the Middle: Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., and Postwar American Liberalism," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 80 (Spring 1981): 133–134; and Allen J. Matusow, *The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960's* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 4–9.

[19] Hamby's 1973 preference for the Truman liberals is paralleled by Bernstein's 1971 belief that the Progressive and Socialist parties in 1952 better understood the persistence of poverty and the social costs of corporate capitalism. As with Hamby, Bernstein's specific comparison does not sustain a general charge of liberal complacency. Barton J. Bernstein, "Commentary," in Kirkendall, ed., *The Truman Period as a Research Field*, 184–189. Bernstein's specific comparison is presented in "Election of 1952" in Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Fred Israel, eds., *History of American Presidential Elections* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), 3255–3257.

[20] For a sample of Truman's 1948 rhetoric see Irwin Ross, *The Loneliest Campaign* (New York: NAL, 1968), 182–183, 188; and Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, 249. The Stevenson article, published in October 1955 is reprinted in Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: "Let's Talk Sense to the American People," 1952–1955*, vol. iv, 1974, 565–577. It is discussed in Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, 387. Also see Stevenson, "The Democratic Party and Business" in the *The New America*, 261. Lawrence Wittner has pointed out that Truman drew heavily on the business elite to staff his administration. Lawrence S. Wittner, *Cold War America* (New York: Praeger, 1974), 115.

[21] Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 300–302. On Stevenson and Truman on civil rights in 1952, see Donald R. McCoy and Richard Ruetten, *Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973), 314–329; Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, 489–499; John Bartlow Martin, *Stevenson of Illinois* (New York: Anchor Books, 1977), 540, 551–552, 656–657, 689–690.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion." Lacking such urgency six years later, the once and future candidate blandly admonished the Georgia legislature that black progress should continue, "particularly in enlarged opportunities for Negro employment. . . ."[22]

Furthermore, Stevenson's temporizing did have an important effect on the Democratic party's civil rights posture in 1956. Eight years after northern liberals had carried a convention floor fight for a plank commending Truman's position on the issue, they were unable and in other cases unwilling to force a roll-call vote on a motion to pledge the party to enforce the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision.[23] At Stevenson's behest, Hubert Humphrey temporarily dropped the role of crusader for human rights to seek out southern support for his ill-fated vice presidential bid.[24]

Nevertheless, the contrast between Stevenson and Truman, so clear at a distance, becomes blurred at closer range. The stereotypes did not always hold. Despite his publicized overtures to business, Stevenson in 1956 did at times try to sound like Truman in 1948. "It is time," he implored, "to take the government away from General Motors and give it back to Joe Smith." At the end of September 1956, journalist James Reston reported cynically that Stevenson "has been wowing the voters with an essentially phony argument that Eisenhower is a captive of big business."[25]

Truman and Stevenson also crossed paths on civil rights. Truman, like Stevenson, embraced compromise at the 1956 convention. The former President appeared personally before the delegates to urge them to adopt the mild majority civil rights plank. Truman similarly had preferred what Hamby described as "a vague civil rights plank" at the 1948 convention. President Truman did emulate Lincoln on civil rights, while candidate Stevenson resembled an enlightened Stephen Douglas one hundred years later. Yet Stevenson was never president and as party leaders both men were governed by the *Realpolitik* of election strategy.[26]

Once the focus shifts to the liberal movement as a whole, the complacency thesis is unconvincing. After 1952, liberal support for Stevenson was neither unanimous nor uncritical. Some activists deserted Stevenson for Estes Kefauver in the 1956

[22] Truman in McCoy and Ruetten, *Quest and Response*, 73–74; Stevenson in Herbert S. Parmet, *The Democrats: The Years After FDR* (New York: Macmillan, 1976), 132–133, 138, also 123–125. Stevenson's 1953 Georgia speech included one of his many attacks on McCarthyism. See Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 92–93.

[23] Parmet, *The Democrats*, 138–141; Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 348–349; Douglas, *In the Fullness of Time*, 283–284.

[24] Hubert H. Humphrey, *The Education of a Public Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 188–189.

[25] Stevenson in Eugene H. Roseboom and Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., *A History of Presidential Elections* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 539; Reston in Whitman and *The New York Times, Portrait*, 160. Hamby admitted that Stevenson's moderation in 1952 was "partly a matter of rhetoric." Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, 499.

[26] Parmet, *The Democrats*, 141; Carey McWilliams, "Moderation Triumphs," *Nation*, 25 August 1956, 149–150; Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, 243.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

primaries. To a substantial degree, Stevenson and Democratic progressives parted company on the question of racial equality. Many liberals shared *The Progressive*'s April 1956 complaint that Stevenson had been "overly cautious, sometimes timid" on race relations. Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) liberals like Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, Joseph Rauh, and G. Mennen Williams (together with the AFL-CIO and the NAACP) placed conscience before harmony at the 1956 convention. According to Thomas C. Reeves, the ADA's 1956 civil rights fight was indicative of the organization's dogged persistence throughout the decade. After 1956, as Hamby acknowledged in 1976, two liberal groups, the Democratic Advisory Council and the Democratic Study Group detailed and promoted a reform agenda, which was passed in the 1960s.[27]

When the representative-leader perspective is extended further—to include Dwight D. Eisenhower—the old notion of liberal-conservative conflict in domestic affairs regains significant validity. Even those who might claim kinship with Bernstein and Hamby concede that the Republican President blocked progressive plans in the late 1950s. In *The End of Liberalism*, published in 1969, political scientist Theodore Lowi was certain that the "old liberal-conservative dialogue" had been superseded by a general agreement that the federal government should be actively involved at home. However, Lowi granted that this transformation was slowed by the "relative quiescence" of the Eisenhower years. In a recent study, *America's Impasse*, sociologist Alan Wolfe charged that post-1945 liberals had gradually blended into a bipartisan coalition for economic growth and an aggressive foreign policy. Wolfe, like Lowi, admits that Eisenhower resisted "the complacent vision" of the "pro-growth liberals" and delayed the triumph of their policies until "the Republican interregnum of the 1950's" was over.[28]

Ultimately, the biographical model becomes fruitful and reliable only when it avoids narrow comparisons and does not allow personalities to interfere with a consideration of social policy. Any appraisal of 1950s liberalism must also embrace the records of progressive governors, mayors, and congressmen. At all levels of government, detailing the impact of specific programs (such as Governor Averell Harriman's antipoverty effort in New York) surely is more meaningful than exchanging impressions of vigor or complacency. Otherwise, the personal mode of analysis becomes the prisoner of rhetoric and nuance.

In this regard, it is a mistake to dismiss Adlai Stevenson as a closet conservative

[27] "The President's Heart and the Democrats' Soul," *Progressive*, April 1956, 3–4; Parmet, *The Democrats*, 121–125, 138–141; Gorman, *Kefauver*, 234–237; Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 254–267, 348–349; Thomas C. Reeves, "Liberals at Bay: Americans for Democratic Action in the Eisenhower Era," (unpublished paper, 1976 Organization of American Historians convention), 10–11; Hamby, *The Imperial Years*, 186. The author thanks Professor Reeves for supplying a copy of his paper.

[28] Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: Norton, 1969), 67–68, 55–65. Alan Wolfe, *America's Impasse: The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth* (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 11, 23–31, 80–81. For the most recent analysis of Eisenhower's resistance to welfare state liberalism, see Robert Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth," *American Historical Review* 87 (February 1982): 87–122.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as some authors have attempted to do.[29] To be sure, Martin has uncovered less than flattering aspects of Stevenson's character and politics. Stevenson did not deserve his egghead reputation, and he could be distressingly aloof, moody, and erratic. Moreover, he privately opposed parts of the Fair Deal and repeatedly waffled on civil rights. On the other hand, although Stevenson's basic instincts were cautious, the same could be and has been said of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Furthermore, Stevenson did campaign in 1956 for several proposals that upheld the Fair Deal and looked ahead to the New Frontier-Great Society era.[30] Of course, reaffirming Stevenson's liberal credentials only indicates a larger pattern of political continuity. It does not suggest enlightenment or imply the lack of a social vision.

Ideology: A General Consensus

If several works published in the mid and late 1970's are any indication, one may learn more about the temper of 1950s liberalism by studying ideas rather than individuals. Godfrey Hodgson, Robert Booth Fowler, and John C. Donovan, among others, have shifted their spotlights from the actors to the ideological stage on which they stood. Hodgson's *America in Our Time* summarizes and explicates the widely held view that almost all Americans in the 1950s were gripped by a set of assumptions resting on abundance and the cold war. Fowler's *Believing Skeptics* is more discrete and intricate, but discerns a similar climate of opinion among leading intellectuals from 1945 to 1964. Though generally concerned with a smaller foreign-policy elite, Donovan's *The Cold Warriors* strongly implies that 1950s liberals were dominated by the specific militant philosophy first defined by National Security Council Report No. 68 (NSC-68) and restated by Dean Acheson throughout the period. More dispassionate and probing than the salutes and dismissals previously explored, the ideological emphasis ably captures the climate of the 1950s but often ends up claiming that consensus in its general or narrow

[29] Newfield and Greenfield, *A Populist Manifesto*, 35–36; Fairlie, *The Parties*, 188–190; Miller and Novak, *The Fifties*, 223–224; Irving Howe, *Steady Work: Essays in the Politics of Democratic Radicalism, 1953–1966* (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1966), 222.

[30] Representative incidents from Martin's massive works include, Martin, *Stevenson of Illinois*, 128–129, 380–381, 522–525, 530, 540, 642–643; Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 246–247, 263–267, 286–293, 301–302, 314, 337–338, 351–353, 418, 505–517, 522–528. Two classic accounts of earlier reform presidents, which stress restraint, are John Morton Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954); Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910–1917* (New York: Harper 1954); for the second Roosevelt era, see Otis Graham, ed., *The New Deal: The Critical Issues* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971). For a good analysis of the pitfalls of biography as a basis for synthesis see Barry D. Karl, "Deconstructing Stevenson, Or Badly For Adlai," *Reviews in American History* 5 (September 1977): 426–432. After 1956 Stevenson believed that increased domestic spending was necessary and inevitable. In June 1964 he strongly defended the need for social programs. See Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai Stevenson: Continuing Education and the Unfinished Business of American Society 1957–1961*, vol. vii, 1977, 142; Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Ambassador to the United Nations 1961–1965*, vol. viii, 1979, 567–574.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

form can explain everything. The consensus model's otherwise valuable preoccupation with mapping common ground frequently slips into a seductive description of uniformity, which ignores or underestimates distinctions between liberals and considerations of political strategy.[31]

For Hodgson, the fact of prosperity after World War II produced a series of governing ideas based on an apparently well founded faith in the relentlessly expanding American economy. Beginning in 1949 and continuing throughout the 1950s, countless intellectuals and popular observers redefined the United States as a stable society. Both as an inheritance and as a contemporary reality, affluence appeared as the precious gift that freed America to solve its problems pragmatically without the European curse of class conflict and ideology. Hodgson has elevated the old philosophy of consensus into the hallmark of the Eisenhower and Kennedy eras. Everything about the United States at this time, he believes, can be traced to a "vigorous assurance" akin to the British mindset in the mid-Victorian age.[32]

In keeping with Hodgson's analysis, this confident outlook was shared by both the Truman and the Stevenson wings of the liberal Democratic elite throughout the 1950s. As Hamby has detailed, Truman in his second term generally adopted Leon Keyserling's adherence to economic growth. Keyserling in turn made overtures to business designed to erase his unjustified reputation as a radical. During the Korean War, the President presided over a major boom and, for understandable political reasons, shelved the Fair Deal.[33] By 1956, both Schlesinger and Keyserling mixed their social concern with a sense of abundance. Schlesinger hailed the size of the labor force and the gross national product as well as the existence of laws to protect workers and farmers. The historian rejoiced that business was "progressive and enlightened" and that trade unions were "solid and respectable."[34] Less sanguine about the national economic health, Keyserling nevertheless agreed that business had made "great and laudable strides forward."[35] Poverty was some-

[31] Godfrey Hodgson, *America in Our Time* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976); Robert Booth Fowler, *Believing Skeptics: American Political Intellectuals, 1945–1964* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978); John C. Donovan, *The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974).

[32] Hodgson, *America in Our Time*, 12–13, 33–34, 50–52, 67–98. The British historian-politician Roy Jenkins has applied the metaphor of Victorian optimism to America from 1900 through the 1950s. See Roy Jenkins, *Nine Men of Power* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1974), 183–185.

[33] Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, 298–303, 441–454. Examples of Keyserling's overtures to business are "Avoiding a Recession, An Interview with Leon H. Keyserling," *U.S. News and World Report*, 4 March 1949, 30–34; Leon H. Keyserling, "Mr. Keyserling's Position," *Fortune*, October 1949, 77–79; "For the Common Good," *Time*, 8 January 1950, 10–11; "Washington Outlook," *Business Week*, 7 January 1950, 16. For a valuable overview of the general cult of "people's capitalism" see Miller and Novak, *The Fifties*, 106–123.

[34] Schlesinger, "The Future of Liberalism," 9; James A. Neuchterlein has accused Schlesinger and other 1950s liberals of underestimating the benefits of abundance. The above analysis disputes that finding. See James A. Neuchterlein, "Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and the Discontents of Postwar American Liberalism," *Review of Politics* 39 (January 1977): 18–19.

[35] Keyserling, "'Liberal' Government is Not Enough," 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thing to be disturbed about, but to most liberals it seemed a residual problem.[36] In the same acceptance speech in which he decried deprivation, Adlai Stevenson gloried in prosperity, proclaiming that "the old, terrible, grinding anxieties of daily bread, of shelter and raiment are disappearing." This spirit of confidence produced a specialized regional conception of poverty, articulated by Harvard economists Seymour Harris and John Kenneth Galbraith and embodied in the Area Redevelopment Bill.[37]

The liberal celebration of moderation and affluence described by Hodgson must not be presented apart from its historical context. At the time, this optimistic viewpoint was firmly grounded in a stable economic reality. Just as the achievement of full employment (4 percent jobless) in 1956 appeared wondrous by 1930s standards, the "high" inflation rate of 3–4 percent that year was almost utopian when compared to the rampaging prices of the 1970s and early 1980s. Even allowing for the serious recessions of 1957–1958, 1960–1961, and later years, Stevenson's hopeful words in 1956 were far less hollow than Herbert Hoover's famous farewell to the poorhouse in 1928. Secondly, as the Area Redevelopment Bill attests, even before Michael Harrington's heralded "rediscovery" of poverty in *The Other America* (1962), the existence of severe economic deprivation had gained the attention of many progressives.[38]

Hodgson's analysis naturally extends to the 1950s consensus on the need to wage a global cold war to contain communism. He rightly points out that post-Korea foreign policy debates usually revolved around specific differences about how much to spend on foreign aid, arms, and space. In foreign policy as in most other realms, choices were confined to "a Chevy and a Ford, or a Pepsi and a Coke." Even if true, however, this unsurprising insight raises problems. If self-described liberals and conservatives only played different arrangements of the same music, how much of their harmony can be explained by a common "liberal" ideology? Hodgson himself moves beyond ideas to borrow from works that highlight a common generational experience or a unified foreign-policy establishment. Other authors have

[36] Bernstein, "America in War and Peace," 302. There is an alternative liberal tradition, expressed in the 1945 Murray-Wagner Full Employment Bill and the similar 1975 Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, which calls for direct government planning to take up an expected slack in jobs. This approach contrasts with a reliance on fiscal stimulus and limited assistance to specific areas and groups.

[37] Stevenson in Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai Stevenson: Toward A New America (1955–1957)*, 186–187. See Seymour Harris, *The Economics of New England* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952); "Old Age Security for Our Economic Areas," *New York Times Magazine*, 29 July 1951, 17, 36–37; and "What Ails New England?" *Saturday Review*, 18 December 1954, 18–19. A more famous and controversial use of the regional conception of poverty is John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 323–333.

[38] See Harold G. Vatter, *The U.S. Economy in the 1950's* (New York: Norton, 1963), 4–5, 73, 105; Robert L. Heilbroner and Lester C. Thurow, *The Economic Problem* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1975), 506. A strong awareness of abundance may have enhanced liberal concern about poverty. Stevenson previewed 1960s rhetoric in 1956 when he claimed that leaving people "in misery" was "a matter of policy, not of destiny." Stevenson in Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Toward a New America 1955–1957*, 242–243.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pointed to national character or class interests.[39] Whatever the reason, the background and attitudes of many progressive leaders were not unique. If a "liberal consensus" did set the parameters of the 1950s, any criticism of the moderate left may be extended to include the era in general. To be fair, we need to know more about what did and did not distinguish liberals from their nonliberal counterparts.

Distinctive liberal attitudes do stand out despite the dramatic convergence that occurred at the height of the cold war. Several studies verify Hodgson's theme of extraordinary unity but also suggest that there were meaningful differences within the general consensus. If a petitition sponsored by the Committee for One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations could attract the signatures of Hubert Humphrey and Mississippi Senator James Eastland, other coalitions were less enduring or not as encompassing. Between 1951 and 1956, the American Congress for Cultural Freedom (ACCF) brought together former Communist conservatives and anti-Stalinist liberals to oppose Communist-front activity among writers and artists. However, the ACCF's initial solidarity soon disintegrated into nasty and destructive infighting over whether or not McCarthyism should be condemned. Opposition to communism and McCarthyism led the Ford Foundation to sponsor the Fund for the Republic, a group which was led by concerned moderates like businessman Paul Hoffman and committed liberals like educator Robert Hutchins.[40]

The same mix of dominant unity and underlying diversity lingered in the worries of many national leaders as the 1950s ended. Reviewing the "national purpose" debate of 1959–1960, John W. Jeffries marvelled at the almost universal agreement that the United States must mount a stronger and more effective cold war foreign policy in the 1960s. Beneath this "basic American consensus of 1960," Jeffries located differences between Kennedy and Richard Nixon on the pace of

[39] Hodgson, *America in Our Time*, 71–74, 105–133. The use of national character to explain foreign policy reached a peak in the 1950s in works like Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955); Robert Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); and Dexter Perkins, *Foreign Policy and the American Spirit* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957). A more recent example is Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973). For a brief discussion of how radical and left-liberal historians have variously used theories based on class, see Bernstein, "Commentary," in Kirkendall, ed., *The Truman Period As A Research Field: A Reappraisal,* 1972, 162–166.

[40] Stanley D. Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million: "China Lobby" Politics, 1953–1971* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 62–69. Two accounts of the American Congress for Cultural Freedom are Christopher Lasch, "The Cultural Cold War: A Short History of the Congress for Cultural Freedom" in *The Agony of the American Left* (New York: Vintage, 1969), 63–114; McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left*, 108–129; John P. Diggins, *Up From Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 326–331, 496–497; Thomas C. Reeves, *Freedom and the Foundation: The Fund for the Republic in the Era of McCarthyism* (New York: Knopf, 1969), 3–60, 204–230. The Fund drew fire for having radicals like Michael Harrington and Paul Jacobs on its staff. Recalling the incident, Harrington was naturally grateful that Fund leaders had stood by him. Michael Harrington, *Fragments of the Century: A Social Autobiography* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1973), 86–88.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

domestic change and drew a further contrast between Stevenson and Barry Goldwater on whether diplomacy or force should come first in any revised approach to world affairs.[41]

Ambivalence Despite Consensus

What caused these differences? Partisanship and the traditional liberal-conservative argument over the domestic role of government obviously explain a great deal. Certainly, McCarthyism eventually isolated the far right from responsible opinion. While significant, these factors do not supply a complete answer. Surely, some of the diversity must have been prompted either by divisions over specific issues within the liberal political-intellectual elite or by an ambivalent outlook among liberals. Intellectuals generally regarded as liberals in the 1950s were simultaneously pleased and troubled, confident of America's ultimate virtue and stability, but increasingly concerned about the short-range wisdom and resolve of the people. Most critics, including Hodgson, have seized on either the excessive optimism or pessimism they associate with the 1950s consensus without either admitting or explaining these contrary impulses. Progressive thinkers, for example, have been attacked for their patriotic hopes as well as for their realistic doubts.

Many observers have charged that liberal intellectuals at this time were regrettably representative of a generation that believed too much. Hodgson found too much faith in economic growth, a global foreign policy, middle-class uniformity, large institutions, and presidential power. John P. Diggins, a sympathetic critic, accused historian Daniel Boorstin of making a fetish of America's pragmatic tradition to justify a victor's history without tension or tragedy. By joining and later defending CIA-supported groups like the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, liberal authors, according to Christopher Lasch, "so completely assimilated the official point of view" that they served as apologists for American power and "value-free" research, not as defenders of genuine academic freedom.[42]

Censured for not being more skeptical of the 1950s status quo, liberal intellectuals have also been faulted for debunking the past and for being cynical about efforts for change. Given a chastened view of human nature by Stalin, Hitler, and McCarthy, many writers backed away from the classical progressive belief that the people know best. Their critical scrutiny of public opinion and previous reform movements undermined a sustaining version of the past and precluded a transforming vision of the future. Moreover, much of this scholarly criticism was inac-

[41] John W. Jeffries, "The Quest for National Purpose of 1960," *American Quarterly* 30 (Fall 1978): 455–458, 461.

[42] Hodgson, *America in Our Time*, 74–110, 120–126, 263–305. John P. Diggins, "Consciousness and Ideology in American History: The Burden of Daniel J. Boorstin," *American Historical Review* 76 (February 1971): 99–102, 110–112. For Richard Hofstadter's reservations about consensus historiography, see Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians* (New York: Knopf, 1970), 437–466. Lasch, "The Cultural Cold War," 75, 95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

curate. Consensus historians were mistaken in finding the Populists intolerant and the Progressives motivated by status anxiety. Likewise, pluralist theorists wrongly linked support for McCarthyism with a heritage of agrarian radicalism. As a general attitude, this cautious perspective encouraged moderation rather than insurgency. The "crisis theology" of Reinhold Niebuhr and Will Herberg, in Diggins' phrase, "strangled the millennialistic myths of American radicalism"; while Richard Hofstadter, according to Daniel Howe and Peter Finn, "stretched American society on the analyst's couch and stripped away its illusions" without supplying "a new sense of corporate identity."[43]

Robert Booth Fowler's *Believing Skeptics* encompasses and balances the themes of belief and skepticism within post-World War II liberal thought. For Fowler, the ideological consensus was as complex as it was pervasive. America's predominantly liberal postwar intellectuals were far from radical in that they rejected totalitarianism, affirmed the United States as a successful society, and worked to preserve individualism, tolerance, and the welfare state. Conversely, unity and satisfaction did not mean unqualified assent. Most intellectuals, according to Fowler, were "often critical of one feature or another" of the contemporary scene. Having put on the armor of liberalism, these thinkers were relentlessly skeptical of the "absolutes" of other ideologies. Yet they normally did not question the "specialness" of America or the validity of liberal assumptions. Apart from constructing an ideal of pragmatic realism and postulating a reality of pluralist competition, progressive intellectuals merely put a new gloss on old truths.[44]

Fowler makes provocative distinctions among mainstream liberal authors. He makes it clear that some figures like Boorstin and Clinton Rossiter were indeed uncritical celebrants of American life. Louis Hartz and Reinhold Niebuhr in contrast deplored such self-confidence, while most major writers like Schlesinger, Richard Hofstadter, and David Riesman were not as satisfied or as skeptical. Unfortunately, Fowler leaves the reader wondering what more can be said about the gray majority between Boorstin and Hartz? If this divergence was more than a slight matter of degree, then detailing a group spectrum may be as revealing as explaining a common ideology.[45]

[43] For a review and rebuttal of the "status anxiety" theory of progressivism, see David P. Thelen, "Social Tensions and the Origins of Progressivism," *Journal of American History* 56 (September 1969): 323–341. On populism, see James Turner, "Understanding the Populists," *Journal of American History* 67 (September 1980): 354–373. Michael P. Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967); John P. Diggins, *The American Left in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 143, 136–145; Daniel W. Howe and Peter E. Finn, "Richard Hofstadter: The Ironies of an American Historian," *Pacific Historical Review*, 43 (February 1974): 21; Marian J. Morton, *The Terrors of Ideological Politics* (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972), 127–141.

[44] Fowler, *Believing Skeptics*, 259–273, 277–286, 40–66, 121–144, 176–210, 215–252. Fowler rightly complained that later critics frequently equated "a concern with stability" with "a knee-jerk affirmation of the status quo." See 263.

[45] Ibid., 259–286, 4–34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unlike Fowler, recent studies of liberal attitudes toward foreign policy in the Eisenhower years have made a consistent methodological choice between ideology or group spectrum. Though exponents of a general consensus theory remain influential, an increasing number of authors now reject the framework of unifying or paradoxical ideas in discussing international affairs. Examinations of the progressive strategic-diplomatic outlook have moved toward theories of elite control, group conflict, and genuine pluralism. Those who see conflict or pluralism perceive a variety of contrasting foreign-policy priorities associated with individual liberal leaders. These alternative conclusions and approaches are most prominent in treatments of foreign and defense policies, since the extent to which 1950s liberals were dominated by a bipolar ideology is crucial both to place blame for the eventual American escalation in Vietnam and to find the roots of the liberal opposition to the war.

Ideology: The NSC-68 Consensus

It is now common knowledge that from the first months of the Republican administration onward, liberals (and many nonliberal Democrats) dissented from specific aspects of Eisenhower's foreign policy and denounced the "New Look" of fewer troops and less defense spending. In 1973, Barton J. Bernstein characterized the contemporary moderate left evaluation of Eisenhower's diplomacy as a "severe" and "massive" indictment. Five years later, Gary W. Reichard disputed the assumption of bipartisanship in foreign policy and insisted that, aside from Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn, "the opposition party *did* oppose Eisenhower" from 1953 to 1956. Various accounts have cited warnings of military weakness and strategic inflexibility from Acheson, Stevenson, Schlesinger, Chester Bowles, Stuart Symington, and John F. Kennedy among others. As William C. Berman explained in a 1976 paper, the Democratic Advisory Council (DAC) pointed to the Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik and the disclosure of the apparent "missile gap" and "sounded the trumpet of alarm about the seeming deterioration of American power and influence."[46]

Berman and John C. Donovan contend that the Sputnik mood tightened the grip of a narrow elite on America's perception of the world and ultimately on the making of foreign policy. Certainly, liberal views in the 1950s were molded to a

[46] Barton J. Bernstein, "Foreign Policy in the Eisenhower Administration," *Foreign Service Journal* 50 (May 1973): 17; Gary W. Reichard, "Divisions and Dissent: Democrats and Foreign Policy, 1952–1956," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Spring 1978): 51–52; for example, in addition to Reichard, see Martin, *Stevenson and the World*; Bernard G. Browne, "The Foreign Policy of the Democratic Party During the Eisenhower Administration," (Ph.D. diss., Notre Dame, 1968); John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy of Peace* (New York: Harper, 1960); Ronald J. Nurse, "America Must Not Sleep: The Development of John F. Kennedy's Foreign Policy Attitudes, 1947–1960," (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State, 1971); William C. Berman, "The Democratic Advisory Council: A Foreign Policy for Democrats, 1957–1960" (unpublished paper, 1976 Organization of American Historians Convention), 4–5. The author acknowledges Berman's kindness in making his paper available and in granting permission to quote from it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

significant extent by Truman's national security managers. In opposing the "New Look," the moderate left upheld the logic of NSC-68, which had argued that a massive defense establishment was necessary and economically sound and that strong conventional forces were essential to counter Soviet power and to wage "brushfire wars" outside Europe. Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, the architects of that landmark 1950 reassessment, were recalled to serve as chairman and vice chairman of the DAC's Foreign Policy Committee during Eisenhower's second term. Ultimately, in Berman's judgment, the DAC became a "major political vehicle" for Acheson and Nitze to disseminate their views and went on to set the "context" for policies of confrontation and escalation in the 1960s.[47]

Ambivalence Despite NSC-68

No one can deny that liberals were in the forefront of an orgy of misplaced fear and bellicose talk, but it is wrong to imply that they were simply clones of Acheson and Nitze. Several authors have discovered that many progressives carried a bugle in one hand and an olive branch in the other. Bernstein paused to comment on the "contradictory strand" in liberal thought—the idea that "the administration had also missed opportunities to ease the Cold War." James A. Nuechterlein found Schlesinger to be "typical of liberals . . . in denying any contradiction between increased defense spending and a genuine desire for peaceful diplomacy and even international disarmament." According to Nuechterlein, Schlesinger simultaneously favored all three priorities.[48]

Unlike Acheson and Nitze, Adlai Stevenson, Hubert Humphrey (in the 1950s), and John F. Kennedy do not readily fit into the hawks and doves categories of the mid-1960s. Walter LaFeber and Charles C. Alexander have labeled Stevenson's handling of foreign policy issues in 1956 as a curious paradox. Bert Cochran noted that Stevenson combined a "call for a halt in [nuclear] testing and a new start for disarmament talks" with "a general attack on Eisenhower for letting our defenses down. . . . " Robert Sherrill and Harry W. Ernst described Humphrey as equally muddled—a zealous chairman of the Senate's Disarmament Subcommittee, yet "consistently a supporter of heavy military budgets—much heavier than Eisenhower wanted or asked for." I. F. Stone recalled hearing two Kennedy Senate speeches within a week: "one idealistic and eloquent, on the need to end the arms race, the other, alarmist on the need to fill that nonexistent 'missile gap.'"[49]

[47] Donovan, *The Cold Warriors*, 81–147. Berman, "The Democratic Advisory Council," 3–4, 9–10.

[48] Bernstein, "Foreign Policy in the Eisenhower Administration," 17; Neuchterlein, "Schlesinger," 13.

[49] Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945–1975* (New York: Wiley, 1976), 193; Charles C. Alexander, *Holding the Line* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 170–171; Cochran, *Adlai Stevenson*, 270–275; Robert Sherrill and Harry W. Ernst, *The Drugstore Liberal* (New York: Grossman, 1968), 158–166; I. F. Stone, "Theatre of Delusion," *New York Review of Books*, 23 April 1970, 20; also in I. F. Stone, *Polemics and Prophecies 1967–1970* (New York: Random House, 1970), 272–273; also see Herbert S. Parmet, *Jack: The Struggles of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Dial Press, 1980), 445–448.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If what Donovan calls the "establishment orchestration model" cannot account for this split personality, Berman's necessarily brief paper fails to mention that the Democratic Advisory Council advocated peace as well as vigilance during the brief thaw in Soviet-American relations symbolized by Nikita Khrushchev's visit and the "spirit of Camp David" in 1959. Beginning in August 1959, the Council prodded the administration to take a more active role in arms limitation discussions and to continue the informal moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. In December 1959, the DAC proposed "a National Peace Agency" (established in 1961 as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) to solve technical problems and to devise new approaches for future negotiations. Shortly before the ill-fated U-2 flight in the spring of 1960, the DAC set up an "Economics of Peace" committee to investigate ways to shift away from a defense-oriented economy should a comprehensive disarmament settlement materialize.[50]

Group Spectrum: A Divided Elite?

Participants and some later historians have traced the DAC's ambivalence in 1959 and 1960 to tension between the Acheson and Stevenson wings of the liberal Democratic elite. In contrast to the implied harmony depicted by Donovan and Berman, David Halberstam in 1972 found the Democrats to be "bitterly divided on questions of foreign policy." Quoting several insiders, John Bartlow Martin subsequently made a case that "during this period . . . Acheson and Stevenson fell into almost complete disagreement." If Halberstam and Martin are right, factional conflict was as powerful as an inherited consensus in determining liberal positions on diplomatic issues.[51]

Stevenson's papers hint of friction and indicate areas of disagreement with Acheson. Writing to Chester Bowles on 22 January 1958, the former candidate declared, "I am getting very anxious about Dean's leadership and military emphasis." In a 27 October 1959 letter to Thomas K. Finletter, Stevenson referred to the need to prepare "a declaration of our dedication to peace and its relentless

[50] DAC Policy Statements, "The United Nations and Disarmament," 19 August 1959; "Disarmament," 23 September 1959; "Nuclear Testing," 20 December 1959; "Secretary Herter and Disarmament Policy," 3 March 1960, Charles Murphy Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. Leo Egan, "Democratic Plan for 1960 Includes U.S. Peace Agency," *New York Times*, 6 December 1959. "A National Peace Agency," December 1959, DAC Working Papers July-December 1959, Murphy Papers, Truman Library. The Peace Agency proposal came out of the Science and Technology Committee, which issued several statements of its own. See "Defense, Disarmament and Survival," December 1959; "Nuclear Tests and National Security," March 1960, "Nuclear Testing," 24 April 1960, DAC Policy Statements, Murphy Papers, Truman Library; "Democrats Set Up Peace Economy Unit," *New York Times*, 11 April 1960.

[51] David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972), 21–24; Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 401–402, 466–467. Also see John Kenneth Galbraith, *Who Needs the Democrats* (New York: Doubleday, 1970); Galbraith, *Economics, Peace and Laughter* (New York: NAL, 1971), 207. Galbraith, *A Life In Our Times: Memoirs* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 357–360.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pursuit for the next meeting of the DAC in anticipation of some more saber-rattling by you know who."[52] Despite the aftermath of Sputnik in 1958–1959, Stevenson wanted the United States to "upgrade" economic development in the Third World, to exhibit "greater flexibility" toward the Soviet Union, and to emphasize "the pursuit of disarmament."[53]

Acheson was hostile to such proposals. DAC Executive Director Charles Tyroler II remembered that the former secretary of state disliked the peace agency idea and dismissed it as meaningless rhetoric. Speaking on his own in late 1959, Acheson bitterly opposed any new negotiations over Berlin.[54] Recognizing that several liberals previously had welcomed diplomatic approaches, the *New Republic* discussed a "rift" that was "real though hard to measure."[55]

Most later evidence supports the *New Republic*'s contemporary description of a dispute that was not as intense or as polarized as Halberstam and Martin have suggested. Stevenson and Bowles were convinced, as Acheson was, that a military build-up was necessary. Bowles wrote Stevenson to report the concern of a Connecticut Democrat who had told him that he was "all for" spending $2 billion more on missiles but wondered, "have we nothing more to offer?" Stevenson similarly told a friend, "I think I will try to concentrate on 'the other war'—economic-political penetration" in part because "the military, which is non-controversial, seems to be getting all the concern and attention." According to Tyroler, factional arguments were "intermittent" but since most disagreements involved "presentation and emphasis," he believed there was "real unity" on the DAC. Admittedly, at one point the DAC's decorum was ruffled when Harriman, a strong Stevenson ally not inclined to mince words, tartly protested Acheson's "declarations of war."[56]

In the 1950s, at least, these strains stopped far short of open controversy. When

[52] Stevenson to Chester Bowles, 22 January 1958; Stevenson to Thomas K. Finletter, 27 October 1959 in Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Continuing Education and the Unfinished Business of American Society 1957–1961*, 151–152, 369.

[53] The quotations are from Stevenson's letters to Barbara Ward (Lady Jackson). See Stevenson to Ward, 2 January 1958 and 30 September 1959 in ibid., 146, 365. For three similar statements made publicly, see ibid., 155–163, 274–279, 362–363.

[54] Charles Tyroler II interview with author, 8 October 1974. Also Acheson to Bowles, 30 December 1959, DAC Meetings Folder No. 3, Acheson Papers, Truman Library. Dean Acheson, "Is U.S. on Right Track in Dealing with Khrushchev?" *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 39 (15 November 1959): 36–37; "Acheson: Negotiation Is Only a Polite Phrase for a Retreat," *U.S. News and World Report*, 30 December 1959, 110–111; "Murphy's Round," *Nation*, 12 December 1959, 430–431; Mary McGrory, "Mr. Acheson Speaks His Mind," *America*, 19–26 December 1959, 369.

[55] "Relaxation for What?" *New Republic*, 2 November 1959, 3–6; "The Theme Is Peace," *Nation*, 19 December 1959, 457.

[56] Bowles to Stevenson, 10 January 1958; Stevenson to Mrs. Eugene Meyer, 23 January 1958 in Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Continuing Education and the Unfinished Business of American Society 1957–1961*, 151–152. Charles Tyroler II interview with author 8 October 1974. Another participant, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., generally agreed with Tyroler's estimation. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 280–281; Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 417–421, 424–427. For Harriman's DAC role, see Galbraith, *A Life In Our Times*, 359; and Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 402.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the *Wall Street Journal* predicted "hot foreign policy debates" at the December 1959 DAC meeting in New York and listed Bowles and Acheson as opponents, Bowles immediately sent off a copy of the article with a reassuring note to the foreign policy committee chairman. Bowles insisted, "nothing could be more ridiculous than the attached." Acheson quickly replied in a similar vein, advising, "Don't give it a thought."[57]

Regardless of any exaggeration, the group-spectrum model has made a major contribution by questioning the notion of consensus and thus providing a rationale for studying the opinions of individual liberals in depth. In 1978 Gary W. Reichard emphasized the Democrats' "ideological pluralism" in foreign policy, particularly a "'realist-idealist' cleavage" between the "pragmatic" Acheson and the "moralistic" Bowles. In Reichard's formulation, based on the pre-DAC (1953–1956) years, Stevenson did not choose between these alternatives but sought to compromise them. Future research must determine whether Reichard's perceived pluralism or the factionalism seen by Halberstam and Martin constituted the liberal norm.[58]

Political Strategy: The Tactical Model

If public affairs and politics are, as Theodore H. White once wrote, as closely linked as love and sex, it is a great mistake to study 1950s liberalism without incorporating the desire to gain power and the need to win elections. As was mentioned at the outset, Adlai Stevenson has mainly been seen as an individual, but despite his personal qualities, Stevenson inevitably spent most of the 1950s playing politics. The governor's intellectual advisers similarly assumed political roles that affected their ideas. Just as liberal positions had a political dimension, the demands of everyday politics affected liberal legislative behavior. According to James L. Sundquist, political pressures worked like an invisible hand in guiding those congressional leaders who successfully refashioned liberal policies during the Eisenhower era.[59]

[57] Bowles to Acheson, 8 December 1959; Acheson to Bowles, 10 December 1959, DAC Meetings Folder no. 3, Acheson Papers, Truman Library. The author would like to thank Yale University Library for permitting quotation from the Bowles letter, a copy of which is in the Chester Bowles Papers, Yale University. In explaining his foreign policy position in a 1960 letter to Joseph Alsop, Galbraith denied that there was a fundamental split. See Galbraith to Joseph Alsop, 10 October 1960, General Correspondence 1948–1964, A General 9-1-60–10-31-60, John Kenneth Galbraith Papers, Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass. Acheson's surprising claim to have supported Stevenson for president in 1960 must be balanced by his reported post-election statement that Stevenson's appointment as secretary of state would be "disastrous." See Martin, *Stevenson of Illinois*, 645; and Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 552.

[58] Reichard, "Divisions and Dissent," 56–57, 67–70. In his analysis of the establishment, Hodgson indirectly justifies the Donovan-Berman elite-control perspective by claiming that Stevenson and Bowles led "a minority school of thought on the fringes of the Establishment" that was "neither very representative nor very effective." The issues are: Is Hodgson right about the Establishment? To what extent did Stevenson represent liberal opinion *in general*? Hodgson, *America In Our Time*, 126–127.

[59] Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1960* (New York: Atheneum, 1961), 47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stevenson and his associates adopted positions for political as well as for personal or ideological reasons. Stevenson and Thomas K. Finletter resisted an unrelenting hardline in foreign policy as bad politics as well as undesirable policy. Adopting a position urged by Galbraith, Stevenson wrote Michigan's Governor G. Mennen Williams in February 1958 that it was necessary "to at least balance our military friends in the Senate," because "the hazards of carrying the 'War Party' label any longer are too obvious to need mention." The DAC's peace offensive in 1959–1960 was prompted by a memorandum from Finletter on 12 August 1959, which pointed to the forthcoming Khrushchev visit and worried that the Republicans might preempt the "peace issue" in 1960. A few months later in a letter to Finletter quoted previously, Stevenson concluded that it was "imperative" to "snatch a few tail feathers out of the dove. I am afraid, however, that Nixon and Eisenhower have just about defeathered that pretty bird already."[60]

Stevenson's aides also kept their hands on the pulse of public opinion. Reasoning from this political paradigm, one must conclude that Schlesinger's 1956 article and Keyserling's rebuttal constituted an argument over tactics, not a debate over poverty or the nature of American society. Four years earlier, the Harvard historian had been convinced that "the central domestic issue is still the fight between the business community and the rest of the country. . . . " Stevenson's first defeat persuaded Schlesinger that postwar abundance had made such 1936-style appeals politically untenable in the 1950s. Since independents and nominal Democrats were no longer receptive to 1930s rhetoric, Schlesinger believed the Democrats would have to go beyond the "bread and butter" issues that forged the New Deal coalition. Essentially, Keyserling found Schlesinger guilty of abandoning the intellectual's proper role in the vanguard of social criticism. Concentrating on the middle-class voter, to his mind, meant avoiding honest talk about necessary sacrifices or averting a confrontation with vested interests. As he viewed it, Schlesinger had elevated political strategy to an unacceptable level.[61]

[60] Galbraith to Stevenson, 20 January 1958, General Correspondence 1948–1964, "Demo Foreign Policy"—Comments on JKG Memo, and Galbraith, "Democratic Foreign Policy and the Voter: A Suggestion for Self Criticism," 20 January 1958, Publications: Articles, "Democratic Foreign Policy and The Voter," Galbraith Papers, Kennedy Library. Stevenson to G. Mennen Williams, 7 February 1958; Stevenson to Finletter, 27 October 1959, in Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Continuing Education and the Unfinished Business of American Society 1957–1961*, 163, 369. Thomas K. Finletter to Paul M. Butler and the administrative committee of the Democratic Advisory Council, 12 August 1959, DAC Working Papers July-December 1959, Murphy Papers, Truman Library. Prior to his death in 1980, Finletter authorized the use of this memorandum.

[61] Schlesinger in Martin, *Stevenson of Illinois*, 631. For Schlesinger's shift after 1952, see Neuchterlein, "Schlesinger," 15. Schlesinger, "The Future of Liberalism," 8. Schlesinger's 1956 article publicly restated the theme of a private memorandum on 1956 campaign strategy written in the summer of 1955. See Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 197–199. Stevenson's thinking paralleled Schlesinger's ideas. After the 1952 defeat, he believed that "We ran out of poor people. . . . " By late 1955, he was persuaded that " . . . we are going to have more and more trouble . . . in making the business control of government proposition stick or amount to much in a time of manifest prosperity for most people."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

James L. Sundquist's *Politics and Policy* implies that Schlesinger was both wise and typical in being swayed by the election returns and economic indices of the early 1950s. Some progressive reassessment was called for, in Sundquist's view, because Truman's Fair Deal had reached a dead end in Congress and at the polls in 1952. It was appropriate, therefore, that new liberal proposals for area redevelopment, a tax cut, and Medicare emerged in Congress later in the decade. This reformulation was complemented in the late 1950s when progressive Democrats reaffirmed their support for civil rights legislation and for federal aid to education.[62]

Without overlooking the contributions of important individuals, Sundquist shows that these "specific, practical and timely" ideas were generated by a political process. The revised economic package responded directly to the general slumps of 1954 and 1957–1958 as well as to the existence of persistent pockets of unemployment. Medicare was advanced by organized labor after 1956 and became a bitter issue only when Democratic politicians embraced it and the American Medical Association assailed it. Black protests and black votes made some civil rights action mandatory after 1956. Overcrowded classrooms and the Sputnik mood likewise enhanced the case for federal aid to public schools.[63]

In *Dynamics of the Party System*, Sundquist perceived this revamped program as one indication of a remodeled Democratic party. Sundquist contended that the national Democratic structure was renovated in the 1950s by the arrival of a fresh breed of middle-class liberals, who revitalized the party in a northern tier of states extending from Maine to Oregon. This transition in leadership brought a partial departure in strategy and doctrine. Frequently the heirs of a progressive Republican tradition, these new leaders were oriented toward immediate issues that would attract independent voters, not toward traditional patronage or class concerns. The outcome from early 1958 until mid-1965 was a briefly "reinvigorated" New Deal party system dominated by liberal-conservative conflict over the New Frontier-Great Society agenda.[64]

In the late 1950s, this positive and increasingly forthright platform was carefully modulated to meet the political requirements of the contemporary struggle between the major parties. The Democrats in Congress, as Sundquist pointed out, deliberately repassed Area Redevelopment and brought Medicare and Federal Aid to Education to floor votes in 1960 to dramatize these issues prior to the fall election. The Democratic Advisory Council's National Peace Agency suggestion was a small step toward disarmament but its immediate purpose was to soften a politically dangerous image. After 1956 the DAC staked out a firm moral position on

---

Stevenson in Martin, *Stevenson of Illinois*, 762. Stevenson to Clayton Fritchey, 6 December 1955 in Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Toward A New America 1955–1957*, 12. Keyserling, "'Liberal' Government Is Not Enough," 18.

[62] Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, 392, 15–34, 57–83, 287–308, 222–252, 156–187.

[63] Ibid.

[64] James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), 218–244, 216–217, 370–373.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

civil rights and relentlessly prodded the laggard Eisenhower administration and the cautious Johnson-Rayburn congressional leadership to do more in the area. This brave departure from the immediate Democratic past was also a calculated shift in tactics to rally blacks and other northern components of the New Deal coalition without precipitating mass southern desertions.[65]

This tactical model is most helpful in recapturing the never-ending political problems that beset 1950s progressives and in overcoming the impulse to view liberals as a small presidential elite. Regardless of any ideological consensus, the moderate left was usually on the defensive in Congress. Only eighty representatives signed a generally worded "Liberal Manifesto" in 1957, and Sundquist estimates that the "core" of liberal senators ranged from only one to two dozen.[66]

While provocative, Sundquist's conclusions are compromised by a general narrative approach. The activities of congressional liberals in the 1950s need to be studied with quantitative precision. Sundquist's summary of state politics in his second book should encourage other scholars to explain more completely the liberal revival in the North, Midwest, and the West. Attention also should be given to the composition and outlook of local Democratic clubs to test James Q. Wilson's 1962 finding that mainly Stevensonian volunteer groups in New York and Los Angeles consisted of ideological crusaders adverse to traditional coalition politics.[67]

This progressive rebirth mixed with a need for unity and a moderate ideology to make the 1950s (and the early 1960s) a golden age of consensus politics within the Democratic party. Despite being routed twice by Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Democrats presented a relatively united front in the 1950s, avoiding the brawls

[65] Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, 70–73, 184–187, 305–308. Stevenson's speech introducing John F. Kennedy to the Democratic National Convention, 15 July 1960 in Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Continuing Education and the Unfinished Business of American Society 1957–1961*, 540. For a good indication of the general DAC position see "Statement on the Action to Provide for Reasonable Limitation of Debate in the United States Senate," 4 January 1957; "Resolution on Civil Rights," 16 February 1957; "Statement on Civil Rights," 2 February 1958; "The Current Legislative Situation," 15 June 1959; "Civil Rights Statement," 6 December 1959; "Civil Rights in the Second Session of the 86th Congress," 15 March 1960; "Civil Rights," 22 April 1960, DAC Policy Statements Folder, Murphy Papers, Truman Library. Charles Tyroler II interview with author, 8 October 1974.

[66] Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, 397–405. Using roll-call analysis and scaling, Charles Gray found a core of only eight Senate liberals in 1957–1958 and only a dozen in 1959–1960. Gray emphasized that most coalitions were "numerous, short-lived and ideologically impure." See Charles H. Gray, "Coalition, Consensus and Conflict in the United States Senate 1957–1960" (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 1962), 283, 308.

[67] For a more precise approach see Gary W. Reichard, *The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-Third Congress* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975). Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat*, 1–28, 32–64, 126–162. Other studies that should be taken as models are: Francis Carney, *The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California* (New York: Holt, 1958); Richard C. Haney, "The Rise of Wisconsin's New Democrats: A Political Realignment in the Mid-Twentieth Century," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 58 (Winter 1974–75): 90–106; James C. Larew, *A Party Reborn: The Democrats of Iowa 1950–1974* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1980); Arthur G. Stevens Jr., Arthur H. Miller, and Thomas E. Mann, "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House 1955–1970: The Democratic Study Group," *American Political Science Review* 68 (June 1974): 667–681.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that shook the party in 1924, 1948, 1968, 1972, and 1980. As unlikely as it might seem, George McGovern may be the most appropriate political symbol of 1950s liberalism. A Henry Wallace Progressive in 1948, McGovern was captivated by Stevenson in 1952 and left his college professorship to head South Dakota's tiny Democratic party. McGovern's conversion to practical politics testifies not only to Stevenson's charisma, but to his success as a party leader as well. Unable to win the presidency, Stevenson, like Franklin Roosevelt, was able to attract liberals and, with difficulty, to maintain Democratic harmony. John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson duplicated Stevenson's intraparty success throughout the first half of the 1960s.[68]

At the end of this article, one should be able to refine the old argument about how much Democratic liberalism changed in the 1950s. Aided by a mood of consensus and driven by political necessity, liberal Democrats experienced a transfusion of younger faces and new ideas that did not break decisively with the past. Updated (sometimes contradictory) themes were simply stitched onto continuing beliefs. Stevenson and the DAC, for instance, spoke out for arms control and negotiation without disavowing NSC-68. Likewise, abiding liberal concern over poverty and civil rights expressed itself in a redesigned Fair Deal fit for electoral consumption in a prosperous postwar period. The result was a great political achievement in which the Democrats incorporated a younger generation, preserved party unity, and overcame what might have been a conservative Republican era. Otherwise, this successful transition had ironic implications for the 1960s. While the march out of the wilderness had encouraged liberals to smooth over their inconsistencies and internal differences, the 1950s also nurtured some of the divisions that defeated the Democrats in 1968 and 1972.

Badly dated by its ties to the early 1960s and to the Vietnam ordeal, the study of 1950s liberalism must renew itself by addressing other issues that span more than one decade. There are several possibilities. Recent work in leadership theory and the concept of leadership style may help to elevate the study of politicians above personalities or polemics. With the collapse of détente and the advent of the nuclear-freeze movement, an extended consideration of liberal attitudes to-

[68] George McGovern, *Grassroots* (New York: Random House, 1977), 47, 49–50, 52–53. Herbert Parmet used an implicit tactical model to view Stevenson as a successful consensus politician in Parmet, *The Democrats*, 95–146. Parmet's analysis and the above comment qualify the prevalent idea that Stevenson was a poor politician. For the more critical view, see Martin, *Stevenson of Illinois*, 761–762; Martin, *Stevenson and the World*, 232–235, 295–296, 337–338, 493, 506–528. Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 133–135, 202–204. John Milton Cooper review of Martin, *Stevenson and the World* in *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 62 (Winter 1978–79): 144–145. For the change in civil rights strategy in 1960, see Carl M. Brauer, *John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 1–11, 16–60; Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 214–218, 286–288. An outstanding overview, which stresses that almost all Democrats were governed by tactics, is Gary W. Reichard, "Democrats, Civil Rights, and Electoral Strategies in the 1950's," *Congress & the Presidency* 13 (Spring 1986): 59–81. Also see John Frederick Martin, *Civil Rights and the Cross of Liberalism: The Democratic Party, 1945–1976* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ward arms control and East-West talks—from the death of Stalin in 1953 to the Vienna summit in 1979—would be timely. The problem of regional stagnation—first raised in the "depressed areas" discussion of the 1950s—suggests one way to evaluate local, state, and federal antipoverty programs. Big Labor's eroding status provides a reason to look at the 1958 "right-to-work" initiatives in Ohio and California and to investigate similar elections elsewhere. Political scientists and historians should build on the growing literature on the instability of recent American politics—the cycles of liberal revival and defeat apparent in 1952–1968 and 1968–1980. All of these studies will require a wider vision of liberal activity. Above all, we must resist the temptation to reduce 1950s liberalism to a single individual, a simple idea, or an isolated perspective.[69]*

[69] The best recent introduction to 1950s liberalism is Richard S. Kirkendall, *A Global Power*, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1980), 135–145. An important study which uses the 1950s as a point of departure is Michael Foley, *The New Senate: Liberal Influence on a Conservative Institution, 1959–1972* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). Warren Cohen has briefly outlined some of the ideological differences between American leaders in 1960 in a balanced study of Dean Rusk. See Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa, N.J.: Cooper Square, 1980), 320–321. For approaches to studying leadership see James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper, 1979); and Fred Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1982). Studies of poverty programs often focus on national efforts and aggregate results without touching on regional economic decline and its possible political impact. The resounding defeat of "right to work" propositions in five out of six states in 1958 was seen by contemporaries as a major factor in the Democratic sweep, but this political confrontation has received little attention from scholars. See Totten J. Anderson, "The 1958 Election in California," *Western Political Quarterly* 12 (December 1958): 276–300; and Thomas A. Flinn, "The Outline of Ohio Politics," *Western Political Quarterly* 13 (September 1960): 702–721. Given the course of American politics since 1960, the ultimate question is whether the 1950s political system was stable or whether major disruptive forces were already at work. Five works that bear on this issue are Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Public Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966); Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Party Coalitions in the 1980's* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1981); Walter Dean Burnham, *The Current Crisis in American Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Martin P. Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties 1952–1980* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Alan Ware, *The Breakdown of the Democratic Party Organization, 1940–1980* (Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon, 1985).

* The author would like to thank Professors Lawrence B. De Graff, John P. Diggins, Keith L. Nelson, and Spencer C. Olin Jr. for their comments. He would also like to express his appreciation to Philip Lagerquist and the staff of the Harry S. Truman Library and to Charles Tyroler II for consenting to an interview in 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the Shadow of the Cloud: If There's No Tomorrow, Why Save Today?

BRUCE RUSSETT
MILES LACKEY

Analyses of social behavior often find that individuals and governments are more likely to cooperate with one another if the "shadow of the future" is substantial—that is, if they anticipate there will be enough future relations in which all participants can be held accountable for cooperation or conflict in the present. Put this way, the shadow of the future sounds benign, but if in fact the "shadow" means that there may *be* no future, people will act primarily for present gains. Since 1945 we all have lived under a particular kind of shadowed future: that of the mushroom cloud. Most of the time we doubtless ignore that shadow, but at others it surely affects the kinds of plans we make for the future and how we choose to use our present moments. Its effects may include fear, anger, energization to change the future (as many antinuclear activists hope), escapism, hedonism, nuclear numbing, or simply denial that there is a problem.

An important new perspective on the possible effects of the nuclear shadow draws on a plausible extension of standard economic reasoning. An economist, Joel Slemrod, for example, argues that expectations of the likelihood of large-scale nuclear war should diminish people's willingness to set aside part of their earnings for future use. If people save primarily either for retirement or to leave

BRUCE RUSSETT is Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Yale University, editor of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and coordinator of the Yale International Security and Arms Control Program. MILES LACKEY has been a staff member of the World Bank and of a congressional subcommittee on intelligence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bequests, expected events—like a catastrophic nuclear war—that would reduce lifespan or the perceived ability to leave bequests should reduce saving by a rational, utility-maximizing individual below what it otherwise would be. Slemrod tests the hypothesis on annual data for the United States economy since 1948, adding a measure for popular expectation of nuclear war to a standard econometric savings function. In his results, expectation of war does make a significant, negative contribution to aggregate saving rates, as hypothesized.[1] The present article offers further intriguing support.

If the shadow of nuclear war really is depressing people's willingness to save, the implications are profound. The post-World War II decline in the American savings rate, and the fact that the rate is quite low by comparison with many of America's industralized competitors in the world economy, has long been a matter of substantial concern. One of the most common responses has been to blame taxes for damaging incentives to earn or save and to call for reductions in taxes, especially for those at high income levels who typically save larger proportions of their income. But if one accepts this new finding, the international tensions of the cold war constitute a major disincentive to saving, and one might well urge on purely economic grounds, major efforts to mitigate Soviet-American rivalry. This finding provides a new twist to the familiar contention that military expenditures mortgage the nation's productive future. Instead of saying that expenditures for the military forces themselves compete directly with, and therefore reduce, funds available for investment, it says that the political and social climate of militarization diminishes private willingness to save and, therefore, the volume of funds available for investment in productive capital. The argument is attractive because of its logic of rational expectations, and it nicely supplements psychosocial perspectives that have warned about the personally and socially corrosive effects of nuclear fears.

Moreover, from the domain of personal saving, the argument may be applicable to such analogous personal attitudes and behavior as readiness to marry and raise children, which are other kinds of acts that may require some postponement of present gratification for the sake of future satisfaction and depend on one's degree of confidence that there will really be a future. Evidence for a connection between fear of war and such personal behavior has emerged, for example, in studies of American children and adolescents.[2] Commenting on many of these responses, one author declares: "It seems that these young people are growing up without

[1] Joel Slemrod, "Savings and the Fear of Nuclear War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30 (September 1986): 403–19.

[2] See Task Force Report of the American Psychiatric Association, *Psychosocial Aspects of Nuclear Developments,* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association 1982); and John E. Mack and Roberta Snow, "Psychological Effects on Children and Adolescents" in Ralph K. White, ed., *Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War* (New York: New York University Press, 1986). Studies have also been conducted in other countries, most notably in the Soviet Union. See Eric Chivian, et al., "Soviet Children and the Threat of Nuclear War: A Preliminary Study," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 55 (October 1985): 484–502.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the ability to form stable ideals, or the sense of continuity upon which the development of stable personality structure and the formation of serviceable ideals depend. We may find we are raising generations of young people without a basis for making long-term commitments. . . ."[3]

In those studies, however, the sample is often not representative, and questions arise about the degree to which the oral responses truly indicate a causal connection between fear of war and personal life plans. The responses may be simply rationalizations of personal anxiety in terms blaming society or even the kind of answer that the respondent believes is socially acceptable or that the questioner really wants to hear.[4] The new economic findings, though they do not bring evidence directly to bear on the validity of the psychological studies, nevertheless do make them more credible.

Yet a serious problem arises with the previously-published empirical results. In order to investigate the effects of the fear of war on savings behavior, it would be most desirable to measure this fear directly, by asking a representative sample of the population their opinion about the likelihood of nuclear war. If, for example, we had good public opinion survey material for the United States over a long time period, we then could relate changes in levels of war expectation to changes in levels of aggregate savings. But truly adequate public opinion data for the United States do not exist, perhaps oddly for this most-surveyed of countries. The question was asked often of national samples for only about a decade, and otherwise irregularly; the wording of the question often varied; and there are long periods when the question was not asked at all. Given the unavailability of this most desirable indicator, Slemrod's analysis uses several substitutes, including a "professionally informed opinion about the likelihood of nuclear war" as presented by the editors of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* The editors periodically reset the clock on the cover of their magazine at various "minutes from midnight" according to their estimate of the risks of war. This is the measure of war fear which produces the strongest negative relationship with fluctuations in the savings rate in his analysis. Its validity is nevertheless in doubt. It is a measure of perceptions by a liberal elite, not necessarily of wider mass perceptions. In addition, it is a measure of attempted persuasion to activate readers, as well as a measure of the editors' true perceptions of danger.

Pieces of the Puzzle

This article will attempt to push forward the basic economic analysis using survey data. In the absence of fully adequate time-series survey data on United States

[3] John E. Mack, "Psychosocial Aspects of the Nuclear Arms Race," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 37 (April 1981): 20.

[4] These problems are nevertheless beginning to be recognized and corrected. According to Mack, "Psychosocial Aspects," 20, "It is difficult, however, to separate the impact of the threat of nuclear war from other factors in contemporary culture, such as the relentless confrontation of adolescents by the mass media with a deluge of social and political problems which their parents' generation seems helpless to change."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public perceptions we shall carry on several alternative analyses. First, we have quarterly data on American public opinion and aggregate savings for the country over the period 1948–1957. A data set for such a short period hardly constitutes a fully adequate test of the hypothesis, but it makes a useful beginning to be supplemented by other evidence.

Second, to combine with aggregate data for national savings we have good annual data on opinion in the United Kingdom over almost a thirty-year period, and data on between eight- and sixteen-year periods for five other western industrialized countries. In addition, we have two sets of data where the same question has been asked in a number of industrialized countries for six different years. These last data sets are too short for single-country time-series analyses, but can be useful in cross-national, cross-temporal pooled time-series analysis.

Third, instead of investigating the relation between fear of war and national aggregate savings rates over time, we can, with some British data, look at the relationship at any given time between fear of war and the answers to survey questions about individuals' intentions to save, to see whether that relation is weaker or stronger than the one at the aggregate level for fear and actual savings.

Fourth, at the level of individual respondents, we can also investigate the relation between fear of war and various other attitudes and perceptions, as well as savings expectations. In doing so we can control for common influences like age, sex, and economic status, and also be sure that fear of war is playing a role distinct from whatever can be attributed to generalized dimensions of dissatisfaction or pessimism.

Fifth, in the United States we can investigate the relationship between fear of war and some rather refined data on individuals' actual savings behavior.

None of these alternatives constitutes a fully satisfactory test of the savings hypothesis; some are more appropriate than others. Individual-level analyses are the most adequate, but even there some problems of data availability and validity are present. These pieces of information are nevertheless all that seems to exist, and together they constitute a substantial and varied body of evidence. If most should converge on support or lack of it for the hypothesis, some useful conclusions would emerge. Alternatively, some analyses may actually be much better fitted to the question at issue and should be given greater weight. In fact, the latter is the case and we shall find important evidence that fears of war do depress savings.

Aggregate Time-series for the United States

The analysis begins with the United States. This is the appropriate point of departure, because the United States is the leading western power and first practitioner of nuclear deterrence for itself and for its cluster of allies. The American public can be expected to be particularly aware of the threat of nuclear war and the strong likelihood, perhaps greater than in any other western state, that nuclear weapons would fall heavily on them. And they are so aware. In cross-national surveys of approximately thirty countries, Americans consistently express one of the highest

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perceptions of the probability of world war. Out of twenty-six countries in 1982, citizens of the United States ranked second, behind only Costa Rica, which is threatened by great power intervention in neighboring Nicaragua; white South Africans came in third. Surveys from 1981 and subsequent years give similar results.[5] Furthermore, among those Americans who think a nuclear war is likely in the next ten years (47 percent of Americans in 1981), most (62 percent in that survey) think their chances of living through it are "poor." In the United States, as elsewhere, these pessimistic expectations are especially prominent among young people, who otherwise would have the longest future to which they might look forward.[6]

We tried to reproduce Slemrod's analysis as best we could using survey measures of the fear of war. His time-series regression analysis used the private savings rate (private savings as a proportion of disposable income) as the dependent variable, and fairly standard economic explanatory variables: the natural logarithms of real disposable personal income (both current and for the year previous), per capita wealth, and the rate of unemployment. In some analyses he also used a measure for the real rate of return on savings, measured as the nominal return on tax-exempt bonds minus the concurrent rate of inflation, on the assumption that savings would be higher given a higher real rate of return. Using this equation, he found a strong and consistent additional (negative) contribution attributable to expectations of war as measured by the *Bulletin* clock hands.

We were able to approximate this equation using quarterly data for the ten-year period 1948–1957, during which time national survey organizations frequently asked the question, with only minor variations, "Do you think we are likely to get in another world war within the next 2 years?"[7] The percentage of the population expecting war ranged from a high of 41 percent during the Korean War (1951) to a low of 8 percent in 1955. Our results appear in Table 1, which gives the customary presentation of such an equation. The first term in each pair shows the regression coefficient and beside it is a measure (p) of the probability that the hypothesized relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable (personal savings rate) would appear purely by chance. The regression

[5] *Gallup Political Index* (Britain), no. 269, January 1983, and numbers also for December 1981, January 1984, and January 1985.

[6] Data from Gallup survey, AIPO 175G, June 1981; and for western Europe, *Eurobarometer*, no. 16, October 1981.

[7] The data are derived from Figure 1 of John Mueller, "Public Expectations of War During the Cold War," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (May 1979): 301–29. Similar questions have been asked for other time periods (next year, ten years, etc.), but the one for two years is the most complete; close examination of the data indicates that whereas the level of expectation would be different for different time horizons, the trend would not vary substantially. Mueller provides a careful discussion of differences in question wording and of which ones fall within acceptable limits for such an analysis. Proper time-series analysis requires complete data at regular intervals. The survey questions were asked irregularly, omitting two of the quarters in our period (4th quarter 1954 and 3rd quarter 1957); we interpolated data from adjacent quarters. In some quarters the question was asked more than once, in which case we averaged the results to provide a single data point.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Attempted Prediction of U.S. Personal Savings Rate, 1948–57

Independent variables:	*Coefficient*	*p*
War likely in next 2 years	0.001	.33
Real disposable income per capita	0.153	.02
Real disposable income per capita one year previous	−0.161	.02
Civilian unemployment rate	−0.016	.03
Rate of return (Federal Reserve discount rate minus consumer price inflation rate)	0.008	.007

Economic and unemployment data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Business Statistics*, 16th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1967), using quarterly data. This equation omits Slemrod's measure of per capita wealth, but since that rarely made a significant contribution even in his equations, the omission is not damaging. Standard tests (the Durbin-Watson statistic, and correlating the residuals with each other) indicate that autocorrelation is not a serious problem in these data, so ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis is appropriate. For simplicity of presentation, in this and all subsequent tables we do not report the constant term from the equation. All significance tests are one-tailed.

coefficient is a measure of the strength of the relationship between that independent variable and the dependent variable. By convention, a coefficient with a p greater than .05 is not considered significant; the smaller the p the greater the probability that the relationship did not occur by chance.[8] As will be apparent, only the economic variables are important; fear of war makes no significant contribution in this equation. For this data set, therefore, the hypothesis must be rejected.

These negative results should not, however, be taken too seriously. They did not replicate Slemrod's methods very well, due primarily to the much shorter period for which appropriate public opinion questions exist.[9] Furthermore, his data extended through 1984, and it is reasonable to expect the impact of war fears on savings to be stronger as the number of weapons and the level of potential destruction has grown over the decades. Thus this hardly constitutes a definitive rejection of the hypothesis.

Aggregate Time-series for European Countries

Some public opinion data concerning the fear of war are available for other democratic countries with developed economies and for more recent years. The best are for the United Kingdom, where a question about expectations of interna-

[8] Strictly speaking, we are not generalizing here from a random sample, but the reference to statistical significance levels remains a necessary means for distinguishing relationships that are strong enough not to be trivial.

[9] Also, the correlation between our survey measure of war fear and the moving average (two preceding and two following quarters as well as the current one) for the clock hands is only .40, suggesting very substantial differences between these mass and elite indicators.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

Attempted Prediction of U.K. Personal Savings Rate, 1957–83

Independent variables:	*Coefficient*	*p*
Next year international discord	−0.001	.41
Real disposable income per capita	0.190	.02
Real disposable income per capita one year previous	−0.027	.38
Unemployment rate	−0.009	.15
Rate of return (Treasury bill rate minus consumer price inflation rate)	−0.001	.15

Survey data from *Gallup Political Index* (Britain), no. 293, January 1985. Total current receipts, taxes, and net savings for households and unincorporated enterprises from Table 8, OECD, *National Accounts: Main Aggregates, 1960–83*, and earlier. Treasury bill rate, consumer price index, and population from International Monetary Fund (IMF), *International Financial Statistics, 1985*. Unemployment rate from OECD, *Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics 1955–1971* and OECD, *Economic Outlook* 38 (December 1985). The economic data are matched with the year in which respondents are asked to forecast international political conditions; i.e., economic data for 1982 with a question about international relations during 1983, asked in December 1982. An alternative, matching economic data with the year for which the question was asked, produced very similar coefficients. These data showed first-order autocorrelation, so the equation is for generalized least squares (GLS).

tional dispute has been asked at the end of each year since 1957.[10] Table 2 shows these results. Here, only current income very well predicts to the savings rate; certainly the expectation of international trouble does not.

The failure to support the hypothesis here may be more serious than with the American data, given the longer time span. Nor is there any consistent support for the hypothesis in data from other countries. Now that the basic method is familiar, there is no point in presenting the full equations, but Table 3 summarizes the apparent effect of expectations of war on savings in those same equations for a number of industrial countries. First are summaries of individual analyses for five countries, and below that the results of pooled time-series analyses first for countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) and then for a somewhat larger set of industrialized countries.[11]

[10] The question is not precisely expectation of world war or nuclear war, as we would prefer. Rather, it read, "Do you think 198__ will be a peaceful year more or less free of international dispute, a troubled year with much international discord, or remain the same?" Nevertheless, for the four years in which this question and the one asking the respondent to assess "the chances of a world war breaking out in the next ten years" were on the same survey, the answers are almost perfectly correlated. Thus both questions tap essentially the same dimension of optimism/pessimism about international peace, and it makes little difference precisely how the question is worded so long as whatever wording is used remains consistent over time.

[11] The tests and corrections for autocorrelation employed in the previous tables do not apply where there is a gap in the time series, as in the German and EEC pooled data, so we have used OLS despite some apparent autocorrelation. The consequences are likely to be minimal, since we found no predicted relationship for the fear variables. In pooled time-series analysis there sometimes is also a problem

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3

Attempted Prediction of Personal Savings Rates, Countries and Years 1970–83

	Coefficient	*p*
	Next Year International Discord	
France	−0.009	.03
Germany	0.009	.02
Sweden	0.002	.09
Japan	−0.005	.15
Spain	0.001	.42
Ten industrialized countries	0.001	.37
	Probability of World War within 10 years	
EEC—original 6 except Luxembourg, plus U.K.	−0.001	.25

Economic data sources and definitions as in Table 2 except ten industrialized countries from UN, *National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables, 1982*, Table 3.32. Precise number of years varies with data availability; Sweden extends back to 1967. Some observations omitted for lack of data. For EEC countries, probability of war equals average value given from a scale of 0–100%. Survey data source same (and earlier issues) as in Table 2 except for EEC pooled analyses, which are from *Eurobarometer*, 22, December 1984, for years 1971, 1977, 1980–83. The pooled analysis for the EEC countries, and analyses for Germany, Sweden, Japan, and Spain, are with OLS; those for France and the ten industrialized countries are GLS correcting for autocorrelation. The ten industrialized countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., U.S.A., data for 1977–82.

The results here fit the earlier pattern. For the individual countries, two show a statistically significant relationship (probability level under .05) but in opposite directions. The coefficient for France is negative as hypothesized, but that for Germany is positive, indicating higher savings with greater expectation of international discord. These essentially cancel each other out, and all the others are insignificant. In the pooled analysis for the EEC countries there is an insignificant negative relationship, countered by an insignificant positive one among the ten industrial countries. Overall, no regular relationship between fear of war and savings behavior appears in the aggregate analysis of fluctuations in national savings rates and fluctuations in average expectations of war or international trouble. Part of the problem may stem from the short time period for which we have data for most of these countries. Another may be in differences in the severity of fears. In the United States in recent years, 40 percent or more of the population considered nuclear war likely, whereas in other industrial countries the comparable figure was usually somewhere in the 20-to-30 percent range.[12] In those countries fear of war may not be severe enough to depress savings notably.

if the average level of the dependent variable (savings rate, here) is very different for different countries. To take care of that we included "dummy" variables for the countries, which showed, particularly for the ten industrial countries, that the effect of fear did not vary much across countries.

[12] Gallup survey, June 1981; *Eurobarometer*, October 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4

Attempted Prediction of Individual Expectations of Savings in the U.K.

Independent Variables		*1957*	*1963*	*1964*	*1966*	*1968*
Expect International discord	coef.	−0.04*	−0.06***	0.07**	−0.04	−0.06*
Expect rising prices	coef.	−0.05*	0.01	−0.06	−0.10**	0.06
Expect rising unemployment	coef.	−0.02	−0.07***	−0.06**	−0.06*	−0.10**
Age	coef.	−0.09***	−0.09***	−0.07***	−0.06***	−0.07***
		* $p \leq .05$	** $p \leq .01$	*** $p \leq .001$		

Survey data from *Gallup Political Index* (Britain), Roper Center archive, Yale University, November or December surveys. Questions are, "For next year do you expect that you will decrease, save the same, or increase your savings?" (Coded −1, 0, +1 respectively) "Which of these do you think is likely to be true of (19____): 1) a peaceful year more or less free from international disputes, or a troubled year with much international discord?; 2) a year of rising unemployment, or a year of full employment?; 3) a year of rising prices, or a year of falling prices?; 4) a year of economic difficulty or a year of economic prosperity?"; age; sex; class identification; voting intention by party; and unemployed or not. Variables often not significant or unavailable for all years are omitted from the equations producing the above results. The international discord coefficient for 1966 would be significant at .08.

British Data on Savings Intention and Behavior

The analyses reported so far have focused on the connection between the expectation of war and national aggregate savings, and we have not been able to find any consistent relationship. A more appropriate method, however, may be to work at the level of individual respondents rather than national aggregates, which are likely to obscure individual variation. That is, we need to see whether individual respondents who say they are pessimistic about the international situation are especially likely to have reduced, or to intend to reduce, their savings. To do this requires questions asked about the international situation and about savings on the same survey questionnaire—not a common combination, since few researchers have looked for a connection. Nonetheless, there are several surveys where it is possible. Five are British Gallup polls reported in Table 4. We attempted to predict individuals' expectations of their savings behavior from their expectations of the international situation. We also were able to control for individuals' expectations of other kinds of economic conditions (prosperity, unemployment, rising prices) analogous to the economic controls in Tables 1 and 2, and standard control variables such as age, sex, unemployment, class identification, and political orientation. In most instances, of the control variables only expectations of prices and of unemployment in the economy, and age (and not always those) reached the level of statistical significance. So as is a standard procedure, we then re-did the estimations including just those variables. That is how we now present the equations.

Some results are predictable from standard economic or demographic theory; for example, expected savings rates are somewhat lower among those who expect

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prices to rise, and they decline with age. Regarding the international situation, however, the results for four of the five years nicely support the hypothesis. In 1964, those who were pessimistic about "a troubled year with much international discord" actually planned to save *more* than did those who expected "a peaceful year." This result is an anomaly, not easily explained. But in 1957, 1963, 1966, and 1968 the results all point significantly toward a diminution in savings stemming from war fears. On balance, the individual-level results provide substantial evidence in favor of the hypothesis.

Generalized Optimism and Pessimism

One possible challenge to our analysis is that expectations of international discord and war may merely be reflections of a more nonspecific attitude of optimism or pessimism. If so, such verbalized expectations would tell us more about a person's psychic state, or immediate personal relationships, or general life conditions (health, job satisfaction, economic security) than about that person's expectations specifically about international affairs. If all were closely related, it would be inappropriate to single out expectations concerning international affairs as a particular influence on savings.

Not surprisingly, there is some relationship, as has long been recognized in survey research.[13] At the aggregate level these relationships may be rather strong. For instance, in the aggregate analysis for the United Kingdom between 1957 and 1984, expectations of a troubled year are correlated with an expectation that the next year will not be prosperous (.69), with an expectation that prices will rise (.56), and with the expectation that individuals will generally be worse off in the next year (.71). Clearly there are broad national moods of optimism or pessimism that move together over time. Even so, there are exceptions. In the Eurobarometer data, 1980 marked a recent high point for European expectations both of "international discord" and that the subsequent year would be worse generally; and 1984 similarly marked a recent low point for both sentiments. (The percentages for the whole EEC were, respectively, 53 and 43 for 1980, and 32 and 30 for 1984.) Nevertheless, the two sentiments moved sharply in opposite directions in 1983, and the general level of anxiety was markedly greater for international affairs than for the situation in general.

At the individual level the relationships are much weaker. For example, in the Eurobarometer survey of October 1983, individuals' expectations of the probability of world war (the same question as in Table 2) correlated negatively with various estimates of their *current* condition as follows: "on the whole . . . satisfied with the life you lead" (−.12); "taking all things together," feeling happy "these days" (−.09); improvement in "the financial situation of your household" over the past 12 months (−.10); and improvement in "the general economic situation in

[13] See, for example, Mueller, "Public Expectations"; and Paul Sheatsley, "Expectations of War and Depression," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 13 (Winter 1949–50): 685–86.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this country" over the past 12 months (–.14). Correlations among various expectations of the *future* are, reasonably enough, a little stronger. For example, the relation between expectation that the coming year will be peaceful (same question as for the United Kingdom in Table 4) and expectation that in general "the coming year will be better" is .24. Similarly, in the British Gallup survey of November 1963 the relation between expectations of international peace and that "next year will be one of economic prosperity" is .30.

We could go on at great length reporting relationships of this sort, but the point is that rarely are they very strong. In the individual level examples just given, the highest correlation was .30, meaning that only 9 percent of the variance in one attitude could be predicted by knowing the other attitude. In fact, the relationships sometimes even are the opposite of what would be consistent with a general optimism/pessimism dimension. For instance, in the October 1980 Eurobarometer survey, taken at a time when anxieties about the international situation were severe, expectations of peace were slightly *negatively* related to expectations of prosperity (–.05) in the EEC as a whole, and also in seven of the individual countries.

Overall, this shows that whereas many individuals do tend to have simultaneously bright or gloomy outlooks on many dimensions of their lives, most can differentiate quite clearly among those dimensions. They are entirely able to make different assessments of their own and their countries' economic condition, their general satisfaction or expectations about life, and the international situation. It therefore makes sense to continue to treat fear of war and international discord as having distinctive possibilities for dissuading people from saving for the future. Furthermore, as was clear in the variables that dropped out of the analysis of Table 4 or that remain with sometimes weak coefficients (expectations of general prosperity, unemployment, and price changes), no other dimension of expectations does consistently better in predicting individual savings.

Another problem is that even though the original hypothesis was about actual savings behavior, the analysis in Table 4 relied on individuals' expectations of what their savings behavior would be. While it may be reasonable to think that savings expectations and war expectations will be related, both are entirely subjective; and savings intentions may be so volatile that at any one time they may bear little relation to what an individual really does over the course of a year. We need, therefore, to know the three-way relations among savings expectations, actual savings behavior, and expectations about international discord. Ideally these should be statements from the same individuals at two points in time, first of their expectations, and a year later, retrospectively, of their behavior. No such panel data seem to exist. The best alternative is to relate over time the aggregate level of Britons' actual savings rates in a year (from national income data), and December survey data on their average level of expectations of savings behavior and their expectations of international discord the next year. What we find for the 1957–1969 period where such data exist is that, consistent with the hypothesis but at a weak, nonsignificant level, expectations of a peaceful year internationally are negatively related to expectations that savings will decline (–.11), but also negatively (and more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 5

Attempted Prediction of American Individuals' Actual Savings

	Coefficient	*p*
	Saved some (asked of those with savings)	
Worried about nuclear war	−0.10	.15
Unemployed	−1.12	.005
Income	0.12	.001
	Saved more than last year (asked for all savers)	
Worried about nuclear war	−0.10	.001
Age	−0.01	.001
	Saved more than last year (savers over $30,000 income)	
Worried about nuclear war	−0.12	.003
Age	−0.01	.002

Note: The analysis for "saved some," is done with logit analysis, a procedure similar to OLS multiple regression for dichotomous dependent variables; the analysis for "saved more" (or less, or the same) is OLS. Socioeconomic control variables not initially significant are omitted from the final equations shown above.

strongly, −.49) to an increase in actual savings for that year. Moreover, an expected savings decline is in fact correlated (though weakly and not significantly, .24) with increased actual savings. Resolving this matter will require data on individuals' fears and actual savings experience.

American Individuals' Saving Experience

There remains one highly relevant set of data from the comprehensive and well-constructed University of Michigan American *National Election Study* of 1984. Table 5 shows the results of two different inquiries on that survey—inquiries that are especially appropriate to our question and suggest the relationship that has so far often eluded us. This analysis improves upon what we had for Britain in several important ways. First, the question about expectations of the international situation is precisely attuned to our interests: "How worried are you about our country getting into Nuclear War at this time?" and is asked of people in the United States, where such fears are greatest. Second, we can include controls for income as well as for education, unemployment, sex, age, race, and political orientation. Third, and most useful, it asks about actual savings behavior, rather than intentions as in Britain, and makes several distinctions. In a preliminary question it distinguishes those who had no savings or who had to draw on their savings in the past year to make ends meet. Thus it cuts away those who had no savings or had to spend them from those who might have had some opportunity to save; it asks of the latter, "Over the past year have you (and your family) been able to save any money?" Then finally, only of those who answer yes, it asks, "Have you been able to save less money, the same amount, or more money than the year be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fore?" We then have a measure not only for those who report actual savings, but—only of those who have saved at all—a measure of whether savings diminished or increased from the year before.[14]

The differences between results from the two forms of the savings question are striking. On the simple matter of saving or not, unsurprisingly, saving is negatively associated with unemployment and positively related to income. Fear of nuclear war seems to make some difference as hypothesized, but is not statistically significant. Decisions to save some or not at all are largely a consequence of economic status.

But the answer is quite different when we shift just to those who save at all; that is, to those individuals who, free from the tightest economic constraints, could make a choice to increase or decrease their savings. These are the individuals who would be most likely to take into account their perceptions of external conditions such as the likelihood of war. For them, decisions whether to save more or less than previously had little to do with economic status, were very much related to age (negatively, as in Britain), and were strongly related to expectations about nuclear war. Those who were very worried about getting into war were much less likely to have increased their savings than were those who were not so worried. Moreover, the relationship remains strong among only those in the top one-third of the income scale who earn over $30,000 annually. These largely are the people with the most discretion, and who contribute most to the national savings pool.[15]

This is one of the statistically strongest (at about the .002 level) relationships reported in this article and is based on the most suitable data. That is, it reports on *individual* perceptions and behavior, not just changes in national aggregates. It uses reports of individuals' *changes* in *actual savings behavior* in the recent past, rather than their gross anticipations of what that behavior may be in the coming year. It represents statements by those individuals best able *economically* to modify their behavior. The measure to tap expectations of international affairs is the most appropriately directed question for our purposes: *Americans' worry about nuclear war.* Those who have enough freedom to allow war fears to affect their decisions tend to do so. In light of these refinements, it is less surprising that the analyses reported earlier in the article were inconclusive. Refining the analysis for individuals provides support for the hypothesis where aggregate analysis did not. Obviously there must be a prospering economy and a tax structure that makes

[14] Regrettably, the advantage of having information on actual *past* savings comes with the disadvantage of having to match it with data on *current* fears of war, reversing the temporal order we would like. Nevertheless, at least at the aggregate level, fears of war were relatively stable in the United States during 1983–84 (data provided from his data base by Thomas Graham of Yale University and M.I.T.); and we believe this disadvantage is more than balanced by the advantages of this constellation of questions.

[15] Lacking discriminations for income or change in savings for the British individual-level analysis of Table 4 we did try to focus on those with some economic discretion by limiting an analysis to only those Britons who considered themselves middle or upper class; but that did not markedly change the results.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

savings possible. These conditions will vary across time and across countries. But assuming they are reasonably present, perceptions of the international situation will matter.

Readers should of course exercise caution in interpreting the individual-level results. Whatever the levels of statistical significance, the proportions of variance in savings being accounted for are small; relatively few individuals are so affected. Other explanatory variables could weaken the results. We do not have conclusive evidence of a causal link, only the statistical association, which conceivably could be spurious. We do not know nearly enough about the associations and calculations people may make between war and savings decisions, whether the relationship if truly causal is one of conscious or unconscious thought, or the degree to which it would hold up in surveys at other times or of other populations. Much work on this problem remains to be done with specially designed survey instruments in the United States, with panel surveys able to trace changes in particular individuals' perceptions and behavior over time, and probably with more intensive interviewing techniques.

No one should suppose that people, even those to whom the nuclear threat seems most acute, would uniformly react by reducing their savings. Psychologists recognize that there are many strategies for dealing with a perceived danger. They include adaptive coping and vigilance, of which a higher discount of the future (and hence lower savings) might be one form; political action designed to avert the danger might be another, and "survivalist" preparations yet another. In addition to these quite distinct "rational" strategies, others include evasion (of which the worst form is Robert J. Lifton's "psychic numbing"), buckpassing, and "bolstering" (an exaggerated form of "looking on the bright side.")[16] The variety of possible strategies suggests real limits to the kind of "rational actor" hypothesis that lies at the heart of this article's analysis.

Neither, however, can our evidence be dismissed. It is intriguing, from appropriate data sets, and on a matter of importance. It implies fundamental questions in the broadest sense about the utility and legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. It should be investigated further; and the investigation should be broadened to other aspects of future-oriented behavior, such as decisions about employment, marriage, and child-bearing and child-raising.[17] A famous remark by Albert Einstein is that "the unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our modes of thinking." But perhaps it has changed those too. Our economic and social futures may be more closely joined to visions of our international futures than we usually imagine.*

[16] See, for example, Irving Janis and Ralph Mann, *Decision Making* (New York: Free Press, 1977). The idea of psychic numbing is discussed by Robert J. Lifton in many places, recently in his (with Richard Falk) *Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), chap. 10.

[17] Ibid., chap. 8, discusses this possibility. Is there a link here from nuclear weapons of which most "pro-life" advocates are as yet unaware?

* We are grateful to the World Society of Switzerland for financial support, to the Roper Center archive of Yale University for access to public opinion survey data, and to David Kinsella for research assistance. Of course, only we are responsible for the results.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Influence of Russian Tradition on the Political Style of the Soviet Elite

STEPHEN R. BURANT

In his first public address as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Konstantin U. Chernenko reaffirmed that cultural revolution constitutes a significant element of his organization's program for the future of Soviet society. According to Chernenko, the party seeks "to construct a new world," a goal that entails "the constant concern for the development (*formirovanie*) of the man of the new world, for his ideological and moral growth."[1]

Recent analysts who have examined the political cultures of Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe have found the goal postulated by Chernenko to be far from realized. Indeed, the political cultures of these regimes consist of a mixture of indigenous ingredients and those directly traceable to the reigning political ideology.[2] By using political culture as an independent variable, these scholars hope to account for observable differences between Communist party-states. Moreover, these individuals endeavor to determine the extent to which the traditional political cultures have been altered by up to three genera-

[1] "Rech' tovarishcha K. U. Chernenko," *Pravda* 14 February 1984.

[2] Robert C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," *Political Science Quarterly* 88 (June 1973): 173-190; Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1977); Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," *American Political Science Review* 68 (September 1974): 1171-1191; Kenneth Jowitt, "Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime," *Soviet Studies* 35 (July 1983): 275-297; "Symposium on Political Culture," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 16 (Spring/Summer 1983): 5-98.

STEPHEN R. BURANT is a senior research analyst at the Library of Congress. He has written on the political sociology of the nineteenth-century Polish radical-democratic movement and on Soviet perspectives on international space law.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions of Communist rule, where an elite committed to cultural revolution and the creation of a "New Socialist Man" has retained a monopoly on the values promoted by socialization and education, not to mention the instruments of control.

The presentation of the issue in this manner presupposes a dichotomy. On the one hand, there are those who are committed to an "official" political culture and who seek to alter society in conformity with their belief system. On the other hand, there exists a "dominant" political culture, that of the masses, whose values and attitudes form the objects of transformation.[3]

This article poses a different problem. While continuing to postulate a dichotomy between an official, Marxist-Leninist political culture and a dominant culture shared by the masses, this study examines the extent to which the latter has shaped the former. Elements of traditional Russian political culture have become part of the political style of the Soviet Communist Party elite, the very individuals one would expect to adhere closely to the international Marxist-Leninist norms and code.

E. H. Gombrich defines style as "any distinctive, and therefore recognizable, way in which an act is performed or an artifact made or ought to be performed and made."[4] An analysis of style calls attention to appearances; political style demands a public display. In as much as it is public, political style also possesses a rhetorical dimension. Elite political style is a means of persuasion, because it communicates an idea or system of ideas to the ruled. The elite may wish to reassure the ruled; it may seek to win their respect or their admiration. The elite may even desire to exercise an emotional impact of one kind or another on those whom it governs. These considerations suggest that political style can achieve its rhetorical objectives only because of the distance that exists between the elite and the masses.[5] If the citizenry were to be exposed to action "behind the scenes" at the Kremlin, they might discover that their leaders are driven by the "delight in power; the cancer of power," which the Polish writer, Tadeusz Konwicki, defines as the essence of rule in Communist party-states.[6] Rather, because they are not privy to politics behind the scenes, the masses may take appearances for reality, thus maximizing the effectiveness of the style.

Because the Soviet elite heads a party and a regime officially committed to Marxism-Leninism and the creation of a new socialist man, this commitment should be manifested in its style first and foremost. After all, the leadership presents itself as the infallible representative of the ideology. If we can find evidence that suggests the persistence of traditional cultural patterns even in the behavior of

[3] In this regard see Timothy Luke, "The Proletarian Ethic and Soviet Industrialization," *American Political Science Review* 77 (September 1983): 588-601; Christel Lane, *The Rites of Rulers* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 22-27.

[4] E. H. Gombrich, "Style" in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1968); see also, E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion* (London: Phaidon Press, 1976), 18.

[5] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 5.

[6] See also Gyula Jozsza, "Political Seilschaften in the USSR" in T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, eds., *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), 139-173.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those who guide the program of cultural transformation, it will serve to complement the growing body of literature that seeks to clarify the limits that traditional culture imposes on directed change from above.

While this article concerns aspects of Soviet elite political style derived from pre-revolutionary Russian political culture, the style as a whole comprises a range of behaviors, attitudes, and habits in addition to those discussed herein. For example, the Bolshevik party emerged as a conspiratorial underground revolutionary organization, and this ethos continues to influence Soviet elite style.[7] Conversely, the Chaika limousines, western clothes, and other visible manifestations of a well-to-do lifestyle indicate that a certain hedonism has infected the Soviet political elite.[8]

Yet another dimension of Soviet elite style, and one that deserves lengthier discussion, is bureaucratism. An astute observer of Communist systems in eastern Europe, Andras Hegedus, has argued that the mediocrity, conformism, and even boorishness apparent in the personal behavior of the Soviet political elite, which we will attribute to the influence of Russian peasant traditions, actually stem from the pathologies of bureaucracy.[9] If Hegedus is correct, a problem arises in determining the sources of a range of characteristics that may be similar in appearance and effect.

While this issue cannot be resolved within the scope of this article, I suggest two different approaches to test the hypotheses elaborated herein with at least a measure of certainty. First, one could compare elite styles of the various East European Communist regimes with that of the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe has undergone a series of social changes similar to the USSR; the composition of social classes and the nature of class relations in the satellite countries have been altered on the basis of a pattern based on Soviet experience. In addition, until recently the political systems of the East European countries were almost carbon copies of the Soviet.[10] Hence, in comparing the elite styles of these various regimes, bureaucratic features can be held constant. If differences appear, one might ascribe some of the variation to the influence of political culture.[11]

The Weberian ideal-type model of bureaucracy suggests another means to gauge the influence of political culture compared to that of the politico-administrative pathologies analyzed by Hegedus. According to Max Weber, bureaucratic pathologies most often affect "[t]he official who is not elected [because he] normally functions more exactly from a technical point of view [and because] purely technical points of consideration and qualities will determine his selection and career."[12]

[7] Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951); Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953).

[8] See Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura* (New York: Doubleday, 1984), 178-239; Konstantin Simis, *USSR: The Corrupt Society* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

[9] Andras Hegedus, *Socialism and Bureaucracy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 171-176.

[10] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past?" in Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, eds., *The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era* (New York: Aldine, 1984), 75.

[11] See footnote 89.

[12] Max Weber, *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 200.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By contrast, elected officials, those appointed by a monarch, or those officials who comprise the Politburo, the Secretariat, and even the Central Committee hold an autonomous position vis à vis the bureaucracy.[13] While acknowledging that Soviet rulers are products of a huge bureaucratic machine, they should be freer of bureaucratic styles and habits than their appointed subordinates. Consequently, in analyzing the style of the Soviet political elite, one can attribute greater weight to carryovers from the traditional culture, compared to bureaucratic habits and casts of mind.

In looking for evidence of the persistence of traditional cultural patterns within the political style of the Soviet elite, I will search for continuities of form, not substance. That elements of a style derived from traditional sources have influenced the behavior of the Soviet political elite does not mean that the elite has adopted their original content as well.[14] For example, an observer at the funerals of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko would have noticed many phenomena throughout each ceremony that Soviet authorities borrowed from Orthodox rites. The fact that the Politburo and Central Committee arranged these funerals in the manner they did does not represent a move from Marxist-Leninist ideology to the adoption of Russian Orthodoxy. Rather, those traditional rites have been interjected with new content and thereby have been made to serve a regime that is officially atheistic.

A problem arises in the attempt to distinguish those aspects of political style that the elite consciously choose in an effort to win mass support or quiescence from those aspects that emerge from primary socialization experiences, which inculcate certain attitudes, habits, and frames of reference in members of a given culture. For example, the cult of the Soviet leader in general and that of V. I. Lenin in particular emerged in the 1920s in part as a deliberate policy to gain popular support for the Soviet regime and in part as a spontaneous outflow of affection by people wishing to honor Lenin using the only terminology they knew. These activities served to create a cult of Lenin similar in form to the cults of saints and tsars of Russia's past.

Yet, even if we acknowledge that the leadership has deliberately drawn upon elements of traditional Russian culture in the derivation of its style, the *latent* effect of such policies is the transmission of these cultural forms and categories to succeeding generations. Thus, in the mid-1930s, when the authorities began to refer to the USSR as the *rodina* (motherland), or earlier when the Soviet political leaders decided to locate Lenin within Russia's pantheon of saints and heroes, these policies, turns of phrase, or modes of behavior entered the media, the textbooks, and other vehicles of socialization as approved aspects of Soviet style. New generations came to regard themselves as offspring of a socialist *rodina* and to conceive

[13] Ibid.

[14] On the distinction between form and content in politics, see Murray Edelman, *Political Language. Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 127-128; on the infusion of traditional life cycle rites with socialist content, see Lane, *Rites of Rulers*, 59-84.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Lenin and their relationship to him as their ancestors revered the most important Orthodox saints. Hence, even manipulation acts as an instrument for cultural continuity and stands as a tacit admission of the limits of cultural change.

Recently, two scholars have analyzed the sociopolitical processes that have led to a decline in the Soviet capacity to effect cultural revolution. Richard Lowenthal argues that Marxist-Leninist dictatorships seek to promote "a special type of politically forced development."[15] Indigenous Marxist-Leninist revolutions occur in countries located on the fringes of the western world or in the Third World. These societies lack most of the historical antecedents that contributed to the emergence of modern capitalist society in western Europe and America. Once in power, a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship quickly finds that it must modernize its society to enable it to survive in a hostile world; its ideology can come to fruition only in an advanced industrial society. This ideology, though, also promises a classless society populated by "new socialist men." According to Lowenthal, these goals conflict. Communist dictatorships soon find that they can catch up with the West most quickly by promoting the discipline and rationalization of production combined with coercive threats and material incentives. By contrast, utopia requires that people come to recognize and work for the common good as a matter of faith. Moreover, the new socialist man is to be free of "the getting and spending" that characterizes western economic man. Inevitably, the utilitarian individualist wins out over the new socialist man, an unintended consequence of the Communist modernization of underdeveloped societies. Following the victory of the pragmatists, technicians and engineers gain sway over the ideologists. These individuals relax the terror and police apparatus. Material incentives achieve primacy over moral incentives. Planned social change results in an "unplanned spontaneous revolution from below," which acquires strength as time passes.

Lowenthal misses two critical points. First, in some measure the qualities of western economic man and those of new socialist man coincide. Both emphasize the cultivation of rational consciousness over spontaneity; they argue for "a vigorous self-control and a narrowing of energies [motivated by] a bold effort to shape a new personality against the background of social 'unsettledness.'"[16] In addition, both the ideal types of economic man described by Weber and the new socialist man called for by Lenin are alien to Russia's political culture because many of the pre-conditions that shaped western capitalism and the rise of the middle class were missing in Russia: the influence of Greek speculative thought was weak; the Mongol invasion destroyed Russian town development; Muscovy permitted no independence to the towns; the concept of individual rights was poorly developed.[17]

However, research on political culture in communist systems suggests that the

[15] Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Systems" in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), 33-116.

[16] Michael Walzer, *Revolution of the Saints* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 312.

[17] Tibor Szamuely, *The Russian Tradition* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1974); Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Scribner's, 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reemergence of traditional cultural patterns also constitutes a spontaneous appearance of undesirable ideological phenomena, which, if anything, are more evident than that of the individualistic profit maximizer.[18]

While he does not analyze political style as such, Ken Jowitt accounts for the emergence of neotraditionalism within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by arguing that this organization no longer posits a social combat task, which subordinates "particular interests to authoritative definitions of the party's task and interest." The tendency towards "corrupt" routinization of the leadership of this previously charismatic organization, says Jowitt, is due to the fact that it "can no longer identify a compelling transformation task, define it strategically (not merely symbolically), and mobilize significant sections of the organization around both task and strategy."[19]

Jowitt's argument assumes that the party and its elite rigorously adhered to their ideological norms in those periods when the elite managed to identify one or more social combat tasks during the collectivization and industrialization campaigns as well as during World War II. While not seeking to diminish the value of Jowitt's contribution, one must look elsewhere for an explanation as to why behavioral traits reflective of specifically Russian traditions live on in the style of the Soviet political elite. Zygmunt Bauman has written:

> The impact of peasant origins on the political culture of Communist societies can hardly be exaggerated. The massive influx of peasants into the lower and middle levels of the budding institutions of post-revolutionary states . . . lends plausibility to the supposition that the style of political life as shaped from the grassroots level upwards, owes more than its marginal peculiarity to the legacy of peasant culture. More importantly, the strength of the peasant politico-cultural contribution exceeds the estimate based on the statistics of Communist cadres as it must have derived its thrust from the sheer fact of dominance of peasant culture in the post-revolutionary society.[20]

Moshe Lewin supports this hypothesis:

> [It] is therefore worth considering also the thesis that the cultural trends of the Stalinist era were not necessarily responses to what the peasants wanted to forget, but rather an expression of the psychic and mental tensions and values of the officials and leaders of state machinery that was rapidly growing within and in conflict with a still age-old rural civilization.[21]

I contend that traditional elements of Russian political culture persist in Soviet political style because of the primary socialization experiences of the individuals

[18] Alexander Yanov seems to think that profit maximizers, the economic "movers and shakers" in Soviet society, are predominant among the factory managers. See *Detente After Brezhnev: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute for International Studies, 1977), 22-42.

[19] Jowitt, "Soviet Neotraditionalism," 284-285.

[20] Zygmunt Bauman, "Comment on Eastern Europe," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 12 (Summer/Autumn 1979): 185.

[21] Moshe Lewin, "The Social Background of Stalinism in Russia" in Robert Tucker, ed., *Stalinism* (New York: Norton, 1977), 128.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who have comprised the elite. In the campaigns for the collectivization of the peasantry and the industrialization of the economy, the regime broke up the bases of traditional Russian political culture. However, at the same time the party was transforming society, "society" entered the party. These individuals brought the baggage of their early socialization experiences with them as they climbed up the organizational hierarchy into positions of power.

In *Democracy in America* Alexis De Tocqueville wrote that the study of politics must begin with the experiences of

> the infant in his mother's arms; we must see the first images which the external world casts upon the dark mirror of the child's mind, the first occurrences that he witnesses; we must hear the first words which awaken the sleeping powers of thought, and stand by his earliest efforts if we would understand the prejudices, the habits, and the passions which will rule his life. The entire man is, so to speak, to be seen in the cradle of the child.[22]

Contemporary socialization theory supports De Tocqueville's argument. According to Gabriel A. Almond, cultures perpetuate themselves "mainly by means of the socializing influences of the primary and secondary structures through which the young of the society pass in the process of maturation."[23] Almond divides socialization into latent and manifest experiences. He defines manifest socialization as the "explicit transmission of information, values, or feelings vis à vis the roles, inputs, and outputs of the system." By contrast, latent socialization "takes the form of transmission of information, values, or feelings vis à vis the roles, inputs, and outputs of other social systems such as the family, which affect attitudes toward analogous roles, inputs, and outputs of the political system."[24] Latent socialization forms "the first and undoubtedly the most basic stage of the political socialization process." Life in the family, the experience of authority, and discipline constitute the "most rapid and binding stage of socialization."[25] More impact occurs at this point than at any other in the socialization process.

An early empirical theorist in this field, W. I. Thomas, argued that primary socialization experiences are critical in bestowing "definitions of the situation" by which the individual comes to apprehend social realities and conform to group norms:

> This definition of the situation is begun by parents in the form of ordering and forbidding and information, is continued in the community by means of gossip, with its praise and blame, and is formally represented by the school, the law, the church.[26]

[22] Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, translated by Henry Reeve, revised by Francis Bowen and edited by Phillip Bradley, 2 vols. (New York: Knopf, 1945), 2:26-27.

[23] Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction" in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), 26.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] W. I. Thomas, "The Persistence of Primary-Group Norms in Present-Day Society and Their Influence in Our Educational System" in Herbert S. Jennings et al., *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education* (New York: MacMillan, 1921), 168.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such is the pull of these "definitions" that "even the most extreme radical in any society is radical in only a few situations."[27] The party might have destroyed the institutions that shaped Russian life before the revolution; it could not destroy all the people whom these institutions had nurtured.

Penetration of the Party into the Countryside and Destruction of Traditional Peasant Institutions

As noted earlier, in the collectivization and industrialization campaigns, the party was able to "identify a social combat task." Following the schematization of political styles suggested by Herbert Spiro, the style of the Soviet elite during this period was "ideologistic." According to Spiro, an ideologistic style is one in which an

> [i]deological motivation [shapes] the recognition of problems and the formation of issues, regardless of "objective" needs. All policy is put in the service of the long-run substantive goals to which the ideology is committed, so that nothing that deviates from it can remain stable, nor can adjustments be made to changes within, or in the environment of, the system, unless the ideology itself dictates these changes.[28]

The collectivization campaign engineered by Joseph Stalin in the late 1920s and early 1930s amounted to an "attack on the sociocultural bases" of peasant life in Soviet Russia.[29] Collectivization annihilated the basic institutions of peasant culture; the party penetrated to the depths of society and sought to make the peasants conform to its codes in every aspect of their daily life. As late as 1927, the peasants still held 222 million hectares of land, or 95 percent of the total, in repartitional tenure.[30] Indeed, the young Soviet regime actually strengthened the peasant *obshchina* (commune) in several ways. V. Miliutin, a vice-president of the Communist Academy, defined the *obshchina* as a "step on the way to more collective farms."[31] Even after the revolution, the *mir* (also the commune) retained its character as a state within a state.[32] Beneath the surface features of the new regime, the lives of the peasantry flowed on much as they had for hundreds of years before the revolution. Soviet power was as yet weak in the countryside.

[27] Edmund Volkart, "Introduction" in Edmund Volkart, ed., *Social Behavior and Personality: Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social Research* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951), 9.

[28] Herbert Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach," *American Political Science Review* 56 (June 1962): 579.

[29] Kenneth Jowitt, *The Leninist Response to National Dependency* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1977), 58.

[30] E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies, *The Foundation of a Planned Economy,* 3 vols. (London: MacMillan, 1969), 1:119.

[31] Quoted in ibid., 125.

[32] On the role of the *mir* in Russian peasant life, see Geroid Tanquary Robinson, *Rural Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Macmillan, 1961), 74-80; Francis Watters, "The Peasant and the Village Commune" in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *The Peasant in Nineteenth Century Russia* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), 133-157.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not until the collectivization campaign did the Soviet regime establish control at the grass roots. Moreover, if the experience of the Smolensk region (*oblast'*) is at all typical, representatives from the center established this control, not local cadres. The Smolensk archives show that at the inception of the drive for collectivization in that part of Soviet Russia, local party chairmen and village Soviet chairmen regarded this new policy with suspicion. These officials sympathized with the peasantry and did what they could to ameliorate the peasant's difficulties. Officials from the center even encountered outright resistance to this campaign from local authorities. Consequently, out of 616 village Soviet chairmen in the Smolensk *oblast'*, 304 or 49.8 percent lost their positions in 1929.[33]

While in theory, collective farm (*kolkhoz*) officials were to be elected by the peasants, in fact the local party organization appointed these functionaries. Moreover, the regime constructed another institution to secure its control over the countryside, eradicate traditional peasant associations, and build new ones consonant with the demands of the center. Arguably, the most important agent of penetration was the Machine Tractor Station, particularly its political section (*politotdel*), staffed by representatives from the center. The *politotdel* assumed four tasks: to form party and Young Communist League (*Komsomol*) organizations in the newly created collective farms; to eliminate anti-Soviet elements from the *kolkhoz*; to organize the *kolkhoz* to meet the demands of the center; to serve as an instrument enforcing the requirements of the state.

By the mid-1930s, as Moscow replaced local officials with its own representatives, Soviet power diffused throughout all of society as these new appointees became village Soviet chairmen, local party bosses, and managers of collective farms. The organization of Communist Party and *Komsomol* cells in the *kolkhoz* combined with the proscription on any sort of "factionalism" to make regime control of the collective farms most effective. These cells were small, but the Smolensk archive indicates their membership gradually increased throughout the 1930s.

By 1935 the social institutions that characterized the *ancien regime* in the countryside had disappeared. However, the regime could not eradicate the values, attitudes, habits, and "definitions of the situation" reflective of old Russia without destroying those who had been socialized into that culture. This was impossible, even for Stalin. Quite the contrary, for Stalin promoted representatives of the common people (*narod*) to positions of power and influence in the regime.

Penetration of the Party by the Narod

The penetration of the Communist Party by the *narod* took place within the larger framework of the upward mobility experienced by the *vydvizhentsy* (lower class, especially working-class individuals who moved into professional jobs in the economy during the early years of Stalin's rule). Between 1928 and 1932, the number

[33] Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 141-142.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of engineers employed in the civilian sector of the economy rose from 18,000 to 74,000, while the number of professionals employed in administration, government, and exchange increased from 63,000 to 119,000.[34] For the most part, the *vydvizhentsy* populated these new positions. Such people were poorly educated, greedy, and, not surprisingly, often downright incompetent. *Obyvatel'shchina* (philistinism) came to characterize the administration and the management of the economy, even at the highest levels.

These *vydvizhentsy* also entered the party as individuals socialized in a peasant milieu, workers who had recently emigrated from the countryside; and peasants came numerically to dominate an organization seeking to effect a cultural revolution.[35] These people acted as agents for the very cultural patterns the CPSU sought to efface in its quest to develop a new socialist man. Consequently, limitations existed almost from the beginning of socialist rule on the party's ability to forge a new form of life for *itself*, much less direct a cultural revolution for society as a whole.

Soviet sources indicate that the Bolshevik party numbered 32,600 in 1917. At this time, workers comprised approximately 60 percent of the party, while peasants made up 8 percent of the organization's cadres. The remainder came from the intelligentsia and the middle class.[36] From 1917 to 1921, the combined membership of workers and peasants fluctuated between 67.7 percent and 71.4 percent of the total.[37]

Between 1923 and 1932 the Soviet Communist Party expanded vertically and horizontally. The total membership rose from 500,000 to 3.5 million. In addition, the party made an intensive effort to recruit proletarian and peasant elements into its ranks. According to data collected by T. H. Rigby, in 1923 workers and peasants comprised 70.6 percent of Communist Party membership. From 1925 to 1930, this figure fluctuated between 79.7 and 85.5 percent, though by 1932 workers and peasants made up 92.1 percent of the Soviet Communist Party.[38] True, some heretofore privileged elements falsified their social origins in order to move into the party and pursue careerist objectives. However, a recent study of Central Committee membership in this period correlated the educational background of Central Committee members with their class origins and found that these two factors were significantly related: those socialized as peasants tended to have "non-intellectual-type educational experiences" (military or party training), and those with working-

[34] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Cultural Revolution as Class War" in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia 1928-1931* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), 59.

[35] Lewin, "The Social Background of Stalinism," 119; Marshall Shatz, "Stalin, The Great Purge, and Russian History: A New Look at the 'New Class,'" *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and Eastern European Studies*, no. 305 (Pittsburgh: Russian and East European Studies Program, University of Pittsburgh, 1984), 14-31.

[36] T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1917-1967* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 59.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., 116.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

class or white-collar origins had "intellectual-type educational experiences."[39] This finding suggests that falsification of social origins and manipulation of background data were indeed minimal.

We cannot know what percentage of industrial workers or even white-collar employees in Soviet Russia during the 1920s had actually been socialized as peasants. Merle Fainsod relates that most of the proletarians in the Smolensk *oblast'* matured as peasants, having recently moved to urban areas from the countryside.[40] The party did not collect data on the class origins of its proletarian members, so at best we can suggest certain trends. As late as 1902, 87.3 percent of the Russian working class was socialized as peasants, and at the same time there were approximately 1.6 million workers in European Russia.[41] By 1915, the Russian working class grew to 2.5 million men in large-scale industry.[42] However, during the revolution and civil war, the number of proletarians declined; the working class only reached its pre-war numerical level in 1925.[43] Because the working class grew so fast in such a short time before the revolution, and because it was replenished so quickly after the civil war, a sizeable share of these people must have come from the countryside.

During the 1920s and 1930s, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was predominantly Russian in national make-up. In fact, Rigby argues that in the early years of the Soviet regime, "the predominance of Great Russians in [the Party's] mass membership was greater than it has been in any subsequent period."[44] In 1927 Great Russians comprised 65 percent of the Communist Party membership as against approximately 53 percent of the total population.[45] Excluding Georgians, Armenians, Jews, and Poles, minority nationals remained underrepresented. Consequently, in the 1920s and 1930s, when the party recruited workers and peasants into its ranks, these people were more likely to stem from Russian families than those of other nationalities.

These Russian worker and peasant elements rose quickly within the ranks of the Bolshevik party. From 1925 to 1930, the percentage of party members who were white-collar workers ranged between 40 and 50 percent.[46] In 1929, a purge eliminated elites in managerial, party, and trade union posts. This purge opened up positions at the top, and individuals whose origins lay in the *narod* replaced

[39] James Patrick Nichol, "Political Selection and Life History Types in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1982), 390-394.

[40] Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*, 307.

[41] Piotr I. Liashchenko, *History of the National Economy of Russia* (New York: Macmillan, 1949), 543-544.

[42] Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR* (London: Pelican Books, 1984), 17.

[43] *Sovetskoe narodnoe khoziaistvo v 1921-25 g.g.* (Moscow: Isdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1961), 531.

[44] Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, 365-366; Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 254-257.

[45] Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, 365-366.

[46] Ibid., 116.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them. The decline in the percentage of production workers in the party to 37.6 percent in 1932 resulted from the promotion of these individuals to white-collar positions and the increased efforts to recruit peasants who had now become safely ensconced in the *kolkhoz*.

In 1932, the emphasis on worker-peasant recruitment ended. From that year onward, the party simply sought "the best" from all strata of society. Recruitment from the intelligentsia became legitimate, because "yesterday's workers and peasants and sons of workers and peasants" who had been promoted to the "commanding posts" of society now comprised the core of this stratum.[47]

Until the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev and recent Politburo changes effected by him, the *vydvizhentsy* predominated in the Soviet leadership. In 1980, Jerry Hough wrote that "over one-half of the Politburo members come from among those who were thrust upward after the Great Purge, when they were in their thirties, and who have been in high posts for forty years."[48] As late as April 1984, another analyst concluded that nothing much had changed since that time.[49] Hough argues that the formative experiences of this generation lay in their rapid upward mobility because of the purges. By contrast, this article contends that the formative experiences of these individuals occurred much earlier in a countryside as yet untouched by revolutionary transformation.

Russian Peasant and Soviet Elite Style: A Symbiosis

Recently, Edward Shils wrote that "whatever changes [an individual's] character might subsequently undergo . . . his character and beliefs at any given moment are what he has acquired and formed previously."[50] Or, to paraphrase Marx, the traditions of all the dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living, even if they have been exposed to intense ideological re-education. For this reason, the legacy of Russian peasant culture continues to inform the style of the Soviet elite.

Political Style of the Russian Peasantry

The political style that characterized the Russian peasantry most closely approximates one defined by Herbert Spiro as "legalistic." In Spiro's words, a legalistic style is

> the attempt to foreordain the entire future by means of comprehensive, detailed, and

[47] Ibid., 224.

[48] Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980), 9.

[49] John Kress, "The CPSU Politburo in Transition: Institutionalization of Elite Replacement and Recruitment," prepared for presentation at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 12 April 1984, 16.

[50] Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 47-48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> consistent regulation. This is designed to preclude the need for future choices, to prevent changes in values or goals . . . since no novel, substantive problems come up.[51]

A legalistic style is inherently conservative, since it precludes change. Moreover, the term "legalism" also connotes a strict adherance to a body of law. In the case of peasants, the law is not a codified set of rules or a body of positive law, but tradition sanctioned by religion. Moreover, the tradition does not merely extend to a peasant's obligations in, say, the economic sphere, but informs his whole way of life.[52] In Russia, tradition encouraged risk-avoiding behavior combined with a concern for the survival of the *kollektiv*—the village. For centuries the Russian peasantry faced conditions that remained unchanged from year to year. The environment was harsh, but the peasant had come to expect such harsh conditions as a part of life. The categories by which the peasantry understood their environment never altered, but they permitted survival, if not prosperity, in these trying circumstances.

A web of custom tied each peasant to his fellows within the commune. For the peasant, the word, *mir*, possessed three meanings: village, world, peace. These denotations tell us much about how the peasant perceived this microsociety and his relation to it. The village comprised the peasants' world, and they found security therein. In fact, only very rarely did a peasant family situate its hut outside the village community; most preferred to live close to their neighbors.[53]

The peasants ruled the commune by means of the deliberative assembly (*sel'skii skhod*), characterized by "democracy in its simplest form without intermediate agents and without representation."[54] All male members discussed their problems freely without inhibitions and then voted on the matter at hand. Communal decisions usually carried by acclamation. No one ever dreamed of opposing openly the will of the *mir*.[55] Several Russian proverbs illustrate the iron rule of the commune:

> What the *mir* has settled is God's own judgment.
> What the *mir* has resolved, so shall it be.
> God alone can judge the *mir*.
> The *mir* is subject to no jurisdiction but God's.

Donald McKenzie-Wallace labeled the *mir* a good specimen of common-law government, because a body of unwritten, traditional conceptions of governance that evolved over centuries defined the limits of communal authority.[56] Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu made a similar observation: "the *mir* is born of custom," and in it "customs take the place of law."[57]

[51] Spiro, "Comparative Politics," 578.

[52] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 46-49; James Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

[53] Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians*, 2 vols. (New York: Putnam, 1894), 1:516-517.

[54] Ibid., 2:6.

[55] Donald McKenzie-Wallace, *Russia* (London: Cassell, 1905), 163.

[56] Ibid., 160-161.

[57] Leroy-Beaulieu, *Empire of the Tsars*, 2:29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In part, modernization proceeded slowly into the Russian countryside because of the disincentives to innovate that reigned in the commune.[58] Innovation demands an element of risk, and tradition discouraged risk in favor of the conservative and rational strategy of survival. The *mir* represented a highly inflexible, rigid, and restrictive pattern of land tenure; it required a plodding, unimaginative style of labor. This style of labor entered into the mainstream of Soviet politics when the party recruited individuals from the working class and the peasantry into its ranks, and these people moved up the hierarchy into positions of power.

In pre-revolutionary Russia, a leader-cult in the form of tsar-worship coexisted with the peasantry's legalistic political style. The leader-cult started with the worship of religious figures: Jesus and Mary became objects of veneration, as did many saints of the Orthodox Church. Eventually, the cult of the saints was "transmogrified" into the myth of the tsar who was at once secular and ruled by divine right.[59] The Marquis De Custine quote Baron von Herberstein, ambassador of the Emperor Maximilian, father of Charles V, to the Russian Tsar, Vassili Ivanovich: "[The Tsar] has no opposition, and everything in him appears just—as in the Divinity—for the Russians are persuaded that the Great Prince is the executor of celestial decrees."[60] Indeed, the peasant knew the tsar as his "Little Father" (*Batiushka*), a wise, all-knowing benefactor, who would right any wrong within his empire, if only he knew of its existence.

Soviet Elite Style

Upon assuming power in 1917, the Bolsheviks sought to effect a cultural revolution in Russia. However, traditional Russian culture exercised a significant impact on the demeanor, outlook, and style of the Soviet leadership. In their behavior, Soviet rulers betray a conservatism, a disdain for ingenuity, and even a crudity that bears similarity to the work ethic of the Russian peasantry, and that conflicts with the conscious, resolute, ideologically driven personality of the new socialist man first prescribed by Lenin. Tow other aspects of Soviet elite style possess a greater rhetorical dimension. The traditional concern for the *kollektiv* and group integration finds reflection in the sense of communality (*sobornost'*), which the elite affects in its decision making and public appearances. Yet, paradoxically, a leader-cult, combining traditional forms and Marxist-Leninist content, continues to exist in the Soviet Union. The leadership promotes reverence for the body and works of Lenin; those rulers that followed Lenin have also created the cults of their own person to a greater or lesser degree.

Style of Work. In several essays written after the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin addressed the issue of a proletarian work ethic and its relation to the general level

[58] Walters, "Peasant and the Village Commune," 152.

[59] Nina Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 6.

[60] Marquis De Custine, *Journey for Our Time* (Chicago: Henry Regney Company, 1951), 76.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of culture. "The communist organization of social labor," Lenin contended, "rests . . . on the free and conscious discipline of the working people themselves who have thrown off the yoke both of the landowners and the capitalists."[61] Lenin believed that a new proletarian style of labor would emerge following the institutionalization of a new organization of labor. A new style of labor was to follow from the development of productive forces, overcoming the survivals of small-scale production, the abolition of private ownership, etc.[62] These changes promised a cultural revolution, a new way of life, "which must be so new as not to contain the tiniest particle of the old."[63] In a more pessimistic vein, though, Lenin observed that as of 1922-1923, tradition had not been overcome in the work habits and style of the state apparatus; they were "rooted in the past, which, although it had been overthrown, has not been overcome [and therefore we have] not reached the stage of culture that has receded into the distant past." Interestingly enough, Lenin's use of the word "culture" was deliberate, because the style of the apparatus was "part and parcel of [the country's] social life and habits."[64] Lenin advocated education and professional training to overcome the lack of imagination, dullness, and routine, which even in the early 1920s had come to define the Soviet state and party administration.

According to Isaac Deutscher (to be sure, no impartial observer), Stalin, and by extension the personnel who rose to power under him, represented those responsible Communist administrators whose culture was still inferior to that of even Russia's old ruling classes and who still continued to cultivate Russia's ancient customs and habits.[65] In the form of Stalin's political style, the traditional style of work came to infiltrate the style of the Soviet elite and subsequently became an aspect of the national style of the Soviet Union.

The observations made of the Soviet leadership in the mid-1940s by Milovan Djilas support this contention. Djilas's views of Stalin and his circle are important because the Yugoslav Communist Party officials in general and Djilas in particular attempted rigorously to adhere to the code of the new socialist man at this time. Djilas labeled Stalin's behavior as "colorless, meager, and an unblended jumble of vulgar journalism and the Bible."[66] Furthermore, during the viewing of a film on collective farms, "Stalin made comments—reactions to what was going on, in the manner of uneducated men who mistake artistic reality for actuality."[67] Sum-

[61] V. I. Lenin, "A Great Beginning" in *Selected Works,* 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 3:171.

[62] Ibid.

[63] V. I. Lenin, "Better Fewer, But Better," in *Selected Works,* 3:714.

[64] Ibid; see also Voslensky, *Nomenklatura*, 43.

[65] Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), 359-360.

[66] Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1962), 12; in their memoir literature, Soviet military personnel describe the vulgarity and boorishness of Kaganovich, Mekhlis, Beria, Molotov, and Malenkov, all of whom had been purged by 1957. See Seweryn Bialer, ed., *Stalin and His Generals* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), 442-461.

[67] Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, 103.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marizing the opinions of the various Yugoslav delegations to the USSR of which he was a member, Djilas wrote that "[a]t every step we discovered till then unnoticed aspects of the Soviet reality: backwardness, primitivism, chauvinism, a big-power complex, although accompanied by heroic and superhuman efforts to outgrow the past and overtake the natural course of events."[68]

Recent evidence suggests that little has changed since Stalin's time. As a correspondent for the *Washington Post*, Robert Kaiser had occasion to meet high Soviet officials, if not the elite itself; most struck him as colorless, unimaginative, and boring.[69] An individual who worked for the Central Committee confirms these impressions:

> . . . there is no doubt that the thinking person in the Party apparatus constantly feels a sort of hopeless emptiness around him. This is inevitable if decent people are consistently driven out of it, or excluded from positions of power. They are replaced by nonentities and ignoramuses. These remarks lie beyond verification, but I believe them to be accurate.[70]

A conversation between Leonid Brezhnev and one of his subordinates reveals still other continuities of form (and content) in the personal demeanor of Soviet officials with their counterparts in pre-revolutionary Russia:

> What's the matter with you (but using the familiar '*ty*') . . . Alexander Savitch? Tell me straight, what's up with you (thee)?
> Everything's all right here . . . Did you (polite form, '*vy*' . . .) listen to the radio this morning?[71]

This dialogue depicts an unequal relationship, a manifestation of rank. Indeed, Efim Etkind observes that such relationships seem "to be a remnant of the serfdom days" and wonders rhetorically whether Brezhnev was aware "that his feudal roots are showing here, that the boorishness of long ago still persists."[72]

Earlier, I discussed the relative weights of bureaucratic pathologies versus cultural continuities with Russia's past as causal factors contributing to the evolution of the political style of the Soviet elite. A recent analyst argues, on the basis of N. S. Khrushchev's experience in trying to reform the Soviet style of leadership by changes in structure, that eventually he rejected the simplistic idea that style was dependent on structure and could be readily modified by altering the mode of organization.[73] In this context, we may also draw an analogy with similar issues raised by Michel Crozier in his discussion of French public and industrial adminis-

[68] Ibid., 165.

[69] Robert Kaiser, *Russia: The People and the Power* (New York: Atheneum, 1976), 181.

[70] A. Pravdin and Mervyn Mathews, "An Interview with a CPSU Functionary," *Survey* 20 (Autumn 1974): 101; see also Voslensky, *Nomenklatura*, 263.

[71] Quoted in Efim Etkind, "Brezhnev the Writer II," *Survey* 23 (Autumn 1977-1978): 101-102.

[72] Ibid.

[73] John Kress, "The Leadership Politics of N. S. Khrushchev: A Study in Political Style," prepared for presentation at the Central States Slavic Conference, Wichita Kansas, 9 November 1979, 16-17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tration. Crozier analyzed the pathologies of French governmental bureaucracy and found that they are the product of French cultural patterns.[74] Hence it is conceivable that a political style characterized as "bureaucratic" in the Soviet Union actually reflects the persistence of traditional cultural patterns of behavior that have been torn from their original context, but which have contributed to the style of the Soviet elite (and bureaucracy) and have found a home there.

The Sense of Communality. The flavor of *sobornost'* emanating from peasant political culture manifests itself in the style of the Soviet political elite in a number of ways. From Politburo to Party Congress to Supreme Soviet session, all decisions are taken with the appearance of unanimity, in spite of the disagreement that presumably occurs beforehand, at least in the highest political bodies. Moreover, democratic centralism is still the norm for Soviet prescriptions on decision making. Lenin's formula for democratic centralism – free discussion of policy alternatives, vote on the matter at hand, iron submission of the minority to the majority – bears much similarity to peasant decision-making formulas in the *mir.*[75]

Celebrations and occasions for sorrow provide opportunities for the elite to affect a sense of *sobornost'*. According to an old Russian proverb, "Even death is good if you are in the *mir.*" The announcement of Brezhnev's death written for all Soviet daily publications showed that the party sought to provide the same sort of security to the nation that the *mir* once furnished to the peasant:

> The loss [of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev] is born heavily by us, deep is our grief. In this sad moment, all the laborers of the Soviet Union unite even closer around the Leninist Central Committee of the CPSU, its leading circles, formed under the beneficial influence of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. The people believe in the Party, its powerful collective wisdom and will, with all their hearts . . . The Soviet people sees in the Party its experienced collective leader (*vozhd'*) . . . The People have been convinced by experience that our Party, given any turn of events, any ordeal, will remain equal to its historical mission. . . .[76]

Soviet daily publications expressed similar sentiments in announcing the death of Chernenko:

> In connection with this terrible loss (of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko), the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, [and] the Council of Ministers of the USSR turn to Communists, to the Soviet people with the call to close ranks still more firmly around the Leninist Central Committee of the Party

[74] Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 211-212.

[75] Interestingly, in an early cultural carryover from pre-revolutionary political culture, Lenin used the term, *Rus'*, to describe Russia's revolutionary republic in an article written in 1918. As Robert C. Tucker has pointed out, "*Rus'* developed in history as a community of right believers, meaning those of the Orthodox faith." See Robert C. Tucker, "Stalin's Legacy to Brezhnev's Russia" in Erik P. Hoffman and Robbin F. Laird, eds., *The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era* (New York: Aldine Publishing, 1984), 49.

[76] "Obrashchenie Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Soveta Ministrov SSSR k Kommunisticheskoi partii i k sovetskomu narodu," *Pravda* 12 November 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and its Politburo. With firm foundation, the toilers of our country see in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the leading and directing force of Soviet society. All actions and thoughts of the Party are devoted to the selfless service of the fundamental interests of the Soviet people, the pursuit of communism.[77]

We do not wish to argue that the CPSU is a *mir* writ large. Rather, the behavioral and attitudinal postures associated with the role of the *mir* in Russian peasant life interact with the institutional and ideological setting shaped by the party. If tradition is "whatever is persistent or recurrent through transmission, *regardless of the substance and institutional setting* . . . ,"[78] cultural forms may indeed endure by means of their infusion with new content. Here, the party frames its role in terms borrowed from older cultural sources; broad continuities lie in the manner by which the individual is supposed to relate to the collective will, which the party seems determined to represent. This language can "placate and mollify" because of the peculiar affect that Russian culture lends to these words.[79] Moreover, the repetition of this kind of language shows that the party has institutionalized such phraseology as the accepted style for the regime as a whole. This style may be the product of a culture inferior to that of Tsarist Russia's ruling classes, but in the contemporary period and for decades to come it is and will remain accepted and legitimate.[80]

The Leader-Cult. Another aspect of traditional Russian political culture that lives on in the style of the Soviet elite is the cult of the leader.[81] Peasant conceptions of the "just Tsar" and the "Little-Father Tsar" were adopted and adapted under Soviet rule to build the cult of Lenin and those of the lesser "deities" who followed him as rulers of the Soviet Union.

In her work on the Lenin-cult, Nina Tumarkin concludes that it emerged as a deliberate exercise on the part of the regime and as a spontaneous outflow of affection by the *narod*, who paid homage to Lenin using the only vocabulary they knew. For some, the revolution had aroused a religious mood, and these people responded by using symbols that traditionally evoked a feeling of veneration. Others sought to parody traditional religious forms, to satirize "Holy Russia with [its]

[77] "Obrashchenie Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Soveta Ministrov SSSR k Kommunisticheskoi partii, k sovetskomu narodu," *Pravda* 12 March 1985.

[78] Shils, *Tradition*, 16. (Emphasis added.)

[79] See Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, 114-115.

[80] Herbert Marcuse postulates a different, though complementary, analysis of Soviet political language. Soviet political language, says Marcuse, proclaims a set of relationships in order to create in practice the facts contained in the proclamation. These phrases are "simple, unqualified, inflexible formulas calling for an unqualified, inflexible response." The language is magical because the words do not describe or analyze reality but are designed to bring about an effect. See Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 70-73.

[81] Jeremy Paltiel distinguishes the cult of personality, "the establishment of personal auth*against* the institutionalized authority of the party" from leader-worship or hero-worship, "common in any mass-movement" and traditional autocratic regimes. See Jeremy Paltiel, of Personality: Some Comparative Reflections on Political Culture in Leninist Regimes *Comparative Communism* 16 (Spring/Summer 1983): 49-50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

icons and cockroaches." Still others sought to use forms that peasant Russia could understand so that the *muzhik* would transfer his loyalty from the saints and the tsar to the Communist Party and Lenin.[82]

If Tumarkin is unsure of the motives of those who created the leader-cult in Soviet Russia, Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, by contrast, locates its source in conscious decisions made by the party leadership. According to Antonov-Ovseyenko, this cult started at the dawn of the Soviet era when "Lenin's comrades granted him the right of 'unchallengeable' decisions"; hence, "the deification of the party leader was by no means accidental."[83] Stalin then proceeded to erect his own cult when he appealed to the ancient sentiments of the Russian people by acting like a tsar. Antonov-Ovseyenko relates a statement of Alesha Svanidze, the brother of Stalin's first wife, after a conversation he held with the "Gensek':

> I just can't get over it. I couldn't sleep all night. Do you know what the Boss came out with . . . he said "You know the Russian people is a tsarist people. It needs a tsar."[84]

The development of the Stalin-cult is well-known and need not concern us here.[85] For our purposes, the details of the cults of Lenin, Stalin, and other Soviet leaders are less important than their cultural origins. The Soviet leader-cult constitutes the appropriation of a form whose sources lie deep in Russian tradition to legitimate a modern state. Because it sanctions the existing sociopolitical system, a leader-cult can comprise an aspect of a legalistic political style.[86] Yet, paradoxically, the reappearance of this traditional form was also a "revolution," for it marked a *return* of an ancient cultural pattern. Consequently, the Soviet leader-cult manifests a profound conservatism—the inability to supersede the old, which Lenin postulated as the necessary condition for the establishment of the new.

The cult of the leader still exists in Soviet society. In his funeral oration, Yuri V. Andropov extolled the virtues of his predecessor:

> A heavy loss befell our Party, our people, all of progressive humanity. Today we accompany Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev on his last journey—the renowned son of the Motherland, fervent Marxist-Leninist, exceptional leader of the Communist Party and Soviet state, the most eminent actor in the international Communist and workers movement, indefatigable fighter for the peace and friendship of nations . . . worker and soldier, exceptional organizer, and wise political activist, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev was bound with the people's blood by unbreakable ties. All his life and actions were subordinated to the interests of the people of labor. All of his brilliant talent, all of his great energy he gave to the work of communism. . . . [87]

[82] Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives,* 69-70.

[83] Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, *The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1981), 224.

[84] Ibid., 223.

[85] See Adam Ulam, *Stalin* (New York: Viking, 1973).

[86] Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, 114-115.

[87] "Rech' Iu.V. Andropova," *Pravda*, 16 November 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Konstantin U. Chernenko used almost the same language in praising the qualities of Andropov:

> The death of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov has created great sorrow in the hearts of the Soviet people. A glorious son of the Communist Party has left this life, an exceptional political activist, a man of good heart. Up until his very last day, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov dedicated all his energies to the Party and the people.
>
> Yuri Vladimirovich led a brilliant and full life. *Komsomol* leader, an organizer in the partisan movement, diplomat, and Party leader, everywhere the Party led him, he worked enthusiastically and selflessly. His remarkable qualities of a Communist-Leninist devotion to Communist ideals, an unbreakable will, modesty, and diligence, concern for the man of labor – all of these [qualities] won him great authority in the Communist Party.[88]

I have used these long citations because both Andropov and Chernenko cover the points relevant to the Soviet leader-cult. Like the just tsar, Brezhnev and Andropov remained true to their faith. Like the just tsar, Brezhnev and Andropov were said to have acted with the interests of the *narod* at heart.[89] The content has changed; the forms remain the same.

Conclusion

Throughout the history of the Soviet Union, specifically Russian political traditions, which the regime has ostensibly sought to eradicate as part of its efforts to promote cultural revolution, continue to influence the style of the very leadership that tried to effect such changes. While continuities in political style became more manifest in the 1930s with the promotion of elements of the *narod* into positions of power, Lenin and his immediate circle also evinced some of these cultural carryovers. Foreign and domestic witnesses suggested that the work habits of the elite share many qualities in common with the style of labor and decision-making formulas of their pre-revolutionary peasant forebears. This style fails to meet the standards set by Lenin in his writings on the communist ethic of work. The elite continues to affect the appearance of *sobornost'*, a feeling of communality derived from the peasant institution of the *mir*. Finally, the leader-cult long reigned in tsarist Russia; throughout the Soviet period it has continued to exist in the worship of Lenin, Stalin during his dictatorship, and in the lesser cults of those who have ruled the USSR since 1953.

These enduring constancies in Russian and Soviet political life impose severe

[88] "Rech' K.U. Chernenko," *Pravda*, 15 February 1984; for Mikhail S. Gorbachev's praise of Chernenko using, again, almost the same terminology, see "Rech' M.S. Gorbacheva," *Pravda*, 14 March 1985.

[89] It is interesting to compare the Soviet leader-cult with that of Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania. There are two features of the Ceausescu cult: he is seen as an individual who, despite lowly peasant origins, rose to prominence through hard work, courage, and intellect; he is seen as a brilliant revolutionary, an individual who can interpret the dialectical processes of history. See Mary Ellen Fisher, "The Ceausescu Cult: National or Personal?" Unpublished paper prepared for delivery at the 1984 Midwest Political Science Convention, Chicago, 5-6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

limits on the possibilities for the completion of a true cultural revolution: the creation of a novel form of social life informed by a new set of values. Rather, once institutionalized, habits originating in an older tradition are passed on to young generations as part of their socialization experiences. As importantly, those who seek to move up the hierarchy into positions of power very consciously adopt the accepted political style of their superiors.[90] Thus, for latent and manifest reasons, Soviet cultural revolutionaries cannot escape their past, the collective history and traditions of their people.*

[90] Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics,* 85; Jozsza, 'Political Seilschaften," 163-166.

* This article is a revised version of a paper given at the 1984 Midwest Political Science Convention in Chicago. The author would like to thank the following people for their assistance and encouragement: Melvin Croan, in whose seminar on Soviet and East European politics at the University of Wisconsin this article originated, Kenneth C. Farmer, James P. Nichol, and Roxane Sismanidis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chiang Kai-shek's Quest for Soviet Entry into the Sino-Japanese War

JOHN W. GARVER

There have been several studies of Sino-Soviet relations during the Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945—for example, those by David Dallin, Harriet Moore, and O. Edmund Clubb.[1] All suffered from a similar unavoidable defect: the authors did not have access to China's diplomatic archives or to memoirs written by China's wartime diplomats and decision makers. These earlier studies relied mainly on contemporary media and British, American, and Soviet archives and materials. This constraint led to a major flaw in these earlier studies; they all treated China principally as the object of maneuvering of other powers.

Prior to the late 1970s both Beijing and Taipei refused to open their diplomatic archives to researchers or to facilitate research on China's diplomacy by foreign scholars. The published memoirs by people influential during the wartime period were few in number, generally followed a narrow "politically correct" line, and in the People's Republic of China (PRC) remained "classified" and unavailable to the few foreign scholars who were able to do research there. In both Taiwan and the PRC, China's past foreign relations were considered to be especially sensitive politically, and little of a nonpolemical nature was written by Chinese scholars.

This is no longer the case. Over the past eight or ten years a wealth of new material dealing with China's perspectives and strategies from 1937 to 1945 has been made available. In both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland the 1980s brought a new openness to scholarly research on China's diplomacy and international rela-

[1] Harriet L. Moore, *Soviet Eastern Policy, 1931-1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945); David Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948); O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia, the Great Game* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

JOHN W. GARVER is an assistant professor of political science in the School of Social Sciences at Georgia Institute of Technology.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions. In Taiwan, for example, during 1980 the Committee on Party History of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Kuomintang began publishing a multivolume collection of papers from the personal archives of Chiang Kai-shek.[2] Since China's wartime high diplomacy was centralized in Chiang's hands, these papers provide exceedingly valuable and new insights into the diplomacy of China's desperate struggle for survival in the 1930s. These archives are supplemented by a number of recently published memoirs and biographic studies. One of the more important of these is a collection of previously unpublished material from Chiang Kai-shek's personal diaries made available to a team of Japanese reporters headed by Keiji Furuya, from the prestigious Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* (*Japanese Economic News*). Published serially in *Sankei Shimbun* in 1974 through 1976, this material was then republished in twelve volumes in 1978, entitled *Jiang Zongtong Milu* (*Secret Diary of President Chiang*), by Taiwan's official publishing house Zhongyang Ribao Chubanshe (Central Daily News Publishing House).[3] Though there was obviously still some sensitive and embarrassing materials that have not been included in these collections, that which has been released by Taipei seems credible. These collections form the basis of this study of Chiang Kai-shek's diplomacy.

Chiang's Strategic Concept and His Advisers

When Chiang Kai-shek led China to war against Japan on 7 July 1937 he did not believe that China's armed forces alone could defeat those of Japan. Rather, his overall strategic concept of how the war would be won focused on three factors as the basis for ultimate Chinese victory: preventing Japanese victory through protracted military resistance; securing Soviet and western intervention against Japan; and working out an acceptable modus vivendi with Japan.

It was unlikely in 1937-1938 that either Britain or the United States would seriously consider military action against Japan. Nor is there any evidence that Chiang Kai-shek imagined that they would do so. The United States was strongly isolationist, while Britain vacillated between a desire to placate Japan and a contrary desire to follow the lead of America. Both countries were wracked by deep domestic crises and both had let their military power in the Far East deteriorate. The most that Chiang hoped for form the Anglo-American powers at that point was the implementation of severe and effective economic sanctions against Japan.

It was the Soviet Union, rather than the United States or Britain, which provided Chiang with hope of direct foreign military intervention in the Sino-Japanese war

[2] *Zhonghua Minquo Zhongyao Shiliao Chubian—Dui Ri Kangzhan Shiqi, Di San Bian, Zhanshi Waijiao* (*Initial Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China—the Period of War of Resistance against Japan, Set Three, Wartime Diplomacy*), vol. 2 (Taipei: Kuomintang Committee on Party History, 1980). (Hereafter *Zhanshi Waijiao.*)

[3] *Jiang Zongtong Milu* (*Secret diary of President Chiang*) (Taipei: Zhongyang Ribao [Central Daily News], October 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in 1937-1938. Chiang hoped that while China's armies were grinding down Japan and while Anglo-American-Dutch economic sanctions were choking off Japan's trade, the USSR would enter the war against Japan. Several factors contributed to the seeming plausibility of this hope. Russia was Japan's historic rival for influence in Manchuria. After Japan's armies seized Manchuria in September 1931, Russo-Japanese relations followed a path of chronic crisis, which frequently took the two countries to the brink of war. Soviet industrial and military power expanded rapidly in the mid-1930s, including its military deployments in the Far East. While Anglo-American military power in the vicinity of Japan was weak, the USSR had powerful armies and air forces on the Manchurian and Korean borders, separated from Japan only by narrow seas. Chiang hoped that once Japan's armies were tied down in China's interior and its forces adjacent to the Soviet Union's borders depleted, the Soviet army would strike and Japan would be confronted by a two-front war. China and Russia together would then defeat Japan.

There was a strong parallelism of Soviet and Chinese interests and diplomacy during the first eighteen months of the war. China strongly supported Moscow's call for collective security arrangements between the USSR and the western democracies, while Moscow fully supported China's efforts to persuade the western powers to adopt sanctions against Japan. Both Joseph Stalin and Chiang wanted to see an "anti-aggressor peace camp" formed including the Republic of China (ROC), the USSR, the United States, and the British and French Empires. Chiang believed that once this "peace camp" were consolidated it would guarantee the security of the USSR's European borders thereby allowing, even condoning, the Soviet Union's entry into the Sino-Japanese war. Chiang understood very well the gravity of Moscow's concern with its two-front threat and saw the realization of a Soviet-Western anti-aggressor camp as a way of stabilizing the European situation so that Moscow could adopt a more vigorous policy in the Far East.

During the 1937-1938 period three individuals served as Chiang's key advisers on relations with the USSR. These men were Jiang Tingfu, China's ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 1936 to November 1937; Sun Ke, the son of Sun Yat-sen and head of the Legislative Yuan (the legislative organ of the ROC governmental structure); and Yang Jie, deputy chief of general staff of the national army from 1935 to 1937 and ambassador to the USSR after Jiang Tingfu. All three men had quite different personalities and political views and each had a significant impact on Sino-Soviet relations during the war.

Of the three, Jiang Tingfu took the most pessimistic view about the probability of Soviet entry into a Sino-Japanese war. Jiang was an established authority on Russian-Chinese diplomatic history and chairman of the history department at Qinghua University in Beiping (as Beijing was called in the 1930s) when the Mukden Incident (when Japan seized Manchuria in September 1931) occurred. After that pivotal event Jiang Tingfu emerged as one of the leaders of antiwar opinion in China. He favored closer relations with the USSR to help moderate Japanese pressure on China, but throughout the 1930s he remained convinced that Moscow was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unwilling to go to war with Japan because of China.[4] In Jiang's opinion, Chinese illusions regarding the likelihood of Soviet entry into a Sino-Japanese conflict were extremely harmful—encouraging China to undertake a war that it was highly likely to lose. Rather than undertaking a losing war that would leave China in an even more pitiable condition than before, Jiang maintained that it was better to continue to back down before superior Japanese strength. It seemed elementary to Jiang that a nation should not undertake a war that it had no realistic hope of winning.[5] Chiang Kai-shek was attracted to Jiang by his prominent propeace activities and by his reputation as an authority on Russian-Chinese relations, and by 1935 he was relying on Jiang for advice regarding the Soviet Union.

Like Jiang Tingfu, Yang Jie and Sun Ke were also early advocates of closer relations with the Soviet Union. They differed from Jiang, however, on the likelihood of Soviet entry into a Sino-Japanese war. Yang, like Chiang Kai-shek, was a military man. Like Chiang, Yang had attended the Shimbu Gakko (military preparatory school) in Japan, enrolling the year after Chiang left. Yang became associated with Chiang during the Northern Expedition when he served first as a division commander and then as director of Chiang's field headquarters. During 1929 and 1930 Yang commanded Chiang's forces in the bloody showdown with warlords Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan. After entering the Central Executive Committee of the KMT in 1931, Yang became head of the Chinese Army Staff College—a post he formally held until May 1938.[6]

During the mid-1930s Yang developed strong beliefs on the issue of probable Soviet entry into a war against Japan. During 1933-1934 he undertook a military investigation tour of Europe and the Soviet Union and returned to write a book arguing that a Russo-Chinese bloc would eventually defeat Japan. In his capacity as vice chief of staff Yang was close to Chiang and in a good position to make his opinion heard. Late in 1937 Chiang Kai-shek sent Yang to Moscow, ostensibly to inspect Soviet defense industry, but in fact to persuade Stalin to extend more military assistance to China.[7] On 12 May 1938, Yang Jie formally replaced Jiang as ambassador to the Soviet Union, a position he retained until 18 April 1940.[8] During 1937-1938 Yang continually told Chiang that Soviet entry into the Sino-

[4] See for example, the correspondence between Jiang and Hu Shi in *Hu Shi Laiwang Shuxin Xuan*, (*Collection of Hu Shi's Correspondence*), (Beijing: Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, May 1979), vol. 4.

[5] Jiang forcefully developed this argument in a brief interpretive history of modern China, which he wrote after his return in 1938. See, Jiang Tingfu, *Zhongguo Jindaishi Dagang* (*Outline of Modern Chinese History*) (Taipei: Qiming Shuju, n.d.).

[6] Howard Boorman, ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), vol. 4, 3-4.

[7] See Wu Xiangxiang, "Yang Jie yu guofang xinlun," (Yang Jie and the new theory of national defense), *Chuanji Wenxue*, (Biographical Literature) 8 (June 1966): 28-30.

[8] *Zhongguo Zhuwai Shiling Nianbiao, 1912-1949*, (*Yearbook of China's Foreign Ambassadors and Counselors, 1912-1949*) (Nanjing: Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1963), 14-15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japanese war was imminent. He was also the agent of more manipulative efforts to provoke a Russo-Japanese conflict.

Sun Ke was Chiang Kai-shek's third Soviet expert. Prominent because of his father, Sun led one of the left-leaning factions of the KMT and saw a linkage between friendly Sino-Soviet ties and progressive government within China and was a firm advocate of both. He tended to have a somewhat romantic notion that the Soviet Union supported countries struggling for justice and concluded that if Japanese imperialism attacked China the USSR would soon enter the war on China's side. Jiang Tingfu felt that such views were pernicious and after the Xian Incident in December 1936, Jiang urged Chiang Kai-shek to have Sun Ke undertake a special mission to the Soviet Union in hopes that Sun would learn first hand of Soviet determination to stay out of a Sino-Japanese war. However, Chiang turned down this recommendation "for reasons of his own," according to Jiang.[9] It was not until November 1937 that Chiang Kai-shek sent Sun to Moscow as head of a special secret mission to solicit aid from the Soviets. Sun's group arrived in Moscow in January 1938.[10] Sun eventually emerged as one of Chiang's most durable advisers on Soviet affairs. During 1938-1940 he gradually shed many of his illusions about Soviet foreign policy, but to the end of the war he retained his belief in a link between a pro-Soviet orientation and progressivism within China.

The Formation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance

The Sino-Soviet nonaggression treaty of August 1937 formed the basis for the close alignment and cooperation between those two countries during 1937-1939. Discussions about the conclusion of a treaty of mutual nonagression and/or mutual security had begun in 1932 when the Soviet and Chinese governments were discussing the normalization of bilateral relations. At that time Chinese Foreign Minister Lo Wengan had staunchly favored such a treaty and had even submitted a draft of a nonaggression treaty to the Central Political Council of China's National Government in April 1933.[11]

Chen Lifu, a member of the standing committee of the KMT CEC and one of Chiang's close supporters, had revived the discussion of possible Soviet assistance to China in the event of a Sino-Japanese war during his talks with Soviet Ambassador Dimitri Bogomolov in 1935. Chen resurrected Lo Wengan's 1932 proposal of a mutual security treaty, but Bogomolov was unreceptive. Such a treaty was "too dangerous" Bogomolov said. Chen interpreted this to mean that while the treaty would precipitate a Japanese reaction to growing Soviet influence in China,

[9] *Jiang Tingfu Huiyilu* (*Memoir of Jiang Tingfu*), special publication no. 48 (Taipei: Biographical Literature Publishing Company, 1979), 199.

[10] Xia Jinlin, *Wo Wudu Sanjia Waijiao Gongzuo de Huiyi* (*Memoirs of my Five Fold Participation in Diplomatic Work*) (Taipei: Biographical Literature Publishing Company, 1978), 45, 51.

[11] This is mentioned in the materials on the 1937 treaty contained in the archives at the Guo Shi Guan (National Historical Institute) in Taipei. File "Wai 02.1 12."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China was too weak to give the Soviet Union much real assisance in the event of a Soviet-Japanese war. Chen continued discussions with People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim M. Litvinov during a secret mission to Moscow in February 1936. Again Moscow was extremely cautious. No agreement was reached but some progress in that direction was made.[12]

By late 1936, as Chiang was maneuvering to prepare either for an accommodation or war with Japan, he moved to consolidate potential Soviet support. When Jiang Tingfu was dispatched as ambassador to the Soviet Union in October 1936, one of his key missions was the negotiation of a Soviet-Chinese treaty.[13] During the first year in Moscow, Jiang discussed both a mutual security treaty and a nonaggression treaty with Soviet officials. Foreign Affairs Commissar Litvinov was unwilling to conclude a mutual security treaty, because he feared that Soviet involvement in a Far East conflict would put it in an inferior position in the West while simultaneously increasing western suspicions of the Soviet Union and diminishing their sympathy for China. In Litvinov's opinion, the USSR should support China only to the same extent that the Anglo-American powers did; it should not be in front of these powers in supporting China, but neither should it lag too far behind them.[14]

While rejecting a mutual security treaty, however, Litvinov was willing to conclude a nonaggression treaty that would provide a political basis for loans to China for the purchase of Soviet military equipment. He specified, however, that such a treaty must be signed in Nanjing (then China's capital), not in Moscow, a provision that Jiang believed further reduced the significance of the pact. Apparently both Jiang and Litvinov saw the literal distancing of the treaty from the Soviet Union as symbolizing a limitation of Soviet commitment, perhaps by giving the treaty a regional, rather than a global significance. In any case, Jiang reported to Chiang Kai-shek that the conclusion of a mutual security treaty was impossible and that in his opinion the terms attached to a nonaggression treaty would make such a treaty inconsequential. He advised Chiang to work instead for a multilateral alliance including not only China and the USSR, but other powers as well.[15]

Litvinov's cautious approach was apparently overruled by Stalin. A month before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which touched off the Sino-Japanese war on 7 July 1937, the Soviet Union did in fact propose to the Chinese government the conclusion of a treaty of mutual security. On 5 June 1937 Ambassador Bogomolov informed Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chonghui that since the Soviet Union and China sought a similar "environment" in the Far East, the Soviet Union therefore wished to see China united and strong. China had no aggressive

[12] Charles R. Kitts, *An Inside View of the Kuomintang, Chen Li-fu, 1926–1949*, (Ph.D. diss., St. Johns University, 1978), 65. Kitts interviewed Chen in 1977 regarding, inter alia, his 1935–1936 discussions with Soviet officials.

[13] *Jiang Zongtong Milu*, vol. 12, 76.

[14] *Jiang Tingfu Huiyilu*, 196.

[15] Ibid., 196–7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aspirations, Bogomolov said, and the Soviet Union thus viewed a strong China as a guarantee of peace in the Far East, while a weak China would be a cause of war. In line with this, the Soviet government proposed that the Chinese government propose to the British, American, French, Dutch, Japanese and Soviet governments the convocation of a convention to draw up a treaty of regional collective security for the Pacific Ocean area. Were the Chinese government to make such a proposal, the Soviet government promised to support it and to lobby actively with other countries to persuade them to attend. If it proved impossible to reach such a regional collective security agreement, then the Soviet Union was prepared to sign a strongly-worded mutual security treaty with China—a draft of which he handed to Wang. In Bogomolov's opinion, it was necessary to convene an international security conference before a bilateral treaty was signed, since it was possible that the outcome of such a conference would make a bilateral treaty unnecessary. In response to a query by Wang as to why the USSR could not itself convene such a Pacific Ocean conference, Bogomolov responded that Soviet sponsorship would rouse many suspicions.[16]

Surprisingly, Wang Chonghui did not promptly inform Chiang Kai-shek of Bogomolov's important proposal. Not until 8 July, the day after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, did Wang pass the proposal on to Chiang. According to Zhou Xicai, who was then the head of the Soviet desk of China's foreign ministry, Wang Chonghui was very suspicious of the Soviet proposal that China sponsor a conference of Pacific Ocean nations. Wang felt that such an international conference should not be convened by China alone, but jointly with Britain, France, and the United States. According to Zhou, talks between Wang and Bogomolov over this issue were still in progress when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred.[17]

The outbreak of fighting on 7 July compelled Chiang to override Wang's caution. On 8 July Chiang Kai-shek summoned Wang and Sun Ke to Lushan. Chiang was uncertain whether the Marco Polo Bridge Incident could be contained, but felt it was necessary to begin making preparations for the possible expansion of the incident. If the fighting expanded, he said, it would become a total war of resistance. In such a war the "most critical factor" would be reaching an agreement with the USSR for the supply of military equipment and the conclusion of a Soviet-Chinese treaty of mutual security. After Wang informed Chiang of Bogomolov's 5 June proposals, Chiang ordered Wang and Sun to go to Shanghai to conclude an agreement with Ambassador Bogomolov along the lines the ambassador had proposed a month earlier.[18]

According to Zhou Xicai, once Wang Chonghui and Sun Ke resumed discus-

[16] Weigesiji (transliteration from Russian), ed., *Waijiaoshi*, (*Diplomatic history*), vol. 3, 896. This is a Chinese translation of a Soviet work published in Moscow in 1956. (Dalian: Foreign Language College, 1979). Also, *Zhanshi Waijiao*, 325.

[17] Zhou Xicai, *Zhong Su Guanxi Neimu*, (*The Hidden History of Sino-Soviet Relations*) (Taipei: Era Publishing company, n.d.), 55.

[18] Ibid., 56. *Zhanshi Waijiao*, 325.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sions with Bogomolov in Shanghai, Bogomolov insisted that it was already too late to discuss the conclusion of a mutual security treaty. The purpose of such a treaty, Bogomolov reportedly said, was to prevent the outbreak of war. Now war had already begun. Had such a treaty been signed after Japan seized Manchuria in 1931, Bogomolov said, it might have prevented Japan from launching a war of aggression. Now it was too late. Moreover, if the Soviet Union now signed such a treaty, it would probably be attacked by Japan. The USSR was not prepared for such a war and it would not be wise, Bogomolov said, to provoke a Japanese attack. Therefore, a treaty of mutual nonaggression was now the most appropriate, Bogomolov suggested.[19]

Chiang had little choice but to accept the second-best option of a nonaggression treaty, and on 1 August 1937 he initialled such an agreement. On 21 August Wang Chonghui and Bogomolov formally signed the treaty in Nanjing. The treaty was publicly announced on 29 August and approved by a meeting of the Supreme National Defense Council on 31 August.[20] Oddly enough, however, it was not until 26 April 1938 that the Supreme National Defense Council, which Chiang headed, sent the treaty to the Legislative Yuan for approval and to the Executive Yuan for implementation.[21] This delay may have reflected lingering doubts regarding the consequences of alignment with the USSR on the actions of the western powers. On 16 May 1938 the Legislative Yuan ratified the treaty.

In essence the 1937 pact did two things. First, it provided the political basis for large-scale Soviet military sales and assistance to the ROC. Second, it insured that neither side would strike a deal with Japan while the war was still underway. If either signatory were attacked by Japan, the other signatory was to render Japan no assistance of any kind, direct or indirect, at any time during the entire conflict and would refrain from taking any action or entering into any agreement which might be used to advantage by Japan. When ratifying the treaty on 16 May, the Legislative Yuan stated that it felt this article of the treaty was especially important.

Chiang Kai-shek also felt that the second, negative aspect of the treaty was highly important since it created some constraints against a possible Soviet doublecross.[22] Chiang was skeptical, however, about how effective a treaty would ultimately be in preventing such a doublecross. Commenting in his diary when he approved the treaty on 1 August, Chiang said that the Soviet Union hoped to use the agreement to pressure Japan and then to sign a similar agreement with Japan insuring Soviet neutrality.[23] The fear of a possible Soviet-Japanese "division" of China was a cen-

[19] Ibid.

[20] *China Handbook, 1937–1944, A Comprehensive Survey of Major Developments in China in Seven Years of War*, (Taipei: Cheng Wen Publishing company, reprint 1971), 109–10. This handbook contains an English text of the 1937 treaty.

[21] See the archive on the 1937 treaty at the National Historical Institute in Taipei cited in note 11.

[22] Huang Guowen, *Kangzhan Shiqi Woguo Dui Ri Waijiao Molie, 1937–1945*, (*Our Country's Diplomatic Strategies toward Japan during the War of Resistance, 1937–1945*) (Masters Thesis, Political Warfare College, Taiwan, 1977, 99–100).

[23] *Zongtong Jianggong Dashi Changbian Chugao*, (*Preliminary Extensive Chronology of Presi-*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tral element of Chiang's thinking that would appear again and again throughout the war. The opposite side of Moscow's promise not to strike a deal with Japan was, as KMT veteran Shao Lizi pointed out in a public analysis of the treaty, a Chinese promise not to join Japan, Germany, or Italy in any anti-Communist pact.[24]

The Quest for an Anti-Aggressor Front

Nanjing was hopeful that the Sino-Soviet treaty would become an integral part of a Pacific Ocean system of collective security including the United States, Britain, and other western powers. During the first few months after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Chinese officials were hopeful of forceful action by the western powers against Japan.[25] On 16 July the Chinese government sent a memorandum to Britain, France, the United States, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union charging that Japan's invasion of North China constituted a clear violation of China's sovereignty and of the letter and spirit of the Nine Power treaty, the Paris Antiwar Agreement, and the Covenant of the League of Nations.[26] Nanjing then moved to mobilize international pressure against Japan. From 21 through 27 July Chiang Kai-shek met with the British, American, Italian, German and French ambassadors to solicit support for China's struggle.[27]

Nanjing's early efforts to draw the western powers into active cooperation with the Sino-Soviet coalition focused on the Nine Power Conference convened in Brussels from 3 through 24 November 1937. Nineteen nations attended, including the United States and the USSR, but not Japan or Germany. According to Tsien Tai, who was then China's ambassador to Belgium and one of the ROC's representatives to the conference, China's representatives had high hopes for the conference when it opened. Specifically, they hoped that the conference would decide to provide material aid—military equipment, munitions, credits and loans—to China and this would in turn make possible a show of force by Soviet forces on the Manchurian border together with a naval demonstration in the Pacific by French, British, and American forces.[28] At a minimum, China's delegates hoped that the powers would agree to adopt economic and fiscal sanctions against Japan.

---

dent Chiang) (Taipei: Committee on Party History of the Nationalist Party of China, October 1978), vol. 4, 1142.

[24] Shao Lizi, "You Zhong Su hubu qianfan tiaoyue dao Zhong Su shangyue" ("From the Sino-Soviet treaty of mutual nonaggression to the Sino-Soviet commercial treaty"), *Zhong Su Wenhua* (*Sino-Soviet Culture*) 4 (August 1939): 2. *Zhong Su Wenhua* was the publication of the Soviet-Chinese people's friendship association in China.

[25] For example, Chiang Kai-shek's 13 July 1937 cable to commander of the Beiping garrison Song Zheyuan, cited in Warren Kuo, "The Lochuan Conference," *Issue and Studies* 5 (October 1968): 39.

[26] Tsien Tai, *China and the Nine Power Conference at Brussels in 1937* (New York: St. Johns University Press, 1964), 1.

[27] *Zongtong Jianggong Dashi Changbian Chugao*, vol. 4, 1139. *Jiang Zongtong Milu*, vol. 11, 68.

[28] Tsien Tai, *China and the Nine Power*, 8–10; also, William L. Tung, *V. K. Wellington Koo and China's Wartime Diplomacy* (New York: St. Johns University Press, 1977), 38–9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Officials in Nanjing were less optimistic about western military actions. About a week before the Brussels conference opened, Wang Chonghui sent a top secret directive to China's delegation at Brussels outlining how they were to handle the conference. There was no chance that the conference would succeed in mediating the Sino-Japanese dispute, Wang said. Nevertheless, China should adopt a moderate attitude toward all countries and not seek to embarrass them. It should also express hopes that the conference would solve the Sino-Japanese conflict on the basis of the Nine Power Treaty. China's objective was to persuade the powers to adopt sanctions against Japan after the inevitable failure of the conference. Moreover, China's delegates at Brussels were to "actively seek ways of causing England and America to approve and encourage *the Soviet Union* to use armed force against Japan."[29]

Nanjing's program of collective Soviet-western action against Japan dovetailed with Moscow's own strategy of collective security. An article in *Pravda* on 13 September 1937 illustrated the perceived linkage between the Sino-Soviet nonaggression treaty and the broader collective security arrangement. The Sino-Soviet treaty showed, *Pravda* said, that peace was inseparable. Events in the Far East would affect events in the West, and peace had to be supported in both East and West. The Sino-Soviet treaty was a new tool for achieving general peace and collective security.[30] Another article in *Pravda* on 20 October was even more specific. Reviewing the recent developments in Europe and the Far East, the article concluded that Japan and Germany were two "anti-status quo powers" who could only obtain their aims by a new world war. What the Japanese militarists most feared, the article said, was that Britain and America would unite to maintain the Open Door in China.[31]

Moscow, like Nanjing, hoped that the Brussels Conference would be a step toward this global anti-aggressor front. The importance Moscow attached to the Brussels Conference was indicated by the fact that it was represented there by none other than Foreign Affairs Commissar Litvinov. Litvinov strongly supported China's call at the Brussels conference for collective sanctions against Japan and for unity among the "peace-loving nations." Attempts to mediate the Sino-Japanese conflict had already been tried and had failed, Litvinov told the conference. The Soviet Union felt that common measures to effectively restrain Japan should be adopted and stood ready to participate in such measures.[32]

Unfortunately for Chongqing (which became China's wartime capital on 20 November), the United States was still more concerned with conciliating Japan

[29] Directive of 24 October 1937 from Wang Chonghui, in *Zhongguo Waijiaoshi Ziliao Xuanbian, Di San Ce (1937–1945)*, (*Selection of Materials on China's Diplomatic History, (1937–1954)*) vol. 3 (Beijing: College of Diplomacy, 1958), 132–33. (Emphasis added.)

[30] Cited in Chu Yushen, *Dongtang Zhong De Zhong Su Guanxi* (*Sino-Soviet relations in the midst of turmoil*) (Hankou: Da Gong Bao, 1938), 128.

[31] Reprinted in *Zhong Su Wenhua* 1 (December 1937): 29–31.

[32] Tsien Tai, *China and the Nine Power Conference*, 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than in cooperating with the Soviet Union against it. Thus, the United States chief delegate proposed the exclusion of the Soviet Union from a subcommittee set up to consider the plan of action to be adopted by the conference in hopes that, with Moscow excluded, Tokyo would be more likely to participate. Litvinov was outraged by this move and withdrew from the conference on the grounds that the USSR was being discriminated against.

This was a major blow to Chongqing's diplomacy. According to Tsien Tai, after the Soviet Union walked out there was no more discussion of "positive steps" in support of China.[33] Chinese diplomats such as Jiang Tingfu were puzzled by the "persistent effort" of the United States and Britain to exclude the Soviet Union from the settlement of the Far East problem. It seemed to Jiang that *any* Soviet action at the League or at Brussels was deemed undesirable by Washington and London—an approach that Jiang believed was extremely shortsighted.[34]

The Brussels conference finally adopted a resolution encouraging both China and Japan to avail themselves of assistance by other countries to bring the conflict to an early end. China's delegates were very disappointed with this meager result.[35] The failure to secure western support pushed the ROC into greater dependency on the USSR.

While the Nine Power Conference was under way Moscow continued to hint that it might enter the Sino-Japanese war. According to Chiang Kai-shek, during the conference Stalin summoned the counsellor of the Chinese embassy in Moscow to praise the determined resistance of China's armies and to tell him that if China's situation became desperate, the Soviet Union might declare war on Japan.[36]

The Question of Soviet Entry into the War

Many Chinese hoped that the 1937 treaty, along with a supportive attitude by Britain and the United States, would provide the basis for active Soviet participation in the war. Some indication of how widespread such beliefs were is given Jiang Tingfu's memoir. Jiang recalls that his appointment as ambassador to Moscow in October 1936 was received with the "greatest, wildest expectations." Public and private bodies gave him a series of receptions and at each gathering Jiang felt that people hoped and prayed that he might somehow manage to get the Soviet army to fight side by side with China against Japan. Some believed that he could successfully perform this "mission," others hoped without believing. Such feelings mirrored general public sentiment, Jiang recalled.[37]

Jiang believed that Moscow manipulated Chinese hopes of Soviet entry in order to first push China toward confrontation with Japan and then to keep it fighting

[33] Ibid., 17.
[34] *Jiang Tingfu Huiyilu*, 198–200.
[35] The conference's final resolution of 24 November is in *China Handbook, 1937–1944*, 85.
[36] *Jiang Zongtong Milu*, vol. 12, 92.
[37] *Jiang Tingfu Huiyilu*, 199.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

once war began. Moscow's submission of the draft mutual security agreement in June 1937 was probably part of a Soviet effort to bolster Chinese courage in a situation of increasing tense Sino-Japanese relations. In his memoirs Jiang recalls that Bogomolov continually used this ploy to encourage pro-war sentiment in China.[38] Especially when meeting with private Chinese citizens, ordinary politicians, and reporters, Bogomolov would indicate that the Soviet Union was prepared to provide China with all necessary assistance if it went to war with Japan. With Chinese officials Bogomolov was more cautious, according to Jiang. On at least one occasion, however, Bogomolov told Jiang himself that the Soviet Union was willing to sign a mutual security agreement and that in the event of Sino-Japanese war, the USSR would give China practical military assistance. It is possible that Bogomolov's statements exceeded Moscow's guidelines. Jiang Tingfu suspected that Bogomolov saw war with Japan as a route to the overthrow of Stalin.[39]

Throughout the first eighteen months of the war, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to persuade Stalin to order the Soviet Red Army into the war against Japan. Stalin, in turn, was cautious in rejecting Chiang's pleas, afraid that too unequivocal a rejection might induce Chiang to make peace with Japan.

Chiang continued to receive diametrically opposite advice from his advisers regarding the probability of Soviet entry into the Sino-Japanese war. In his memoir Jiang Tingfu recalls that "The winter of 1937 was the most difficult one that I had ever experienced. While General Yang sent [Chiang] messages of hope and confidence, I had to send messages of disappointment."[40] After the fall of Nanjing in December 1937 Jiang sent Chiang a very pessimistic report saying that he was absolutely certain that the Soviet Union would not enter the war unless directly attacked by Japan. When Foreign Minister Wang Chonghui read Jiang's report at a secret meeting of the Supreme National Defense council, Sun Ke denounced Jiang's "failure" in Moscow and his "misreading" of Soviet intentions. "On account of this, and perhaps for other reasons as well," Jiang wrote, "I was recalled."

Yang Jie concluded from discussions he held with Stalin and People's Commissar for Defense Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov in late 1938 that Soviet intervention was imminent. On 12 November Yang Jie sent Chiang two cables dealing with the possibility of Soviet entry into the war. In the first cable, Yang quoted Stalin as saying that Soviet entry into the war would only further unite the Japanese people about the Japanese government and stifle the Japanese antiwar movement. "Therefore," Stalin concluded, "The Soviet Union must wait for the arrival of the opportune time to go to war against Japan." (*Gu Sulian dui Riben zhi kaizhan dengdai shiji zhi daolai.*)[41] Yang's second cable summarized his discussions

[38] Ibid., 191.

[39] After his recall from China, Bogomolov was executed in Stalin's purges. Arthur Upham Pope, *Maxim Litvinoff* (New York: L. B. Fisher, 1943), 419.

[40] *Jiang Tingfu Huiyilu*, 201.

[41] *Zhanshi Waijiao*, 335–6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with Voroshilov. According to Yang, Voroshilov agreed with Chiang that Soviet entry into the war could with one blow lay the basis for peace in the Far East. But the Soviet Union had many worries, Voroshilov said. If it went to war in the East, the West "would soon follow" and the USSR had no guarantee of victory in a two-front war. Thus at present the Soviet Union had to continue preparations. But Yang could tell Chiang, Voroshilov said, that such preparations would "be rapid."[42] Again a subtle hint to prevent discouragement in China.

On 6 December another cable from Yang conveyed to Chiang the substance of further discussions with Voroshilov about the question of Soviet "dispatch of troops" (*chu bing*) to China. Stalin was afraid, Yang reported, that such a move would incite the whole world to go to war against the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet Union could only provide China with material assistance. Stalin knew, Yang continued, that China's war of resistance was extremely difficult, but he was convinced that final victory would be China's if it continued to "resist to the end." Yang concluded the report with the observation that it was "not impossible" that the Soviet Union would enter the war even though it had many worries. China should try, Yang suggested, to encourage Britain, the United States, and France to give the Soviet Union an "appropriate guarantee" to enable it to take such a move.[43]

Also in December, Stalin and Voroshilov cabled Chiang directly to explain the difficulties involved in Soviet entry into the war. If the USSR sent troops to China other than in direct response to Japanese provocations, then "The world would say the Soviet Union was an aggressor and sympathy for Japan around the world would immediately increase." Such a development would not be advantageous to either China or the Soviet Union. Only if the Nine Powers, or at least the major ones, agreed to deal with Japan in cooperation with the Soviet Union could Moscow immediately send troops to China. "For in such a situation, the Soviet Union would be seen as just," Stalin said. Moreover, the Soviet tyrant said that this policy could be changed only by the Supreme Soviet which would not meet for one-and-a-half months. In the meantime, the Soviet Union would increase its aid to China in every possible way.[44] Again, Stalin was saying "not now," while still keeping open the possibility of Soviet entry. Stalin was telling Chiang that the way to achieve Soviet entry into the war was for China to persuade the United States and the British Empire to join the Soviet Union's proposed "peace camp."

Chiang Kai-shek forwarded the terms of a German-mediated peace proposal of December 1937 to Stalin. This was a hint to Stalin that Chiang might settle with Japan if Soviet support was not adequate. Moreover, such a settlement by implication could see China aligning with the Axis in anti-Communist cooperation. Stalin, however, called Chiang's bluff, no doubt confident that Chiang knew he could not accept a humiliating peace with Japan and survive politically. Re-

[42] Ibid., 336–7.
[43] Ibid., 470.
[44] Ibid., 339–40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

garding the terms of the Japanese peace proposal, Stalin told Chiang in his December cable that China should be willing to talk peace with Japan only if Japan agreed to withdraw from North China and to restore the pre-7 July 1937 status quo. Moreover, Stalin continued, Japan would violate any armistice agreement it signed and was merely stalling for time with German help. It was the duty of the Chinese government, Stalin urged, to speak in its capacity as the government of a great people and not submit to coercion.[45] Chiang replied to Stalin that he agreed with the Soviet leader's appraisal of the German mediation effort. He also added that he hoped the Supreme Soviet would decide to give China "powerful assistance" (*shili yuanzhu*) in order to lay the basis for peace in the Far East.[46] Stripped of its diplomatic ambiguities, Chiang's reply to Stalin said, in effect: we want to stand by our agreement not to align with Germany and Japan and hope you will soon enter the war against Japan.

The Soviet ambassador in Wuhan reinforced Stalin's message on 26 December, when he told Chiang's brother-in-law and financial expert, Kong Xiangxi, that the Soviet Union sympathized with China and would assist it materially to the extent that this was possible. It could not, however, unilaterally dispatch troops to assist China.[47]

Nanjing fell to Japan on 13 December, and the barbarous savaging of that city's people began. According to Jiang Tingfu, General Yang Jie had received the impression during his talks with Voroshilov that once Japan occupied Nanjing, the Soviet Union would enter the war, and had cabled this "intelligence" to Chiang Kai-shek.[48] Yang had not cleared this cable with Jiang, and once Jiang learned of it he sent his own cable to Chiang urging him to discount Yang's report. Nevertheless, after the fall of Nanjing, Chiang cabled Stalin and used Yang's discussions with Voroshilov as the basis for requesting Soviet entry. Litvinov conveyed Stalin's negative reply to Jiang Tingfu, telling the latter as well that he did not think General Yang's reporting to Chiang Kai-shek was reliable.

According to Jiang Tingfu, Yang Jie was willing to use devious methods to secure Soviet entry into the war. In mid-1937 Jiang was about to depart for London to participate with Kong Xiangxi and other Chinese officials in the coronation of King George VI. Yang urged him to announce to the British Reuters Press Agency while in London that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan within two weeks. Although this was entirely groundless, Yang felt, according to Jiang, that once the Japanese heard this they would immediately launch a preemptive attack on the Soviet Union thus precipitating Soviet entry into the war. Jiang refused Yang's plan.[49]

[45] Ibid., 340.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Jiang Yongjing, "Kangzhan chuqui de waijiao yu guolian ji De shi zhi tiaoting," ("The mediation by the German ambassador, the League of Nations, and diplomacy during the initial phase of the war of resistance"), *Zhongguo Xiandaishi Lunji* (*Collection of essays on modern Chinese history*), vol. 9, (Taipei: Liangjing Publishing Co., 1982), 378.

[48] *Jiang Tingfu Huiyilu*, 200.

[49] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In late 1937, a speech by the commander of the Soviet Special Far Eastern Red Army, General Vasilii K. Bluecher, (known in China by the pseudonym "Galin") also encouraged hope in China that the Soviet Union was about to intervene. According to propaganda ministry official Hollington Tong, whose job at that time included monitoring the foreign press, Bluecher said that when it was necessary to preserve world peace, the armed forces of the Soviet Union would not hesitate to cross her boundaries to wage war. Tong's retrospective judgment of Bluecher's speech was that it was an attempt to slow down the Japanese drive into China in order to prevent a decisive Japanese victory.[50]

After the failure of the Soviet Union to intervene after Nanjing's fall, Yang Jie sent a long letter to Chiang Kai-shek on 5 January 1938 reporting on his work. In it he laid out three reasons why the Soviet Union was unable to intervene at present. First, public opinion in Britain and America sympathized with China in a Sino-Japanese war, but would side with Japan in a Russo-Japanese war. (Here again, Stalin was indirectly indicating, through Yang, his view of the Sino-Japanese war as a way of drawing the United States and the British Empire into his proposed anti-aggressor camp.) Second, the Soviet Union hoped for an anti-fascist united front of Britain, America, and France, but until this front materialized it would be hard for the Soviet Union to deal with its two-front danger. Third, Stalin was extremely suspicious of British policy. Britain was unwilling to see China victorious over Japan and also hoped to see a Russo-Japanese war in which Britain could aid a weaker side. Yang then advanced his opinion about how Soviet entry could be secured, an opinion which hinted at the use of strategems of the sort that Jiang Tingfu reports Yang suggesting. Yang's letter read:

> In my opinion, the Soviet Union has all sorts of worries about war with Japan. Would it be possible to use a rather more effective method of inciting Japan or of uniting with other interested countries? In sum, if we want Soviet participation in the war, in my humble opinion, we must create an environment in which the Soviet Union cannot but participate in the war. The way to do this is to first of all find a way to have Britain and America back up the Soviet Union and perhaps to give a guarantee in the West of Europe's security. Secondly, the closer Sino-Soviet relations become, the more disadvantaged Japan will feel and the more provocatively it will act toward Russia. The Soviet Union could not tolerate such a situation and would be drawn into the vortex.[51]

In November 1937, Chiang had sent Sun Ke to Moscow to solicit increased military assistance. Sun arrived in Moscow in early 1938 and his first meeting with Stalin was on 4 February, a meeting at which the two men sat talking and drinking late into the night. Stalin urged China to be patient, while still holding out the possibility of eventual intervention. Sun reported this conversation in a cable to Chiang on 7 February. The international situation was not yet right for Soviet intervention, Stalin said, and it was still necessary to wait for the opportunity to ripen. If Britain, France, and America became willing to act together with the

[50] Hollington K. Tong, *China and the World Press*, (n.p., 1948), 47.
[51] *Zhanshi Waijiao*, 473–4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Union, then it would be possible for the Soviet Union to send troops. If the Soviet Union alone sent troops now, Stalin continued, it would only encourage Germany and Italy to assist Japan, lessen international sympathy for China, and encourage the misperception that the Soviet Union wanted to communize China. All of this would be contrary to the interests of China's war of resistance. For these reasons the Soviet government had decided to continue its current policy of no direct intervention in the war. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union would assist China materially and would encourage Britain, France, and the United States to support China. Undoubtedly in an effort to keep alive Chiang's hopes, Stalin then added that the Soviet Union's Far Eastern armies would "continue active maneuvers and await the moment to move."[52]

In March, as the Japanese drive south from Shandong province toward Xuzhou in northwestern Jiangsu province was about to begin, Chiang pushed again for Soviet entry into the war. Xuzhou was an important rail junction and Japan's campaign to seize it required the southernly redeployment of reserves previously held in Manchuria for use in the event of war with the USSR. This sapped the Japanese forces confronting the Soviet Red Army. The initiation of the Xuzhou campaign was an effort by the commanders of the Japanese field armies in China to torpedo the efforts by the general staff in Tokyo to prevent the expansion of the war in China.[53] Chiang Kai-shek generally had good intelligence regarding factional conflicts within Japan, and he probably knew of the impending Xuzhou campaign and understood its implications. The head of Chiang's Japanese intelligence section, Wang Pengsheng, had been telling him for some time of the divisions within Japan over policy toward China.[54] In February 1938, Chiang sent the head of the Japan desk of the Foreign Ministry, Dong Daoning, to Japan to conduct ultrasecret talks with Japanese officials. Dong remained in Japan for two weeks, met with the leaders of the "non-expansion of the fighting" faction, and returned to China with letters for Secretary General of the National Military Council Zhang Chun and Minister of War He Yingqin from their old Japanese friends. Dong's mission led to the initiation of further secret talks between head of the Foreign Ministry's Asian Section, Gao Songwu, and the Japanese consul in Hong Kong on 16 April 1938. These talks then continued through May.[55] In the situation of intricate triangular maneuvering and intense factional conflict within Japan, Soviet intervention, or even the threat of such intervention through maneuvers or force concentrations by the Red Army, might significantly strengthen the arguments of anti-Soviet elements in Japan who favored an early end to the war in China so as to be better prepared to seize eastern Siberia when the opportunity arose. Chiang's

[52] Ibid., 407.

[53] John Hunter Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937–1945; The Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1972), 137.

[54] Wu Xiangxiang, "Ribentong Wang Pengsheng," ("Japan expert, Wang Pengseng") *Chuanji Wenxue* 8 (May 1966): 30–33, 39.

[55] *Jiang Zongtong Milu*, vol. 11, 174–5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

early 1938 negotiations with Japan were in part an effort to bolster Soviet support, while his efforts to increase Soviet support were intended to strengthen the hand of the peace faction in Tokyo.

On 10 March, Chiang cabled Yang Jie in Moscow ordering him to meet with Voroshilov and press for a Soviet assault into Manchuria. Japan had deployed eight to twelve divisions to China, Chiang said, leaving northern Manchuria weakly defended. Yang should urge Voroshilov that if Soviet forces struck Manchuria or Korea, because of the depleted state of Japanese defenses, they would achieve good results. Picking up on Stalin's mention of Soviet maneuvers to Sun Ke on 4 February, Chiang also instructed Yang Jie that if direct Soviet entry were not possible, Yang should urge Voroshilov to concentrate Soviet forces on the Manchurian and Korean frontiers, thereby preventing Japan from redeploying still more units to the south to fight China's armies. Such a move would also be "very useful," Chiang said.[56]

Xuzhou fell to Japanese forces on 21 May, and then the battle for Wuhan began.[57] Wuhan was the last of China's major industrial cities not yet in Japanese hands. It was China's most important iron and steel center outside of Manchuria. It sat astride the north-south rail line and the east-west axis of the Yangtze and in the center of the rich and densely populated upper Yangtze basin. Its fall would be, and was, a major blow to China's war effort. The battle for Wuhan marked the decisive stage of the first fifteen months of the war. Japanese logistic lines had been stretched out and its forces spread thin and worn down. Chinese patriotic fervor and unity between the KMT and the Chinese Communist party (CCP) were at unprecedented heights. If Japan's advance was to be checked, it would be checked at Wuhan. If Soviet entry into the war was to occur, it would be most effective during the battle for Wuhan.

Just as the battle for Wuhan was developing, the Da Gong Bao publishing house in Hankou (one of the three cities constituting Wuhan) published a book analyzing the prospects for Soviet entry into the war. The editor in chief of Da Gong Bao, Zhang Jiluan, was very optimistic about the prospects for a Sino-Soviet war in mid-1938.[58] The book's ideas were probably representative of Zhang Jiluan's and other influential Chinese at that juncture. Written by Chu Yushen and entitled (in Chinese) *Sino-Soviet Relations in the Midst of Turmoil*, the book asserted that Soviet strength was inadequate to allow it to simultaneously deal with powerful enemies in both Europe and the Far East. But if Britain were willing to adopt a firm foreign policy and to cooperate with the USSR by guaranteeing its security in Europe, then the Soviet Union could and would send an army to China to help fight Japan. Sooner or later Britain would adopt such a firm policy and under such a beneficial international situation, a Russo-Japanese war would develop.

[56] *Zhanshi Waijiao*, 479–81.

[57] The battle of Wuhan is reviewed in *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) (Beijing), 18 July 1983, 5. See also, Dick Wilson, *When Tigers Fight, the Story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945* (New York: Viking Press, 1982), 110.

[58] *Jiang Tingfu Huiyilu*, 211.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The book ended with the words: "We believe even more strongly that if we are only able to continue fighting, the international situation will at last change one day and the Soviet Union will send troops to the Far East. There will finally come a day when this is realized."[59]

As Japanese armies marched toward Wuhan in June, Chiang Kai-shek continued to press for greater Soviet involvement in the war. At that point an intense debate within the German elite had just been resolved in favor of Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop's pro-Japanese line. Adolf Hitler had finally agreed to drop Germany's neutral position in the Sino-Japanese war for the sake of alliance with Japan. One immediate consequence of this critical decision was the recall of the German military advisers still serving with China's forces, including Chiang's trusted and able top adviser Alexander von Falkenhausen. On 2 June Chiang cabled Yang Jie, who had by then replaced Jiang Tingfu as ambassador to Moscow, instructing him to ask Stalin and Voroshilov to dispatch an able adviser, such as General Bluecher, to Wuhan to assist him as "general adviser."[60] Bluecher was the commander of the USSR's Special Far Eastern Army headquartered at Khabarovsk. His appointment as Chiang's general adviser to replace Falkenhausen would have been a powerful symbolic demonstration of Soviet support for China. It might also have been viewed by Japan as a provocative move. On 28 June, Chiang again cabled Yang asking him if the recall of the Soviet ambassador from Wuhan indicated a change in Soviet policy. Chiang noted the recent changes in German policy and argued that in his opinion "The Japs and Germany will inevitably take special action toward the Soviet Union before long."[61] In effect, Chiang was saying to Stalin that China had fully sided with the Soviet Union rather than its Axis enemies, that those enemies were themselves drawing closer together, and that it would be wise for Stalin to join his Chinese ally in a swift knockout of Japan before Germany was in a position to act.

The occurrence of heavy fighting on the Soviet-Korean border in July and August 1938 greatly encouraged Chinese hopes for Soviet entry into the war.[62] The fighting at Changgufeng, a small hill just west of Lake Khosan on the Korean-Soviet border, was the topic of discussion at a dinner banquet in Wuhan in mid-July 1938. According to the memoir of Jiang Tingfu, then just returned from his post in Moscow, many people at the banquet believed very strongly that the incident signaled the beginning of a Russo-Japanese war. Some of those present, Jiang Tingfu recalls, even went so far as to assert that Japan would collapse financially by September. Jiang Tingfu himself argued that the Soviet Union would not intervene. It was quite possible, he said, that the incident was not even the result of

[59] Chu Yushen, *Dongtang Zhong de Zhong Su Guanxi*, 192.

[60] *Zhanshi Waijiao*, 341.

[61] Ibid., 342.

[62] Clubb, *Russia and China*, 312. Aslo, Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation" in James W. Morley, ed., *Deterrent Diplomacy, Japan Germany, and the USSR, 1935–1940* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 140–153.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

orders by the central governments of the two countries, but was caused by the officers in command at the border. It was even possible, Jiang said, that General Bluecher had violated discipline by attacking the hill. Jiang felt that much of the optimistic talk at the banquet was an attempt to please and flatter Chiang Kai-shek. Toward the end of the evening, however, Chiang endorsed Jiang Tingfu's view and said that China should continue as though the incident had not occurred. According to Jiang, while Chiang Kai-shek may previously have had illusions about direct Soviet military assistance (that is, entry into the war), by that point it was clear that he had shed such illusions.[63]

Chiang Kai-shek may not have been as fully disillusioned then as Jiang believed. Chiang realized the debilitating effect that overconfidence in foreign intervention could have, and even if he personally had hopes of such intervention, it would be best for him to disparage such ideas—at least at such situations as dinner banquets. As early as late January 1938, for example, Chiang had warned a conference of staff officers that among four errors that China had committed during the early period of the war, the first was the false belief that since the great powers could act against Japan, China could limit herself to defensive tactics.[64] It seems likely that regardless of how much hope Chiang had in Soviet intervention in mid-1938, he would not want to unduly encourage such hopes among his subordinates.

On 27 July, Chiang Kai-shek cabled Yang Jie inquiring about how resolute the Soviet response to the Changgufeng incident would be. Marshaling his arguments for Yang to present to Soviet officials, Chiang raised the possibility that Japan would suggest the establishment of a border commission to defuse the crisis in Russo-Japanese relations while redeploying all its troops southward to bring the war in China to a "hiatus" (*duan luo*). Japan would then be free to use all its strength to deal with the USSR. Japan's intentions were clear, Chiang said, and the Soviet government should not be deceived. Yang was to ask the Soviet government just how resolute the Soviet position vis à vis Japan was. Chiang's sense of urgency and possibly his dissatisfaction with Yang's efforts were indicated by his queries about whether or not Yang had met with the Soviet ambassador since his recall and when the ambassador would return to China, and by his request for a prompt reply by Yang.[65] In a cable on 2 August, Chiang reiterated these questions and asked for confirmation of press reports that the Soviets had suffered 200 casualties and five planes shot down during the Changgufeng incident.[66]

On 10 August in Moscow, Foreign Minister Litvinov and Japanese Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru agreed to a peaceful settlement of the dispute on the Changgufeng region. Again, Chiang's hopes were disappointed. Writing in his diary some time later, Chiang Kai-shek revealed his bitterness about the relatively peaceful settlement of the Changgufeng incident. Had Japan been sincere in its proposals

[63] *Jiang Tingfu Huiyilu*, 211.
[64] Wilson, *When Tigers Fight*, 87.
[65] *Zhanshi Waijiao*, 341–2.
[66] Ibid., 342.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of anti-Communist cooperation with China, Chiang wrote, it would not have submitted so meekly after its defeat by the Soviet Red Army at Changgufeng.[67]

On 7 August, shortly before the Litvinov-Shigemitsu agreement was announced, Sun Ke sent a long cable to Chiang from Paris outlining why the Soviet Union was hesitant to enter the Sino-Japanese war. The Soviet government was afraid, Sun reported, that if it entered the war, China would make a separate peace with Japan. It was also afraid that Germany and Italy would take advantage of a Far East war to attack in the West. But the European situation was improving, according to Sun. Cooperation between France and Britain was growing, thereby hedging in Germany and Italy so that a change in the Far East situation need not disrupt the European situation. China should seek to win the confidence of the Soviet Union, Sun said. It should emphasize that Sino-Soviet cooperation was not limited to the war period, but would continue into the postwar era. China should seek a permanent alliance with the Soviet Union and should seek to adopt common political, military, and diplomatic measures with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Sun said, Moscow feared that China would become fascist after the war. China could assuage such apprehensions by carrying out land reform and equalizing land ownership, developing industry, and stopping discrimination against the Chinese Communists' Eighth Route Army.[68] The first part of Sun's comments—those regarding the danger of China's making peace with Japan, changes in the European situation, and closer solidarity between China and Russia—probably faithfully reflected what his Soviet hosts had told him. These arguments had the effect of transferring to China the responsibility for Soviet nonentry into the war while keeping alive Chinese hopes that the Soviet Union might, after all, intervene. It is unclear whether Sun's comments about China's domestic situation were Sun's own ideas or were expressed to him by Soviet officials.

By late September the battle for Wuhan was entering the final stage with Japanese forces advancing on that city from three directions. On 30 September, Chiang Kai-shek summoned the Soviet ambassador and urged that the Soviet Union act to restrain Japan.[69] Two days later Chiang cabled Yang to inform him of his discussions with the Soviet ambassador. Chiang ordered Yang to ask Stalin and Voroshilov whether or not the Soviet Union was prepared to adopt "military sanctions" against Japan. China and the Soviet Union should sign a mutual security agreement along the lines of the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak agreements, Chiang said. With the recent Four Power Munich Agreement undoubtedly in mind, Chiang instructed Yang to tell Stalin that:

> China believes that at this point the Soviet Union should take the most effective sanctions against the Far Eastern aggressor, and move a step closer to China . . . At present one can hope for temporary stability in the European situation so there would be no worry to your back. To use this extremely advantageous opportunity to teach the Far

[67] *Jiang Zongtong Milu*, vol. 12, 9.
[68] *Zhanshi Waijiao*, 408–9.
[69] *Zongtong Jianggong Dashi Changbian Chugao*, vol. 4, 1297.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Eastern aggressor Japan a lesson would also prevent Germany from making trouble another day. You should tell them [Stalin and Voroshilov] that the Chinese people generally believe the Soviet Union's policy has been one of helping oppressed nations and is truly China's truest friend through thick and thin. Now our war of resistance has already reached its fifteenth month and the struggle against aggression has entered its most difficult and critical stage. China's own strength is stretched to the limit. The Soviet Union cannot be ready to see China fail within reach of success and thus see the arrogance of the Far Eastern aggressor further increased and the world situation become even more irretrievable.[70]

Chiang instructed Yang to explain this reasoning thoroughly and sincerely to Stalin and Voroshilov. He should also lobby with officials at the Foreign Ministry and use all his strength to encourage the Soviet Union to adopt an active policy. Chiang also ordered Yang to reply promptly to his cable.[71] On 9 October, Chiang again met with the Soviet ambassador.[72]

The USSR did not, of course, enter the Sino-Japanese war in 1938. Chiang ordered the withdrawal from Wuhan on 19 October, and the city fell to Japanese forces on 21 October. When Chiang led China to war in July 1937, he had hoped that the Soviet Union would enter the war. Moscow had encouraged these hopes. Although it is speculative, one is tempted to conclude that Chiang must have been bitter once he finally understood, in the fall of 1938, that the Soviets would not, after all, enter the war, but intended to stand aside while Japan and China fought a costly, bloody, inconclusive war.

Once it became clear to Chiang that the Soviet Union would not enter the Sino-Japanese war, his policies began to change. After the fall of Wuhan, Soviet-Chinese relations entered a new stage. The Soviet Union continued to support China's war effort until June 1941, but the scale of aid declined. Both sides continued to mouth slogans about friendship and common interests, but new problems began to proliferate. Most importantly, the leaders of both countries began to look elsewhere for reliable foreign partners—Stalin to Berlin, Chiang to Washington. This parting of global orientations finally pulled apart the Sino-Soviet alignment of the first eighteen months of the Sino-Japanese war.

Conclusion

There were successful and failed aspects of both Chiang's and Stalin's policies toward each other's country during the first year and a half of the Sino-Japanese war. While Chiang did not persuade Stalin to enter the war against Japan, he did secure very substantial Soviet material and political assistance. From Stalin's standpoint, support for China was the complement of contemporaneous Soviet support for Spain. Stalin intended the conflicts in both areas to serve as catalysts of

[70] *Zhanshi Waijiao*, 343.
[71] Ibid.
[72] *Zongtong Jianggong Dashi Changbian Chugao*, vol. 4, 1297.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet and western collective security against Japan and Germany. In this regard, Stalin's policies in both China and Spain failed. There was, however, a second Soviet objective in both China and Spain: to divert, tie down, and bleed Japanese or German forces. In this regard, Stalin's strategy, in China at least, was successful. Chiang Kai-shek was aware of his role in accomplishing this Soviet objective, was bitter about it, and naturally demanded for China's services as high a price as the market would bear.

As Soviet involvement in China began to fade with the emergence of the Soviet-Nazi alignment, the United States began stepping up its support for China as one element of its effort to cope with Japan. From one perspective, Roosevelt was doing the same thing Stalin had done—paying for Chinese soldiers to tie down Japan. Chiang's subsequent dealings with the Americans were shaped by his earlier experiences with the Soviets. Nor was Chiang Kai-shek the last of China's leaders to fear great power manipulation of what political analysts of a later generation would call "the China card."*

* The author wishes to acknowledge support in the form of a Research Fellowship by the Committee for Scientific and Scholarly Communication with the USA of Academia Sinica in Taiwan and the Inter-University Program Administered by Stanford University in Taipei.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court *by Robert J. Steamer. Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press, 1986. 321 pp. $24.95.*

A veteran, perceptive, and articulate student and interpreter of the Supreme Court of the United States, Robert J. Steamer of the University of Massachusetts has performed a distinct service with his latest work. Conversant and comfortable with the Court's history and its membership (eighty-seven associate justices and fifteen chief justices as of the time the book was published, just prior to Chief Justice Warren Burger's retirement and Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist's elevation to become the sixteenth Chief) and acquainted with its wide-ranging literature as only few other scholars of the appellate bench are, *Chief Justice* is both a study of leadership and a minihistory of our highest tribunal.

One need not agree with Steamer's every evaluation of the fifteen—for example, one might well contend that he is rather too harsh on Roger Brooke Taney and Harlan Fiske Stone and too easy on Salmon P. Chase and Fred M. Vinson—to applaud the merits of his purpose: an analysis of the style and content of their management of the Supreme Court's quotidian business and their direction of the nation's judicial modus operandus. He does this by employing an imaginative, if controversial model consisting of four classifications or components: Leadership through Inspiration and Conviction; Leadership through Persuasion and Example; Leadership through Political and Extra-Court Activities; and Leadership Minimized in the Short-Term Chiefs. The fifteen chief justices are grouped within that quartet according to Steamer's perception of their role achievement. Thus, the three whom he quite justly regards as supremely fitted to the office—John Marshall, Charles Evans Hughes, and Earl Warren—are placed into the first category. In regarding them as the only "greats" among the fifteen, he echoes the judgment of the sixty-five Court personnel evaluators of the 1970–1971 Mersky-Blaustein project, who also bestowed that elusive adjective upon Chief Justices Taney and Stone. (Incidentally, only Marshall received the "great" appellation from all sixty-five, with seven associate justices also ranked as "great.")

Taney, Morrison R. Waite, Melville W. Fuller, and Edward D. White comprise the second group— "able but, to a degree, flawed chiefs." Steamer acknowledges Taney's philosophical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strength and White's intellectualism – surprisingly he views only White and Stone as genuine intellectuals among the fifteen; categorizes their leadership as exercised through persuasion and example; admires their natural strengths; yet concludes that they were *good* but not *great* leaders. The judgment points to the difficulties of comprehending evaluative performance in simple adjectives.

Leadership through political and extra-court activities informs the third group, consisting of Vinson, William Howard Taft, and Burger, the only chief justices to have served at some length on lower appellate courts before their elevation to the Supreme Court. Especially in the instances of Taft and Burger, their successes came in extra-court activities: in their devotion to the operation of the entire judicial establishment, including greater efficiency in the procedures of the highest court. They were essentially judicial reformers whose devotional primacy was to the system *qua* system. Vinson, too, was essentially an able managerial executive, but his overall jurisprudential contributions were, rightly or wrongly, viewed on a below-average plane by court observers.

Steamer's last group comprises the short-term chiefs, one in which he again includes Vinson, plus John Jay, John Rutledge, Oliver Ellsworth, Chase, and Stone. In the author's eyes, their leadership was seriously compromised – he prefers to style it minimized – by their short tenure. John Rutledge was never confirmed by the Senate and served but four months on a recess appointment. Jay and Ellsworth, whose combined tenure covered less than a decade, were generally unhappy on the Court and did their level best to absent themselves as frequently as feasible. The politically ambitious Chase served only nine years; but he steered the Court through the case-volume-heavy Civil War/Reconstruction period during which he rendered a few genuine contributions. Stone's five years as Chief (he served sixteen as an associate) were troubled and managerially ineffective ones, yet his choice by Roosevelt represented a politically wise and popular move.

Although it is wholly fair to question Steamer's model and some of his verdicts, there is no doubt that he has given us an insightful and valuable study of the fifteen chiefs and their leadership – or lack thereof. It represents a meritorious enterprise, indeed.

HENRY J. ABRAHAM
University of Virginia

White House Operations: The Johnson Presidency *by Emmette S. Redford and Richard T. McCulley. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1986. 247 pp. $30.00.*

Redford and McCulley have given us as good a description of Lyndon B. Johnson's White House staff, in administrative terms, as we are likely to see. In the process they have captured not simply what was unique about LBJ's staff but also what has been common to all White House staffs since the Johnson years. Their book establishes that the structure of the modern White House staff stands on a foundation laid during the Johnson presidency.

The book also gives a sense of what an extraordinary group of people Lyndon Johnson attracted to his staff. Just think for a moment of the now-and-then of some who served: Barefoot H. Sanders, Jr., a federal judge; Douglas Cater, Jr., president of Washington Col-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lege in Chestertown, Maryland; Bill Moyers, a formidable television producer and commentator; Tom Johnson, publisher of the *Los Angeles Times;* Robert Hardesty, president of Southwestern State Texas University in San Marcos; Matthew Nimetz, under secretary of state in the Carter administration and now a distinguished Wall Street lawyer; Peter Benchley, best selling author; James C. Gaither, chairman of a San Francisco law firm with over a hundred attorneys; Harry C. McPherson, a top Washington lawyer; Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association; Ben Wattenberg, distinguished author and columnist; Fred Bohen, vice president of Brown University.

The books also bursts a host of Johnson myths, including the frequent contemporaneous characterization that the salient feature of the Johnson presidential staff was its "ceaseless turnover." Johnson hung on to some of the best of the Kennedy staff as well as his own. Where there was turnover—in the press office, for example—there was turmoil.

The book recognizes that the large continuing role for the White House staff is here to stay, a role at least as substantial as that in the Johnson presidency. The authors aptly capture the political character of the president's office and White House staff; the need for a sizeable staff to handle communication to and from the president; the cross-cutting nature of decisions at the presidential level, which requires a staff that transcends narrow departmental lines; the need of presidents for aides that are immediately available, flexible, loyal, and who intimately understand him; and the inevitable fact that presidents will periodically expand their White House staff, at least temporarily, to handle special crises of deep concern and special danger. Witness Ronald Reagan's creation of a special staff to handle his Iranscam problem.

The authors also capture something else very important about White House aides: that they act very much at the pleasure of the president. More than any other employees of the government, this cadre of individuals holds their power at the sufferance of the president. Lyndon Johnson made that clear to all of us who served on his staff. It is important for all presidents to do that.

The Redford and McCulley book should, of course, be read by those who are studying the Johnson presidency—it gives a better picture of the administrative operations of the Johnson staff than any other work I have seen. But even more importantly, future presidents and their key advisers can benefit from the meticulous analysis these gentlemen have given us of one White House staff and learn how to assemble future White House staffs.

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.,
Washington, DC

Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy *by Michael MccGwire. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1987. 530 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $18.95.*

This study represents a seminal contribution to our understanding of Soviet military and foreign policy. It weaves together many disparate threads of doctrine, force structure, and approaches to arms control, into a logically consistent and politically coherent fabric whose pattern reveals insight into the evolution of Soviet military policy and its relationship to the broader security concerns of Soviet leaders.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MccGwire's central thesis is that Soviet leaders made a fundamental decision about their security in 1966–1967 that has shaped all subsequent Soviet military and arms control policy. Soviet leaders, in his opinion, have always been strongly committed to avoiding a superpower war, but until the late 1960s they believed that if such a war broke out it would be fought as an all-out nuclear confrontation. In 1967–1968 they concluded that it might be possible to keep a superpower war from escalating to an intercontinental nuclear exchange, thereby avoiding the devastation of their homeland.

MccGwire argues that this doctrinal shift had far-reaching consequences for national security policy and force structure, consequences that began to appear at the end of the 1960s and became fully apparent by the middle of the next decade. One such development was a thorough revamping of the concept of operations in the European theater in order to minimize the risk of a conventional war precipitating an intercontinental nuclear war. Another was the recognition that the U.S. military-industrial base could not be attacked. This meant that the United States could carry on a war even after it had been defeated in Europe and compelled the Soviets to plan for a two-phase war: the first, short and intense in Europe, and the second, long, drawn out and global. Much of the book is devoted to explicating and documenting these and other consequences of the 1967–1968 decisions.

In support of his thesis MccGwire marshals an impressive array of evidence spanning four decades of Soviet military and foreign policy. His analysis is unusual and impressive in terms of its scope and the skill with which he is able to interweave military and political evidence in order to reconstruct changing Soviet conceptions of their security and their implications. On the whole, MccGwire makes a convincing case for his position, so much so, that from now on the burden of proof will be on those who disagree.

It is too bad that a study as erudite, imaginative, and literate also has some serious methodological flaws. MccGwire—as must all Soviet analysts—makes inferences on the basis of the observable tip of the Soviet iceberg. He assumes, however, that force structure, doctrine, and foreign policy pronouncements and initiatives perfectly reflect and, therefore, reveal the intentions of their framers *and* collectively form a logically consistent and internally coherent corpus from which that intent can be reconstructed. This ignores the distorting influences of domestic politics, bureaucracy, and organizational behavior, and the myriad of ways in which they shape the formulation and implementation of governmental policy. Case studies of critical American security initiatives and weapons decisions reveal just how important, even decisive, these factors are. They make any attempt to infer strategic intent from force structure and doctrine highly misleading.

Although the context is different, Soviet scholars (such as, Raymond Garthoff, Karl Spielmann, Matthew Evangelista) have also demonstrated important ways in which Soviet foreign and military policies can be influenced by leadership politics, bureaucratic competition, and organization behavior. To the extent to which these factors are determinants of policy, or even just important intervening variables, they render very suspect any interpretation of Soviet policy that claims that practically all Soviet actions over the course of several decades are demonstrable manifestations of a far-reaching and sophisticated strategic plan. Analysts must display some sensitivity to these factors and take them into account in their arguments. They cannot blandly assert, as MccGwire does, that one can use purely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deductive logic to reconstruct the policy framework that explains the evidence. This approach is unconvincing.

These methodological flaws, while serious, do not negate the value of McCGwire's study, which transcends his thesis and the nature of the evidence adduced in its support. Even those unconvinced by his overall thesis will find many of the related arguments insightful and compelling. So too ought they to applaud his largely successful efforts to explore the links between military and political developments and to evaluate military developments in terms of their broader political context. In this regard, the work represents an achievement that other Soviet analysts, regardless of their particular outlook, would be well-advised to emulate.

McCGwire's arguments also have important political implications. The book makes a strong case for the fundamentally cautious and defensive nature of Soviet military policy. This stands in sharp contrast to so many studies of the Soviet military that assume that its size and offensive doctrine are unambiguous intentions of aggressive intent. The strategic Cassandras who make this kind of argument invariably explain away similar attributes of U.S. force structure and doctrine that could be interpreted as aggressive. McCGwire has demonstrated that what applies to the Eagle, also applies to the Bear.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
Cornell University

The Conventional Defense of Europe: New Technologies and New Strategies *edited by Andrew J. Pierre. New York, New York University Press, 1986. 185 pp. Cloth, $19.50; paper, $6.95.*

This is the fifth book to emerge from the Project on European-American Relations sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, and it is definitely a worthwhile contribution to the contentious issue of European defense. In addition to an introductory chapter by the editor, the book contains selections by officials from the United States, (Richard D. LeLauer), France, (Francois L. Heisbourg), West Germany, (Andreas von Bulow), and the United Kingdom, (General Sir Hugh Beach).

In his introductory chapter, Pierre notes that recent developments have once again raised the question of the proper defense of Europe. Growing anxiety over nuclear weapons, adverse conventional military trends, and emerging technology as well as innovative military strategies have all combined to make the defense of Europe a salient topic. More of a descriptive than an advocatory chapter, Pierre's contribution concludes with something for everyone: improve conventional defense, but do not expect to solve political problems with technical means; reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, but do not expect to eliminate them; submit the U.S. Airland Battle strategy as well as the NATO strategy of "Follow-on Forces Attack" (FOFA) to greater public scrutiny and further study; do not expect significant increases in military spending within the alliance; and produce the new technologies in both the United States and Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DeLauer thinks that he has found something new that will, in fact, solve the security dilemma of Europe with the outlay of only a small additional amount of money. His something new is the emerging technologies (ET), and he endorses them with all of the fervor of a true believer. Using an argument that Henry Kissinger made almost thirty years ago, he is convinced that the West must use its superior technical ability to compensate for its conventional numerical and material inferiority (p. 42–43). Speaking with the assurance of a scientist who believes that political problems can be solved by technical means, DeLauer thinks that NATO must be strong in both conventional and nuclear weapons so that "a conventional attack could be escalated flexibly to a tactical or theater nuclear conflict if conditions warrant" (p. 45). It is bizarre to see the old "destroy-the-world-in-order-to-save-it" philosophy still being articulated.

Oddly, DeLauer cites some of the least alarming force-level figures to come to a conclusion that the figures would never justify. He suggests that the Soviets possess a 1.5 to 1 advantage in total military personnel; more than a 2 to 1 in main battle tanks; 1.6 to 1 in armored personnel carriers; at least 1.6 to 1 in artillery, anti-tank weapons, and mortars; and 2 to 1 in attack helicopters. If his numbers are correct, there is little need for NATO to do anything. No field commander in his right mind would launch an attack with only that modest an advantage over the defending forces. In typically "ugly American" fashion, he casts aspersions on the determination of the western Europeans to defend themselves (p. 49) and even suggests that their own security is not as important to them as having enough jobs (p. 65). As he warms to his task, he employs a considerable amount of "real-time" jargon to sell the benefits of the new weapons and, apparently, to convince the rather dense Europeans that American technology is their salvation. He accepts unquestioningly the debatable notion that American nuclear weapons have kept the Soviets from attacking (p. 49) and would probably be amazed at the suggestion that perhaps the Soviets have not attacked because they did not see any clear gain in doing so independent of the barely credible American threat to use its nuclear weapons. The discriminating reader who might not want to get upset at all of this drivel should skip this selection and move on to the more interesting chapters by the Europeans.

The one by Heisbourg raises a number of useful political, demographic, and financial issues that contribute to the debate, but ultimately he does not point to a solution that is significantly different from past policies. The chapter by von Bulow does offer a radically new concept that has been suggested in the past but perhaps never by anyone of von Bulow's stature. Taking the broadest view of all the contributors, von Bulow looks to the long-term evolution of Communist systems into some kind of modus vivendi in Europe instead of proceeding from the proposition that Europe must remain an armed camp into the indefinite future. Stressing the need for NATO to avoid making the Soviets feel threatened, he offers a strategy for NATO that concentrates on purely defensive arrangements using the Swiss and the Swedes as models. Downplaying the usefulness of tanks, which can be clearly used in an offensive as well as defensive role, he suggests increased reliance on anti-tank weapons, the elimination of deep-strike capabilities, and the increased reliance on reserves and mobile defense forces that would take advantage of the favorable terrain to provide an effective defense of Germany without causing the Russians to believe that they were subject to immediate attack. His suggestions are novel and useful, and more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than any other contributor, von Bulow is prepared to think in clearly new terms. This chapter is worth the price of the book and should be seriously studied by anyone who is interested in a long-term solution to the problem of the defense of Europe that has some possibility of success. The concluding selection by Beach again presents a broad political perspective but seems to argue for more of the same as most of the other selections do.

This book certainly delineates the differences in opinion that characterize the present debate, and it aptly demonstrates why this problem is so difficult to solve. The perspectives represented in this book are often so diametrically opposed that one despairs of such a disparate group of planners ever agreeing on a course of action. However, if we can overcome our traditional way of thinking and our commitment to refighting World War II, and if we can listen to people like von Bulow, there is a chance that NATO may yet find its way out of the morass into which it has sunk through unimaginative and conventional thinking that offers for the future simply forty more years of avoiding political solutions and concentrating on evermore exciting weapons to preserve the stability in Europe.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Hard Right: The Rise of Jesse Helms *by Ernest B. Furgurson. New York, Norton, 1986. 302 pp. $18.95.*

The career of Jesse Helms, senior senator from North Carolina, holds interest both for its dramatic singularity and for its relationship to a broader movement that is altering the balance of national politics. Ernest B. Furgurson, chief of the *Baltimore Sun's* Washington bureau, provides a thoroughly researched and engagingly written narrative that focuses on the first while supplying useful information on the second.

At one level, Helms is not typical of much of anything. He has never seemed at ease in the Senate or socially representative of the conservative populists from whom he gathers much of his support. It is hard to imagine anyone speaking of Helmsism, as one speaks of Reaganism or even Nixonism. His impact on the Senate has resulted mainly from the consistency with which he has defined the extreme conservative position on almost every issue. A policy or an executive branch nominee right enough to get by Helms is usually right enough to be approved by all other conservatives. Yet he lacks the flamboyance or magnetic personality through which some rightwing politicians have attracted mass followings. Furgurson finds him a "unique personality." Helms's success demonstrates that shrewdness, determination, and luck can still triumph in American politics over usual criteria of electability.

Even these qualities, however, would probably not have been enough to raise Helms to national prominence had not his career gained impetus from the emergence of the political New Right in the late 1970s. Two of the chief ingredients promoting the New Right were the discovery of a nationwide pool of social conservatives who could be tapped by direct mail to give generous financial support to rightwing candidates, and the political mobilization of white evangelical Protestants, formerly passive and predominantly Democratic, who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

felt aggrieved by challenges to traditional moral attitudes. Helms was among the first to grasp the potentialities of both developments. He pioneered direct-mail political fund raising to help pay the campaign debt after his initial election to the Senate in 1972, and he made himself a spokesman for social discontents among evangelicals long before the Moral Majority was formed.

In 1976, Helms's support probably saved Ronald Reagan from political extinction in the North Carolina presidential primary. Since Reagan became president in 1981, Helms has used his seat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to combat pragmatic tendencies in the administration's conduct of foreign policy and to advocate support for rightist regimes and causes all over the world.

Writing before the 1986 election, Furgurson is sometimes a bit hyperbolic about the likely political prospects for the New Right in general and Helms in particular. Broad Republican gains in the South in 1980 and Helms's bitterly fought reelection against a popular incumbent Democratic governor in 1984 were in part traceable to the appeal of New Right themes. But the defeat in 1986 of many rightwing senators who had ridden into office on Reagan's coattails six years before seemed to show the limitations of campaigns based mainly on bulging warchests and rigid adherence to conservative ideology.

Helms's selection by Republican senators at the beginning of 1987 as ranking minority member on the Foreign Relations Committee over the more pragmatic Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, who was chairman when the Republicans controlled the Senate but is junior to Helms in Senate service, was less because of ideology than in spite of it. A tactical coalition supporting Helms was formed from progressive as well as rightwing Republicans, both groups eager to establish the precedence of seniority over ideology. Furgurson's political perspective is unabashedly liberal. For the most part he deals evenhandedly with Helms, while making clear his distaste for the causes with which his subject has been aligned.

A. JAMES REICHLEY
Brookings Institution

When Federalism Works *by Paul E. Peterson, Barry G. Rabe, and Kenneth K. Wong. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1986. 245 pp. Cloth, $28.95; paper, $10.95.*

Beginning in the summer of 1979, the authors conducted over 200 interviews in four cities on the operations of nine federal grant-in-aid programs. Although the title refers to federalism as a whole, the book is a narrower analysis of the operation and effects of a particular set of federal aid programs in four cities at the end of the Carter administration and in the early part of the Reagan administration. The four cities studied are Baltimore, Miami, Milwaukee, and San Diego. The grant programs studied are subdivided, as is much of the analysis, into two main types of grants—development and redistributive grants. The development grants studied are for hospital construction, vocational education, school impact aid, and community development. The redistributive grants studied are for health maintenance organizations, special education for handicapped children, compensatory educa-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion for children from low-income families, school desegregation assistance, and the rent subsidy program. (One is struck by the omission from the latter category of the big-dollar redistributive federal aid programs to Aid for Families with Dependent Children and the Medicaid program.)

The analysis is infused with a particular point of view about federal aid and has a clear system of heroes and villains. The authors believe that the federal government should take on more responsibility for redistributive programs and reduce its role in the development area. The heroes in this book are social policy liberals and "policy professionals." Policy professionals are the subject of a separate chapter. They are described as administrators at the national, state, and local levels who develop "common professional interests and aspirations . . . that transcend their identification with the government that happens to pay their salary" (p. 20). The villians are Reagan (his policies get hard treatment), conservatives, and politicians generally. William Donald Shaefer, the mayor of Baltimore, is described frequently and often negatively as presiding over a "machine-style goverment," which is "the most politicized" of the cities studied.

In many respects, the juxtaposition of the treatment of policy professionals and politicians is the most interesting aspect of this book for political scientists. The final chapter shows how important this subject is to the analysis. "Federalism works well when national, state, and local governments together take the time to design and implement programs that meet broad social needs not easily addressed by local jurisdictions alone. Success does not come quickly or easily, but *professional policymakers* eventually adapt the workings of their organizations to take into account the concerns expressed by other levels of government" (p. 216, emphasis added). On the other hand, the authors say that "Federal grants are not always effective." The very next sentence hits at politicians as a root cause of program failure. "When *politicians* regularly involve themselves in policy implementation, the conflicting interests of rival levels of government heighten resistance to regulations and destabilize institutional relationships, thereby contributing to delay, distrust, and confusion" (p. 216, emphasis added).

When Federalism Works is an interesting, lively, readable book that reaches conclusions with which many readers will agree. It is more of an essay than a study. The authors do not go as far as one would like in testing their thesis, about which I have considerable doubt, that the role of policy professionals is a key to the success of federal aid programs and that the activities of politicans are a chief barrier to achieving it.

RICHARD P. NATHAN
Princeton University

Common Decency: Domestic Policies after Reagan *by Alvin L. Schorr with a contribution by James P. Comer. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1986. 246 pp. $20.00.*

Media treatments of social policy in the 1980s have emphasized the resurgence of American conservatism and an indifference toward poverty. Often, columnists rail against Reagan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administration policies as the embodiment of a new selfishness. So, when a book title links the notion of "common decency" with "policies after Reagan", one knows what to expect. Happily, Alvin Schorr's work rises well above expectations. Instead of a polemic against President Ronald Reagan, Schorr has produced a wide-ranging, well-informed review of income maintenance, housing, health, and education policies. (James Comer wrote the chapter on education). After providing the reader with background on each problem area and the strengths and weaknesses of existing programs, Schorr presents his proposals for improving the system. His purpose is to achieve the five goals discussed in Chapter 2, including: strengthening the sense of community, mainstreaming income maintenance and social services, full employment, selective decentralization, and racial integration.

In examining each subject, Schorr recognizes that good intentions are not enough and that policies usually err in the details. Contemporary policy analysts accept this reality and generally focus on one area at a time. Schorr, whose experience in social work and social programs spans several decades, takes up the challenge of analyzing and developing recommendations in five major fields. Although his ambitious effort succeeds in part, many sections fall victim to a sketchy, unbalanced treatment or to misleading or mistaken analyses. These weaknesses might be overlooked had Schorr used his broad approach to demonstrate the interactions between programs, such as how income-support proposals relate to health and housing.

One well-argued, unifying theme of his policies is the promotion of mainstream approaches for helping low-income families. For example, Schorr argues for raising the social security minimum substantially as a way of deemphasizing the income-tested welfare program for the elderly, Supplemental Security Income. In proposing a refundable tax credit to replace the personal exemption, Schorr provides details on the rationale, costs, distributional impacts, and effects on other programs. He persuasively argues that these policies are feasible and offer significant advantages over income-tested welfare programs. However, Schorr mistakenly contends that the refundable tax credit can attain two incompatible outcomes. On the one hand, he maintains that the credit would substantially reduce the use of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. But, since his proposed credit would be paid on top of existing AFDC benefits, it is hard to see why AFDC participation would decline at all. Indeed, it might increase as families would be able to attain higher benefits outside the work force than before the credit became available.

In discussing Social Security, Schorr points out a rarely noticed fact: despite benefit formulas weighted toward low earning elderly, the distribution of current intergenerational transfers is weighted toward those with high preretirement earnings. Yet, he fails to note that all such transfers will wither away as the system matures.

A more serious omission is that Schorr's treatment of problems and policies says little about the responsibilities of the poor nor about how to deal with the high illegitimacy, drug use, and crime that helps to generate the most intractable urban poverty. Still, the book has many virtues. It exposes readers to a rich amount of material and to a modern, liberal perspective on how to move the country toward a more humane society.

ROBERT I. LERMAN
Brandeis University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cities of the Prairie Revisited: The Closing of the Metropolitan Frontier *by Daniel J. Elazar with Rozann Rothman, Stephen L. Schechter, Maren Allan Stein, and Joseph Zikmund II. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1986. 288 pp. $25.00.*

This is an important book. Elazar and his associates provide a rich combination of descriptive data, historical analysis, and political theory building in this volume, which restudies eleven civil communities from the original thirteen civil communities discussed and described in Elazar's *Cities of the Prairie.* The earlier research concentrated on the ". . . changes of the first half of the postwar generation (1946–1961)," (p. 7) and this volume, while nearly replicating the original research design, studies the communities from 1962 to 1977. Elazar argues ". . . that it is neither possible nor desirable to study local political systems apart from their larger geohistorical, cultural, economic, and political settings" (p. 8). The book is a comprehensive summary of what has happened to the civil communities as a result of the varied factors affecting them since 1962 and how they have responded to the changes in government and society.

The first four chapters consider the specific changes in the civil communities, and the last four chapters provide detailed case studies of Pueblo, Colorado; Champaign and Urbana, Illinois; Decatur, Illionis; and Joliet, Illinois. The fifth chapter, rich in conceptual and empirical contributions, is perhaps the most interesting. Elazar and his associates use Chapter 5 to discuss federalism versus managerialism in the civil community. They conclude that ". . . the local polity is still the best framework within which to preserve local autonomy" (p. 134). They consider the impact of the Great Society's programs on the civil communities and the struggle between various governmental forces.

The authors then go on to argue that a matrix model of American democracy best depicts federalism. In the matrix model, units of government interact but none is "higher" or "lower" in importance (p. 136). They then argue that acceptance of a Jacobin model led to the development of a managerial pyramid (p. 140), which driven by modern technological forces, led to a call for increased centralization of power and a subsequent hierarchical relationship. This then, became an underlying reason for the growth of the federal government and its larger programmatic and revenue-based involvement in state and local affairs over the last thirty years.

For the authors, the "solution to the real problems of American cities and metropolitan areas, however, is not to be found in . . . increasing federal largesse. It is to be found in recreating the civil community . . ." (p. 157). What follows is an insightful discussion of what needs to be done to restore the civil community and how best to do it. There is a discussion of the clash between the fourth frontier stage and governmental responses to the changes it has engineered. While much of this discussion is speculative, it is provocative and important. The book offers rare insight into a variety of American communities and does so over an extended period of time. This study embodies the best of social science research; it is willing to draw significant theoretical conclusions while also developing important empirical data. While one may question the underlying assumptions, the reader can only marvel at the masterful blend of theory and data. It is well documented and the reader is given access to considerable information and source materials. Elazar and his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

associates are to be congratulated for a fine effort worthy of considerable professional recognition. I am confident they will receive it.

DAVID A. CAPUTO
Purdue University

Winston S. Churchill: Road to Victory, 1941–1945 *by Martin Gilbert. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1986. 1417 pp. $40.00.*

Apart from Churchill's own multivolume history of these years, so much has been published in diaries, memoirs, and special studies as to make it unlikely that this seventh volume of Churchill's life would alter the main outlines of the story. So it proves. The footnotes reflect the degree of the author's dependence on sources other than unpublished Churchill papers.

Space restricts a reviewer to a few forays into the substance of this book. First, there is the perennially interesting question of Churchill-Roosevelt relations. While there are no revelations, the points are nailed down. The two were far less of a mutual admiration society than earlier accounts suggested. And Churchill certainly thought he had a clearer understanding with FDR about "tube alloys" (the atomic bomb project) than he later found he had. Second, there is a great deal on Anglo-Soviet relations. Again no revelations, but the serious and continued efforts Churchill made on behalf of Poland have never been more poignantly portrayed. Third, publishing here the parts of Churchill's 1942 speech referring to Charles De Gaulle (pp. 277–278), which were omitted from his later collected speeches, is helpful. Inclusiveness has its uses.

As in earlier volumes Gilbert concentrates on a massively detailed account of events, not on analysis, or even on some division of the chronology according to main themes. This has the advantage of letting events unfold with all the chopping and changing of plans that actually occurred. The answer to who favored or opposed what operation depends on precisely when the question is put. Thus, Churchill favored an invasion of southern France late in 1942, and at that time opposed attacking Italian islands in the eastern Mediterranean until Turkey joined the allies. Later he changed his mind about both.

A disadvantage to this style of presentation is repetitiousness. At times this seems to reflect forgetfulness of what has already been said (pp. 358–359, and see p. 901 and n. 2, p. 906). Elsewhere (pp. 795–797) it seems simply to reflect repetition in the record. Other than repetition, a reason for the extraordinary length of the text (after all, volume 5 covered 1922–1939 in only 1167 pp.) is the format, which gradually abandons the use of asterisks in favor of sizeable blank spaces in order to break up sections of chapters. At least in the American edition control over printing sometimes breaks down altogether (p. 849).

Moreover, if the records are themselves contradictory, the author takes no responsibility for reconciling factual discrepancies. Thus, British troops liberate Antwerp 4 September 1944 (p. 934), but on 9 October 1944, Churchill is hoping to take Antwerp soon (p. 975). Small errors abound. Some cast doubt on the author's accuracy in transcribing conversations. For example the garbled Gilbert and Sullivan attributed to Sarah Churchill (p. 1227).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In short, this volume does not diminish its subjects, though much of the trivia could be omitted. No doubt the intent of all those bathroom anecdotes is to leaven the heavy going in strategy and politics. Yet those weighty matters remain the important things about these years of Churchill's life.

BARRY MCGILL
Oberlin College

The Wise Men, Six Friends and the World They Made: Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy *by Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986. 853 pp. $22.95.*

This is the work of journalists, not scholars. It is based mainly on the memoirs of the six men concerned and other secondary sources, although the authors did interview some intimates and were given access to some of the principals' private papers.

The overall theme of the book is palpably silly—that these six were the top men of the American establishment, who came from the common background of Groton, Yale, Harvard, Princeton, and so on, and built the world to their image. Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman, Robert A. Lovett, and Charles E. Bohlen did come from an establishment background, but John J. McCloy was a poor boy from Philadelphia who scratched his way up, and George Kennan was an equally poor boy from Milwaukee who did get to Princeton but was never anything but an outsider. The authors do not push the notion of a power elite to the ridiculous level of C. Wright Mills. They really use the theme as a gimmick that gives them an excuse to deal with these six rather than some other six—or ten or twenty-four—who played equally or even more prominent roles in those years. But even so, the result is still a lot of slippery notions about how American foreign policy is made.

The authors pick up almost all the anecdotes of the period—both the false and the true—and occasionally add some distortions of their own. Their preference is for the gossipier versions, but they sometimes miss. For example, they tell the story of Averell Harriman spending the weekend of 7 December 1941 with Winston Churchill at Chequers. In their version, Harriman and Churchill hear the news that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor on a BBC broadcast, and they then telephone President Franklin D. Roosevelt to confirm it. The way Harriman told the story—many, many times—was better. Churchill had had his usual several glasses of brandy and was very much in his cups when he was called to the phone. "Oh," he reported back to Harriman, slurring his words, "Ish noshing. Japs bombed Pearl River." It was only later in the evening that they heard the BBC broadcast and telephoned Roosevelt. Other anecdotes that the authors repeat and sometimes distort are much further from the truth and many are far from being so harmless. However, the authors are never vicious or deliberately unfair. The anecdotes—both the true and the distorted—are both apt and amusing.

The authors also capture some of the personalities at least some of the time. They are perhaps a little hard on the "anguished, tortured" George Kennan, his flights of poetic abstractionism and philosophizing instead of hard-headed policy analysis, his convoluted

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inconsistencies, and his anti-democratic elitism. But even if it is hard, the description is not unfair. Acheson comes out less rigid and pompous than some of his contemporaries, especially those in Congress, saw him; while the descriptions of Lovett and McCloy are rather flat. The authors also capture Harriman's pushiness, elbowing his way into meetings where he was not invited, and his efforts to meet every national leader of his time as if he were collecting stamps. But they also give him credit for being wise and right about so many of the issues of his time, as he was. So too do they give a sense of Chip Bohlen's ebullience and good fellowship, and his good judgment on issues as well as his shortcomings as an originator of policy ideas.

This book is not a contribution to historical writing nor an insight into the way the American government works. But if it is not an instructive book, it is at least good entertainment.

ROGER HILSMAN
Columbia University

Soviet Power and the Third World *by Rajan Menon. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1986. 261 pp. $20.00.*

Rajan Menon provides us with a very useful overview of Soviet policy in the Third World, with particular attention to the uses of Soviet military power in the decade and a half since 1970. *Soviet Power* does not, like many recent books in this area, concentrate on either the Soviet theoretical literature *or* concrete behavior, but tries to do both comprehensively. Thus we are provided with chapters on the Soviet view of the East-West competition in which the author reviews the writings of Soviet academic specialists on the Third World as well as military authors, a chapter on Soviet military power in which he discusses actual Soviet power projection capabilities and analyzes the ways in which they have and might be used, and a chapter on arms transfers that includes detailed statistical data on the provenance of Soviet military assistance.

The author's observations and judgments are, by and large, sound. For example, he notes the growing skepticism among Soviet academics over the prospects for "socialist oriented" states like Afghanistan and Angola; he points out weaknesses in Soviet force structure for distant force projection, for example, in the areas of replenishment and overseas basing; and he notes that arms transfers have bought very little influence for the Soviets despite the attention paid to them by both superpowers. Menon is consistently concerned with the danger of overplaying the Soviet "threat" in the Third World as he feels the Reagan administration has, cautioning us, for example, that U.S. capabilities for Third World intervention are more substantial than those of the USSR, and that the Soviets were not the ones who took the initiative to intervene in the Angolan civil war.

Menon's book would have benefitted considerably, however, from a sharper and more detailed focus on the specific issue of power projection. Instead of providing us with overviews of topics like the writings of Soviet *institutchiki*, the general patterns of superpower defense spending, or the reasons for the mid-1970s turndown in the Soviet economy (each of which has been treated better and more comprehensively elsewhere), the book would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been much more useful had it tried to probe, for example, the shifting attitudes of the Soviet military toward Third World intervention. While there is some discussion of this issue in Chapter 2 (pp. 60–83), *Soviet Power* misses more than it uncovers. For example, there is no analysis of the Soviet general staff's decision to downgrade the priority of the navy in the late 1970s, or of the substantial naval literature that has appeared since the first edition of Sergei G. Gorshkov's *Sea Power of the State* (including the so-called "Stalbo" debate of the early 1980s). Menon shares the strange but common habit of many contemporary Sovietologists to pay great attention to the writings of professors and colonels but not the party secretaries, chiefs of staff, and defense ministers who employ them. Had he done so, I think he would have uncovered a fascinating turn in the attitudes of senior Soviet military leadership toward the power projection mission that would have done much to support the book's general argument. Indeed, had the book paid more attention to the authoritative pronouncements of the senior party leadership, it would likely not have treated the entire period from 1970 to the present as one undifferentiated epoch in Soviet foreign policy. *Soviet Power* is a useful overview of the military aspects of Soviet Third World policy, but does not break new ground in research on this subject.

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA
The Rand Corporation

The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future *edited by Robert Conquest. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 406 pp. $27.95.*

Like all multiauthor works, this volume is uneven. And like most studies of the Soviet nationality problem, it suffers from methodological errors and questionable assumptions. Although always intriguing and occasionally outstanding, as a whole *The Last Empire* does not quite meet the high expectations that its impressive cast of contributors raises.

Since only a few of the articles deal specifically with "nationality and the Soviet future," the volume is not much different from other collections in its focus on past and present developments among the USSR's ethnic groups. To its great credit, however, *The Last Empire* departs from the norm for such studies by devoting equal attention to non-Russians *and* Russians on the fully justified rationale that the latter, while dominant, are no less a part of the Soviet state's nationality problem.

The articles vary in interest and quality. Best of all are Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's incisive discussion of Soviet nationality policies and theories, Gertrude E. Schroeder's careful analysis of social and economic developments in the republics, and Mikhail S. Bernstam's fascinating study of demographic trends among Russians and non-Russians. Also of interest are the elegantly written interpretive essays by Alain Besancon and Hugh Seton-Watson, the provocative contributions by Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush on Soviet Muslims, and Vladislav Krasnov's thoughtful analysis of visitor comments at Ilia Glazunov's 1978–1979 exhibits in Moscow and Leningrad. Less satisfying are the detailed, but analytically insubstantial essays by Frederick C. Barghoorn, Alexander Shtromas, and John B. Dunlop on, respectively, Russian nationalism, Baltic resistance, and national awareness.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, Leonard Schapiro's article on anti-Semitism, Milovan Djilas's on Eastern Europe, and Donald W. Treadgold's on the implications of nationalism in the USSR for the world are sketchy; Roman Szporluk's on the Ukraine and Russia is unfocused; while Mikhail Agursky's on national Bolshevism is, quite simply, incredible.

Two methodoligical problems bedevil almost all the contributions. The first is a cavalier attitude towards concepts and definitions. A few authors actually state what they mean by nationalism; most do not. The result, perhaps inevitably, is "conceptual stretching": nationalism is used to refer to independence movements, ethnic awareness, national concern, national consciousness, and so on. If, as Dunlop suggests, the establishment Kirgiz writer, Chingiz Aitmatov, is a nationalist, then who, one wonders, is not? A closer acquaintance with the vast theoretical literature on nationalism would have helped in avoiding this error.

Ironically, although nationalism is stretched, nations are reified. Most of the authors seem to share the traditional view of nations as willful monoliths and homogeneous organisms. There is strong reason to believe, however, that heterogeneity, disunity, and fluidity are far more characteristic of nations and of the variously committed individuals composing them. Not surprisingly, most of the articles also imply that nationality is an unchanging essence that the present has inherited from the past and that the future is likely to inherit from the present. One of the more glaring examples of this tendency is the assumption that Muslims were and always will be what they currently are—Muslims.

Finally, many of the articles are based on the widely held—though no less questionable—premise that the rapidly growing Muslim populations of Soviet Central Asia are the key to the Soviet Union's ethnic stability. Ancient cultures, demographic explosions, and stubborn traditions are interesting, of course, and they may one day result in some degree of instability. In and of themselves, however, they are politically meaningless. Moreover, the Muslim potential for instability is still just that, a potential. Although things may change one-hundred years from now, the actual proven political importance of the Ukraine is and will remain Moscow's major nationality challenge for a long time to come. It is too bad that Szporluk's is the only article that addresses this issue.

ALEXANDER J. MOTYL
Columbia University

The Camp David Accords: A Testimony by Sadat's Foreign Minister *by Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel. New York, Methuen, 1986. 414 pp. $39.95.*

Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel served as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's foreign minister during the first nine months of 1978. He participated in the Camp David negotiations, but when he saw the direction they were taking he resigned. This book is primarily his account of Egypt's diplomacy during this momentous period that set the stage for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Kamel's personal relationship with Sadat went back to their days in prison together when, as young nationalists, they agitated against the British. This bond was enough to bring

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the two men together in the difficult days of 1978, but it was not enough for Kamel to win Sadat's full confidence.

What Kamel has done remarkably well is to tell the detailed story of what he and the Egyptian foreign ministry were trying to do in negotiations with the Americans and the Israelis. Kamel provides a wealth of information, including the texts of highly sensitive documents. Rarely has a book given so much insight into the thinking and functioning of the foreign ministry of a Third-World Country. (Two of Kamel's predecessors, Mahmoud Riad and Ismail Fahmy, have also written similar accounts of their tenures, but Kamel's is the most instructive.) The picture that emerges from his account is one of a highly sophisticated bureaucracy trying to conduct foreign policy in a regime where the president had almost pharaoh-like powers.

Kamel is least sure-footed when it comes to trying to read Sadat's mind. He is particularly at a disadvantage because Sadat did not always keep him informed of his contacts with the Americans and the Israelis. Still, Kamel has the courage to state his own convictions and to recount what he would have had Sadat do. This is not the work of a theoretically inclined analyst. It is, instead, an honest account by a participant in a complex diplomatic negotiation. Fortunately, the book is loaded with primary source material, and, as far as I could check, it is essentially accurate. Some useful documents are included in the appendices.

The Arabic edition of the book has been available since 1984 and has gained a substantial readership. Kamel's hostility to the Camp David Accords, and his reservations about Sadat, are widely shared by Arab intellectuals, including many Egyptians. Few Americans are aware of this point of view, and for that reason, as well as the richness of the documentation, this is a book that is important for any student of Egyptian foreign policy and of the Middle East to read. Kamel's book, along with a handful of others on Egyptian foreign policy, provides rich material for analysts to work with. A theoretically informed, comparative study of Egypt's foreign policy, is still needed, but Kamel provides a major building block.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
The Brookings Institution

The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower *by Paul Dibb. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1986. 293 pp. $26.95.*

Too frequently, analyses of Soviet foreign policy are divorced from the domestic political, economic, and technological elements of Soviet power, and instead are based exclusively on assessments of Soviet military capability. This volume by a long-time Australian intelligence analyst is a noteworthy exception. The author provides a penetrating, thoughtful, and multifaceted view of Soviet strengths and weaknesses. The picture he presents is of a USSR that is confronted with serious internal and external challenges that inevitably constrain its power, making the USSR an "incomplete superpower," perhaps even a declining power. But the author shies away from pronouncing the collapse of the Soviet empire; rather

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he predicts a long-time muddling through that, although inadequate to solve the core problems confronting the system, will enable it to adjust and endure for the foreseeable future.

Chief among the internal security concerns of the Soviet Union, according to Dibb, are the potentially destabilizing influence of nationalism among the Russian ethnic groups of the USSR, the increasing restiveness among populations in East Europe, and the continued consolidation of Soviet security in Siberia and the Far East. On the latter point, the author's expertise is especially welcome. He notes that Siberia represents both a strategic asset and a strategic liability for the USSR. Siberian development will require the diversion of large amounts of investment capital and populations, which is likely to exacerbate the USSR's already troublesome relations with China and Japan.

While the domestic economic problems confronting the Gorbachev leadership are serious, Dibb does not foresee the erosion of the credibility of the system. Public confidence in the regime would be threatened, he notes, only if the standard of living should fall. Faced with lagging growth, labor shortages, and a widening technological gap in comparison to many western states, the Soviet leadership has been forced to reassess its economic priorities. In particular, the author notes that the Soviets have in recent years cut back on defense spending in order to provide for some improvement in consumption.

In his analysis of the Soviet Union's international environment, Dibb portrays the USSR as equally beset by problems. After presenting detailed and penetrating analyses of Soviet relations with its major adversaries—the United States, western Europe, China, and Japan—he concludes that the overreliance of the USSR on military instruments of power has merely heightened concerns about the Soviet Union's aggressive designs. The reasons for the USSR's overreliance on military power are complex. In addition to the often-cited history of foreign invasion, the author examines Soviet perceptions of their own vulnerabilities. Although the USSR has achieved a phenomenal military build-up in the four decades since World War II, it is not without significant weaknesses; and Dibb argues that we must be sensitive to them. Furthermore, he cautions us to avoid inferring Soviet intentions from their capabilities. Rather than causing the USSR to behave in a reckless manner, he concludes that these vulnerabilities are likely to temper and constrain Soviet international behavior.

This is an important, balanced, and nuanced assessment of Soviet power. It is meticulously researched and thoroughly documented, using both Soviet sources and the leading western scholarly studies. Given the stakes of international tensions today and the often alarmist rhetoric used to portray the USSR and its global aspirations, it is refreshing to read a detailed scholarly assessment of Soviet vulnerabilities and strengths.

GORDON B. SMITH
University of South Carolina

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Triumph of Democracy in Spain *by Paul Preston. New York, Methuen, 1986. 274 pp. $32.00.*

Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System *by Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986. 516 pp. $42.00.*

As excellent examples of scholarly research, these books are both concerned with the recent transition to democracy in Spain. The first describes the events of the political transformation itself. Preston begins his study in 1969, in his view the beginning of the end of the Franco regime, and concludes in 1982 with the Socialist election victory and the peaceful exchange of power. The second, as the subtitle suggests, focuses on the unfolding of the new democracy's party system. The authors of both clearly establish their research goals and carry them out successfully. These two books are, therefore, valuable additions to the growing literature on the political transition in Spain.

Despite many similarities, these books reflect the study of Spain's transition to democracy from different perspectives. *Triumph of Democracy* is a product of the historical method: Preston recounts events through chronological description. He relies primarily on newspaper accounts, documents, other printed material, and personal observation. Preston's use of this approach produces a work rich in detail. *Spain After Franco*, on the other hand, clearly reflects the social science orientation of its authors. Gunther, Sani, and Shabad analyze the Spanish party system around the time of the 1979 general election, the second after Franco's death, through a reliance on systematic elite interview and scientific mass level survey data. Their research methodology makes this work useful not only to those interested in the development of the Spanish party system but also to students of comparative West European voting behavior and party dynamics. Thus, given their methodological differences, both of these books follow research techniques characteristic of their respective disciplines.

Preston's book is the best historical account of the transition to date. It moves rapidly yet smoothly from one political institution, actor, or group to another—such as the Church, labor unions, business, regional nationalists committed to terrorism, the monarchy, and political parties—weaving discussion of them into a tight analysis of affairs before and during the transition. Preston's description goes well beyond a cursory treatment of the transition and should satisfy most readers, regardless of specific interest. As an example, Preston appropriately addresses the economics underlying the political change—even during the Franco regime. This point is not, however, emphasized at the expense of others. Similar to social, political, and religious factors, economics was one of several pillars that collapsed under the Franco regime. Preston, like Gunther, Sani, and Shabad, also strongly emphasizes the dominant role political elites occupied in determining the path the transition took. His use of the myriad names of individuals, political groupings, parties, and organizations is informatively and clearly presented. Preston's use of both the formal and the vernacular terms for many of these adds color to this historical account. And, not to go unmentioned, the book is extremely readable.

Spain After Franco goes beyond *Triumph of Democracy* by also providing indepth ex-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

planation of party dynamics during the transition. Gunther, Sani, and Shabad's discussions of the developments within each major party and ideological subgroup, both at the national and the micronational level, provide a quality of description similar to that found in Preston's work. Their relating of the recent history of the Spanish party system and of developments within individual parties during the 1977-1979 period provides essential background. The book's greatest strength, nonetheless, emerges from the fact that the authors ground their explanations on several types of data. While methodologically sensitive, they combine interview and survey data in order to address who was responsible for the party system's direction. Their use of extensive interviews about elite-level behavior and indicators of individual partisan support and the reasons underlying it provides a full testing of the questions they raise. Gunther, Sani, and Shabad's belief that individual party leaders, governmental officials, and other elites were most influential in this development provides explanation that is on solid empirical ground.

While reading these books, one finds oneself raising a questioning eyebrow only occasionally. For example, Preston's chronological description, with its retrospective analysis, moves toward a historical conclusion already known. One wonders, if certain events had turned out differently, whether some analytical comments would have been included. To its credit, *Spain After Franco* avoids this with a different mode of analysis, one not tied to the historical outcome itself. This book, unlike Preston's, could have been written in a similar fashion regardless of the success of Spain's transition to democracy—it would just have had to refocus on why the party system was stifled in its development. But, some of Gunther, Sani, and Shabad's analysis falls short of Preston's, given a lack of questioning of drawing conclusions about dynamic change in the party system's development with time-specific evidence, particularly their survey data. Furthermore, while rich in its analysis of these data, more multivariate analysis would have given greater precision to our understanding of individual attitudes of party matters. The three authors of *Spain After Franco* also seem to have produced an uneven quality of prose and left room for improvement in the book's overall organization.

Such minor comments should not, however, discourage serious consideration of these books by anyone interested in better understanding Spain's transition to democracy. Both would be very useful to advanced students and scholars interested in recent political affairs in this Iberian country. In choosing between these books, given the overlap in many of the events they analyze, a person might remember that one is an excellent work of an historian, the other its equal as the product of a group of scholars seriously concerned with more social science based insights into the nature of the Spanish party system.

THOMAS D. LANCASTER
Emory University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What's Happening to India? Punjab, Ethnic Conflict, Mrs Gandhi's Death and the Test for Federalism *by Robin Jeffrey. New York, Holmes & Meier, 1986. 249 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $17.50.*

Serious students of developing societies have long abandoned the notion that forces of modernization will necessarily bring about political development. However, even hard-nosed observers of the Third World would be somewhat bewildered by the role of modernization in the growth of militancy among Sikhs—a religious sect founded in the sixteenth century—that has led to one of the most serious challenges to the Indian political system. Robin Jeffrey, an Australian political scientist, tells this story persuasively and lucidly.

The Sikhs live in India's most prosperous state of Punjab, a prosperity that is partly related to the success of the green revolution since the 1960s. Punjab's estimated gross domestic product of about $250 per person is the highest in India. The income of the average Punjabi and his life expectancy is significantly better than that of the average Indian. Among the benefits of the green revolution that have now played a part in the growth of Sikh militancy are better roads, an educational explosion, spread of newspapers and magazines, diffusion of consumer goods like motor cycles, radio, and television.

The question of Sikh identity that animates the current upsurge has both traditional and modern roots. The "intertwining of the Sikh religion with the 'ideal of sovereignty' " goes back to the eighteenth century (p. 51). Yet the contemporary "need of many people to feel that they are retaining their religious traditions even in times of unsettling change" (p 131) is an important factor in Sikh politics today. Exposure to international events such as the mix of religion and politics in Iran as well as to the methods of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) have contributed significantly to the course of events. However, the Sikh upsurge has its basis primarily in Punjab's factional struggles, "time-honoured, long deadly, yet held in check by the narrow horizons of peasant life" (p. 147). But this time the game of factional struggles has gone out of control. Among the reasons are forces of democratization, the erosion of the influence of factional leaders over their followers, and the meteoric rise of the late Jarnail Singh Bhindrenwale—the Khomeini of the Sikh upsurge, who communicated with his supporters directly by combining the roles of "eighteenth-century princeling and twentieth-century media star" (p. 168).

The book is not an indictment of modernity. Modernity has not introduced violence to a peaceful pastoral land. Like factionalism, violence has always been a part of life in rural Punjab. However, modernity has given new life to violence and factionalism. For instance, expanded communications that "bombard Punjabis with information" have stripped away "the personalized, face to face qualities that previously kept violence within manageable bounds" and have brought in a world where enemies—whether members of rival factions or ethnic groups—are treated as "abstractions" (p. 97). In the era of modern communications in Punjab "devices" of factional struggles "ranging from murder to raising the ideological bets (for example, 'I am a "better" Sikh than you')—have far greater ramifications" (p. 124).

Jeffrey does not argue that ethnic turmoil is the inevitable consequence of moderniza-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion. His is a "cautionary tale" (p. 18). While forces of modernization may be conducive to ethnic mobilization, it is political decisions that make the difference between ethnic accommodation and ethnic strife. The centralized decision making under Indira Gandhi, when considerations of narrow political gains dominated over political wisdom, led to the tragic turn of events in Punjab. Jeffrey, therefore, ends with a somewhat optimistic note. He hopes that Indian politicians would learn from past mistakes; that they would see the dangers of centralization and would seek to strengthen Indian federalism, which could accommodate regional political leaders and new forms of ethnic assertion.

There are places where Jeffrey's explanations of complex phenomena are not sufficiently nuanced. Thus his explanation of increased political centralization, which emphasizes Indira Gandhi's personality traits attributed to her insecure childhood, is unconvincing. At times his chatty style can be irritating: his comment on the sophisticated English of a Sikh speaker at a New Delhi meeting, "no Peter Sellers caricature, this man" (p. 47). Despite these minor criticisms, this is an excellent book from which both the expert and the novice can learn about the dynamics of contemporary Indian politics and of the turmoil in Punjab.

SANJIB BARUAH
Bard College

The United States and Germany: A Vital Partnership *by Arthur F. Burns. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1986. 51 pp. $10.*

The choice of United States ambassadors abroad has not always been felicitous, reflecting the political patronage nature of the most coveted posts. In the instance, however, of the appointment of Arthur F. Burns to the post in Bonn in 1981, the choice was appropriate and wise. The former Columbia University professor (1941–1969) and chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1970–1978), who then served as ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany for four years, had the confidence of Helmut Schmidt, the Social Democratic chancellor who resigned from office in late 1982, and of Helmut Kohl, the Christian Democratic Union chancellor, who succeeded Schmidt. As a consequence, relations between the two countries remained fraternal despite some notable policy differences.

In February 1986, Burns delivered three Elihu Root lectures, reprinted in this slim volume. In a short preface, Schmidt pays tribute to Burns, the son of a Jewish family from Austria-Hungary, who is above aversion or hatred and who "pleads for mutual understanding, not forgetting." The ambassador, presently Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the American Enterprise Institute, devotes his first lecture to "What I Learned in Germany." In his post in the Federal Republic, he attempted to clear away the faulty perceptions, emotional underbrush, and distorted views held by public officials and citizens of both countries. In conversations with numerous Germans, he realized that they viewed East-West relations from a different perspective than many Americans.

Burns argues that if the United States and the West European governments, the Federal Republic included, were to increase consultations and improve communication, then policy differences, such as the Eurpoean project to finance the construction of a pipeline from Siberia to carry natural gas to western Europe, would not have arisen. He admits that Presi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dent Ronald Reagan's decision to visit the Bitburg cemetery in 1985 was ill-conceived but contends that the relations between the United States and the Federal Republic would have been seriously damaged if the visit had been canceled.

In the second lecture, "The Economic Sluggishness of Western Europe," the ambassador becomes an eloquent spokesman for the adminstration's free enterprise philosophy. He maintains that much of the blame for weak economies must be put on the welfare systems that have been carried to "excessive lengths" and have had a negative effect on work discipline and the incentives, on trade unions that have sharply driven up wages without commensurate productivity gains, on excessive government regulations, and on the inefficiency of nationalized industries. This reviewer cannot concur with these conservative views, but space restrictions preclude a rebuttal. Suffice it to say that the ambassador paints the American economy and its spirit of risk taking and entrepreneurship in glowing terms, glossing over the many economic problems, while failing to deal with the many benefits of European welfare systems that prevent millions of people from slipping under the poverty line—unlike the United States.

In the third lecture, "The Future of German-American Relations," Burns sums up past irritations and differences as well as sources of future tensions. He acknowledges that West Germans were becoming more assertive in pursuing their own national interests, differed in their approaches to relations with the Soviet Union, were becoming less confident in American leadership in the West (surely even less confident since the Aministration's Iran-Nicaraguan scandals), and feared involvement in a United States-Soviet Union confrontation. Moreover, Germans were critical of the sudden shifts in American policy based on domestic politics and congressional involvement. The author pleads for closer West European cooperation leading eventually to a European Political Union in order to enhance a common defense and allow a gradual withdrawal of United States military forces. Given the strong nationalist sentiments in Europe, he is not sanguine about its creation. He concludes that because of West Germany's importance to the United States, tensions between them must be minimized. Among his recommendations are the symbolic stationing of one or more German military brigades on American soil, increasing the confidence of Germans in American commitments to "human freedom and world peace," and enhancing mutual understanding through greater educational efforts and exchanges of groups of citizens. Although readers critical of present American foreign and domestic policies will disagree with many views of Ambassador Burns, the book provides a valuable insight into the *Weltanschauung* of an eminent statesman.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL
University of Massachusetts at Amherst

The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization *by James Edward Miller. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1986. 356 pp. $32.50.*

This lucidly written volume focuses on the evolution of American policy toward Italy during the 1940s. It tells the story of how that country, a political adversary and then military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enemy of the United States at the beginning of the period, emerged a decade later as the linchpin of the American security system in Europe. In the process, however, much of the democratic idealism that marked Washington's attitude toward Italy at the outset of the decade – so characteristic of Franklin D. Roosevelt's visceral neo-Wilsonianism and liberal internationalism in general – was jettisoned under Harry Truman and his advisers in favor of an avowedly more pragmatic, security-conscious, and hardline anti-Communist policy orientation. Thus, the author persuasively argues that Italy served as the decisive battleground for a post-World War II revolution in American foreign policy the consequences of which, under the necessitous banner of cold war confrontation with the Soviet Union, conditioned American life for many years to come: irreversible commitment to massive political, military, and economic intervention in the affairs of other countries on a global scale; the domestic political traumas associated with McCarthyism; and the origins of the fateful domino theory that would wreak such havoc a generation later.

The consequences of this watershed in American foreign policy were no less momentous for Italians. Washington's original intention had been to treat Italy as a test case for a larger diplomatic initiative whose primary goal was the creation of a stable world order based on the establishment of democratic states joined to some form of mixed-economy capitalism through, with a nod to Woodrow Wilson, the agency of national self-determination. Crucial to the success of such an undertaking, and here the experience of the New Deal was telling, was the flooding of domestic markets with cheap consumer goods in order to blunt the appeal of local Communist parties and facilitate the emergence of stable democratic systems. But the exigencies of cold war politics intervened and the means-end equation of American foreign policy became reversed. Rather than seeing Italian democracy as a worthy end in itself that might produce stability through social reform, Washington policy makers now sought immediate stabilization in Italy by means of a jerry-built and hastily imposed democratic regime. This they considered the only way to achieve the urgent objective of containing the Italian left whose political victory they otherwise feared would end in the Sovietization of the entire Mediterranean region. So it happened that the only genuinely mass-based democratic forces in the country, gathered in the Italian Communist and Socialist parties and so strongly identified with the domestic struggle against fascism, were defeated while the prospect of fundamental structural reforms evaporated. Instead, victory went to conservative and reactionary elites who, once the mainstays of Mussolini's fallen regime, now prudently reclothed themselves in the politically and ideologically more appealing garb of Christian Democracy.

Undeniably, this outcome constituted an enormous diplomatic victory of the United States over the Soviet Union. But the darker side is that from the beginning the postwar Italian republic seemed in the minds of many ordinary citizens a foreign imposition that illegitimately confined state political power in Rome to narrowly based and long-entrenched elite strata hardly noted for their democratic susceptibilities or beliefs. Likewise, they saw in this outcome the disappointing failure of the reformist impulse of the antifascist resistance as well as the devaluing of the civic idealism it bred. Is it any wonder, then, that the American-sponsored stabilization of Italy about which Washington officials began to boast at the end of the 1940s generated so much political cynicism among Italians? Or that so many

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of them in recent years have greeted the destabilizing tactics of Red Brigade terrorists with such widespread, if passive, sympathy?

JACK E. REECE
University of Pennsylvania

Human Rights In East Asia: A Cultural Perspective *edited by James C. Hsiung. New York, Paragon House, 1985. 165 pp. $10.95.*

The China chapter by Richard W. Wilson in this book begins with a suitably critical paragraph recounting the two-year imprisonment of dissident Chinese artist Li Shuang. From the lengthy Taiwan chapter by Hung-chao Tai one would never know that the authorities there have routinely imprisoned their critics, and sometimes tortured and murdered them. If partisan bias were this book's only problem, it at least might be useful regarding the Communist countries. Indeed, the chapter about human rights in North Korea by Manwoo Lee is quite good if one allows for the paucity of specific information available on the subject. Unfortunately, there are other problems.

When given an opportunity to choose their leaders in free elections, East Asians have invariably selected staunch democrats. These writers would have us ignore this unmentioned fact and judge the regions' allegedly homogeneous political culture by the statements of propagandists for the ruling elites. Thus, from a quotation in the English-language propaganda organ *Beijing Review* Wilson concludes that "the Chinese" favor authoritarianism over individualism. Presumably, if 50,000 Shanghai students demonstrate for democracy, as they did after the publication of this book, that fact has nothing to tell us about Chinese political culture. (Incidentally, *Beijing Review* is the only contemporary Chinese source that Wilson cites; otherwise he relies heavily on the *New York Times*. He appears unfamiliar with the academic literature on the subject.)

The theme of the book seems to be that East Asians (including the Japanese) are more interested than are westerners in group rights and positive rights. It does not seem to occur to these writers that environmental laws and real-estate zoning (where private interest is sacrificed for the public good) are much more highly developed in the West than in the East. Conversely, selfish "negative" rights, such as the rights of freedom of information and freedom of expression, are only of much concern to western human rights "purists." There is no understanding by these writers that the main constitutional argument for free expression is that it improves the quality of government—that is, increases the likelihood that officials will serve the public good rather than their own private interests.

We are told that whereas westerners hanker after civil liberties, East Asians understand that welfare rights are more important. Reading Hsiung, one would think that the Four Freedoms (freedom from want, etc.) were the idea of some Chinese sage; Franklin Roosevelt is not mentioned. The authors are oblivious to the fact that welfare rights are far more advanced in the West than in East Asia. There is an appalling lack of knowledge of any western country other than the United States, and the "United States" often seems to mean

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Harlem. Over and over again these writers – particularly James Hsiung in his introduction – manage to get things backwards. It is stressed that East Asians favor consensus, while confrontation is the way of the West. Actually, it is democracy that requires a broad consensus, which probably does not exist in dictatorships except in the minds of misled outsiders. There is no spontaneous desire for democracy, we are told; China's so-called Democracy Wall (about which the book contains many factual errors) was briefly "installed by the regime" out of ulterior motives. Hsiung is even more unhistorical in describing the efforts of the Taiwanese to achieve democracy. His description of the important Kaoshiung Incident of 1979 is a caricature of reality.

There are, of course, genuine cultural differences between East and West. And yet, the absurdities of this volume drive home the point to any thoughtful reader that the twain occasionally does meet. Human rights are human rights; the authors do not make a persuasive case that there are disparate western and East Asian concepts. One is simply not convinced that it is more legitimate for East Asian rulers to persecute their critics than it is for despots elsewhere to do so.

JAMES D. SEYMOUR
Columbia University

Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out *by Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky. New York, Praeger, 1986. 118 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $9.95.*

For those who may have forgotten that Canada has an armed forces, this slim volume (published in conjunction with Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies) provides a useful update. Jockel and Sokolsky have written extensively about Canadian defense policy, and the current volume represents a significant expansion of their earlier article in *The Washington Quarterly* (Fall, 1984).

Jockel and Sokolsky correctly point out that Canada is taking what amounts to a "free ride" on the backs of the United States and western Europe. They document the sorry state of Canada's military effort: a navy so obsolete that only four destroyers are considered battle-worthy; an air arm with but 138 modern fighter aircraft; and a total military strength of 83,000. Canada's entire defense establishment could be seated in the Rose Bowl, and there would still be 20,000 vacant seats.

The blame for Canada's military decay rests with the Liberal governments of Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau. Strapped for funds to support burgeoning social programs, Pearson and Trudeau looted military budgets. During one five-year period, defense spending in Canada plunged 45 percent. Today, Canada devotes 2.1 per cent of its gross national product to defense: the smallest contribution of any NATO power save tiny Luxembourg.

The authors detail the not always successful efforts of the Mulroney government to rectify these deficiencies. The rhetoric in Ottawa has changed, but accomplishment remains painfully short. Canada's military commitments continue to outdistance her capacity to meet those commitments: double tasking, phantom reservists, and unrealistic deployment schedules cast a "let's pretend" quality to Canadian defense.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unfortunately, the authors appear unwilling to examine the fiasco of military unification Canadian-style, or to look closely at the gross overranking of Canada's armed forces. Twenty-nine percent of the Canadian armed forces are officers (versus 14 percent in the United States, and 6 percent in West Germany). These are the failings of academic writers not fully grounded in the realities of military service, but they do not constitute a fatal flaw.

The focus of the authors' effort involves Canada's NATO responsibilities. They are at pains to point out the illogical (and probably unfeasible) assignment of airlifting a dispersed brigade – with all of its equipment – from Canada to Norway in time of crisis, while maintaining another brigade in Germany. The most controversial aspect of the book will be Jockel's and Sokolsky's recommendation that Canada withdraw from Germany and concentrate on the Northern Front. Canadians, after all, enjoy cold weather. This is a good book, and the subject is worthy of greater attention than it has been given. The authors' willingness to take positions is a decided plus.

JEAN EDWARD SMITH
University of Toronto

Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority *by Lucian W. Pye with Mary W. Pye. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985. 414 pp. $25.00.*

Who but Lucian Pye would be bold enough to undertake this ambitious and controversial study of comparative political cultures in ten Asian polities? He seeks to illuminate "images of power" and "orientations toward authority" typical of the Confucian polities of China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, of the syncretistic polities of Southeast Asia, of Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan.

Five questions run through his discussion of each polity. What are the distinguishing characteristics of the "subjective realm" of political life? What child rearing and typical family practices best explain these attitudes toward authority in the different polities? How do images of power in one compare with those in the others? What subjectively difficult choices do contradictory images of authority impose on leaders and followers in each? How do these characteristics affect the way a polity defines and implements policies for rapid economic and political development?

Drawing insights from personal observations made throughout a long career, from historical readings, Asian political philosophy, western social science and psychiatric literature, material on family life, etc., he sketches broad-brushed profiles of the subjective realm of politics, where "images of authority," "appropriate roles" for leaders and followers, and "propensities" for individual political behavior are shaped and gain their inward authority in each polity.

Although political culture remains the most elusive area of comparative politics, this reviewer has little doubt that unspoken assumptions about the obligations and rights of those in authority and the subjective dimensions of leader-follower relationships are important for understanding much that happens in political life. These are particularly difficult dimensions of Asian politics for westerners to understand.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One need not accept Pye's assumption that these images of authority gain their authority mainly from how mothers and fathers raise their children to find this study fascinating, if at times culturally arrogant. There are many intriguing generalizations. While some are farfetched, many of them ring true. He argues that, as distinct from westerners, who are raised to be independent, Asians generally idealize benevolent, paternalistic leadership that legitimizes dependency. By being loyal followers and accommodating to the consensus of the group at any one time, followers will be cared for.

Varieties of paternalistic authority can be seen in diverse patterns of patron-client dependency. Those in China have a good deal more affect attached to them than the more open and expediential dependencies typical in the Philippines, or the utilitarian patron-client relations so dramatically demonstrated in Indian patronage politics. "Bapakism" in Indonesia is yet another type. Contradictory requirements put individuals in painful binds, as in Korea, where people are called upon to be both deferential to authority and to demonstrate they are not to be pushed around.

Pye uses ambiguous Freudianisms more frequently to characterize Indian personality and political culture than when discussing the other political cultures. This may be because Morris Carstairs, Eric Erikson, and Ashis Nandy, among others, have developed a provocative literature on "the Hindu personality," which does often seem different from what westerners are used to. To this reviewer, however, it also suggests that Pye may be less sure in his knowledge of the historical or institutional structures within which Indian politicians have to function than he is with the other polities he deals with so boldly.

Nevertheless, even though in a number of instances he may underplay the role of historical experience and the influence of political structures and processes, this ambitious book deserves attention. Country specialists deeply knowledgeable in their own special area can help us understand which of Pye's generalizations reflect the reality they know and which are speculative hypotheses intended to provoke curiosity and turn our minds to areas of politics usually ignored, precisely because they are so hard to pin down. Pye's bibliography is extensive and admirably varied.

W. HOWARD WRIGGINS
Columbia University

Third World Ideology and Western Reality *by Carlos Rangel. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1986. 180 pp. $19.95.*

The tone and substance of this book is revealed in the introduction by Jean-Francois Revel. Discussing Soviet policy toward the Third World he writes: "The Soviets use the Third World for its ends in the same way that, formerly, cruel adults mutilated small children to use them as beggars" (p. xiii). Strident, unsubstantiated polemics uncomplicated by the presence of any data, systematic historical data, or consideration of any major political process that doesn't fit into the demonological imagery is frequently evoked.

The essay by Rangel purports to demystify what it calls "third world ideology," a label applied to an enormous variety of political economists and development writers from the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brandt Commission to the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America, who have criticized the international division of labor and its impact on Third World development. For Rangel and Revel, this is the original sin: the crises of underdevelopment have always been internal and have to do with "attitudes and institutions" that preceded the West (p. 144). Whatever influence the West has had on the Third World has been beneficent. The book proceeds through nine chapters of unrestrained polemics to argue that fascism is a kind of socialism, that capitalism is "incomparably more productive and creative" than socialism, that Third World ideology is a tool of the Evil Empire or local Third World tyrants or both, that the West has developed the Third World often against its own tyrants, that Third Worldist ideology has prevented further growth.

The methodology is the flamboyant self-evident assertion, "Meanwhile it has been demonstrated . . ." but no systematic or even illustrative data is ever presented. More seriously, Rangel systematically distorts the writers, who he dubs "Third World ideologues," by ascribing to them the view that the West is the sole cause of underdevelopment. Neither Franz Fanon, Emmanuel Arghiri, Paul Baran, Fernando Cardoso, or any of the major writers who have written on the problems of dependency have failed to analyze and critique internal actors as well as external relations. Rangel invents an ideology, imputes it to his adversaries, and proceeds to demolish it. In the process he amalgamates a variety of theoretical and political perspectives, subsuming Michael Manley, Mao Zedong, Willy Brandt with Soviet foreign policy makers under the same label. Rangel selectively and arbitrarily quotes from some of Karl Marx's *New York Herald Tribune* articles on India to justify his own view of the beneficent effects of western imperialism and omits Marx's later, more critical writing on Ireland. Likewise, Rangel pulls a quote from Gunnar Myrdal's study of Asian underdevelopment in which Myrdal examines the negative impact of traditional institutions on Third World development to buttress his brief, omitting the larger and more significant issues that Myrdal raised concerning the way in which western capital and traditional institutions interacted to produce poverty in Asia.

Four hundred years of colonial conquest and occupation, colonial wars in which the western powers destroyed millions in Algeria, Indochina, Korea, China, and the Belgian Congo (not to mention the millions of Africans seized in the slave trade) are discussed in three pages, "Colonialism: A Bad Business." The absence of empirical or historical analysis of the impact of the West on the Third World is papered over by a wide-ranging psychologizing. The real source for "blaming the West" for the underdevelopment of the Third World is "guilt" in the West and power lust in the Third World. Pseudo-psychologizing serves as an ad hominem device to avoid any serious examination of North-South relations and as a means of attacking the political forces engaged in reforming those relations.

What emerges from this essay is less a discussion of Third World myths and western realities than a paranoid vision of a civilized West beseiged by hordes of barbarians, who justify the West's pursuit of its interests by force. "The countries of capitalist civilization are being confronted and virtually besieged by a still imperfect but already operational coalition between the socialist empire and the Third World, and the besiegers have within the threatened citadel an active, numerous, impune and even prestigious and influential "fifth column" (p. 170). In the real world of U.S. financing of contras against a besieged Sandinista regime, of western banks drawing down one billion dollar debt payments above

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

any new financial transfers, it is clear that Rangel has turned executioners into victims and vice versa. The value of this study is not in what it tells us about the West or the Third World—of which it is short in substance and long in bombast. This is the imagery and ideology of the neoconservative right: a world of virtuous and civil capitalist nations who must not fear to use their power to destroy their enemies. Western civilization must be saved by the conscious elite, countering cowardly businesspeople and opportunistic (or worse) democratic politicians who trade and sign treaties with the enemy. The strident style and paranoid vision thus fuel a highly voluntaristic extremism, which harnesses the rhetoric of democratic pluralism to the politics of unremitting international confrontation.

JAMES PETRAS
State University of New York at Binghamton

Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Defender of Liberty and Law *by Donald L. Smith. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1986. 355 pp. $25.00.*

Zechariah Chafee, Jr. must have been one of the few Harvard professors in the long and distinguished history of that great institution to have been put on trial, in effect, by his university for the public expression of his ideas. The ideas were critical of the construction and use of the Espionage Act of 1917 by the Department of Justice and by the Supreme Court of the United States during World War I. They were published in the *Harvard Law Review*, and included words saying that "we have censored and punished speech which was very far from direct and dangerous interference with the conduct of the war," and that the "chief responsibility for this must rest, not upon Congress. . . , but upon the officials of the Department of Justice and the Post-office, who turned that statute into a drag-net for pacifists, and upon judges who upheld and approved this distortion of law" (p. 37). After a hearing before the Standing Committee to Visit the Law School, Chafee was cleared, so to speak, after agreeing with President A. Lawrence Lowell to the publication in the *Review* of some material about the matter, including eight "corrections and statements" by Chafee about his piece. At the end of the proceeding, Chafee said: "Gentlemen, I had no sympathy with the political and economic doctrines of these prisoners. I can hardly imagine any persons with whom I should get along worse than with Abrams and his associates. My sympathies and all my associations are with the men who save, who manage and produce. But I want my side to fight fair. And I regard this Abrams trial as a distinctly unfair piece of fighting, that I determined to record accurately and permanently" (p. 54).

Donald L. Smith has faithfully, intelligently, and sympathetically recorded the intellectual and, to a much lesser degree, the personal life of this extraordinary man, who intended to achieve his distinguished academic career through scholarship in commercial law, equity, and legal process, but in fact both began and ended it (in many attacks on the American treatment of Communists and persons thought sympathetic to Communists during the cold war) as an unyielding patrician champion of the freedoms of radicals whose political beliefs he neither endorsed nor understood. His published contributions to the intellectual life of the First Amendment are thoroughly and perceptively detailed, as is his well-known

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

influence (through private as well as public communication) to the development of the ideas of Learned Hand and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and through Justice Holmes, I suppose, as well as directly, of those of Justice Louis Brandeis expressed in his monumental opinion in *Whitney v. California*, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927).

Donald Smith deserves great credit for an excellent first intellectual biography of a man whose adult life and major work corresponds to and is greatly responsible for the period of the full development of the First Amendment doctrine in American constitutional law. The book is not, however, only for First Amendment buffs. It is rich in material as well about the kind of life law professors led, at least at Harvard, in the years between 1920 and 1955; about the educational system and (perhaps deserved) arrogance of the Harvard Law School; about Chafee's short career as lobbyist for a federal interpleader remedy; and about his determined service on the Hutchins Committee on freedom and responsibilities of the press, on the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association, and on the UN Commission on Human Rights. I found all of this interesting, some of it very much so, and well worth reading not only by lawyers, but also by everyone interested in twentieth-century American political thought about freedom and law.

BURKE MARSHALL
Yale Law School

"Government From Reflection and Choice": Constitutional Essays on War, Foreign Relations, and Federalism *by Charles A. Lofgren. New York, Oxford University Press, 1986. 235 pp. $29.95.*

Discovering the original intention of constitutional provisions may have lost some standing as a valid intellectual enterprise by reason of Attorney General Edwin Meese's clumsy forays. Philip Bobbitt has demonstrated in *Constitutional Fate* how historical and textual arguments must compete with doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical arguments. Perhaps the most elaborate enterprise in original intention of all times – W. W. Crosskey's two-volume research on the commerce clause – failed to convince most constitutional scholars. Original intention may be regarded in the same way that Justice Felix Frankfurter appraised social science evidence: "I do not mean that I disrespect it. I simply know its character."

But original intention will survive Meese. In this volume a very competent constitutional historian, Charles Lofgren, collects six of his essays. Originally published as journal articles during the decade of the 1970s, they were generally responsive to the military and foreign policy issues of that troubled era – the war-making power, compulsory military service, the treaty power, and foreign relations.

A major essay on the origins of the Tenth Amendment is particularly significant, because in it Lofgren articulates his reasons for seeking original understandings. Whether the decision in *National League of Cities v. Usery* (1976) properly interpreted the Tenth Amendment has only a secondary interest for him. As a historian, not a lawyer, "the issues are primarily interesting because they are there" (73). Controversies with deep historical roots appear in a modern setting. They offer puzzles about people who evidently thought

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they were up to important things. And so Lofgren feels no obligation "to produce *an* answer to the question of what the Tenth Amendment originally meant" (73). Reconstruction of constitutional origins will never resolve all ambiguities. What is possible, and what the author hoped to achieve, was an understanding of how those Americans principally involved in 1789–1791 "likely understood the Amendment."

Another major essay deals with warmaking under the Constitution. Corwin dismissed these arrangements as an invitation to struggle. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison believed that the allocation of power was much clearer, but disagreed as to which branch was the recipient. Lofgren finds the Convention debates of little help, and relies more on the ratification debates and the "trends of the times" in the theory and practice of war and reprisal. He concludes that Congress was intended to have "nearly complete authority over the commencement of war" (p. 36). But over two centuries "the presidential role in war-making has . . . become dominant" (p. 38). This essay was written in 1972. One year later he would have had to make allowance for the War Powers Act and other congressional initiatives.

Two of the best known decisions in the field of foreign relations—*Missouri v. Holland* (1920) and *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* (1936)—are reassessed and placed in historical perspective. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's opinion in the former case created such a bogy of possible unlimited federal authority through the treaty power that thirty-three years later Senator John W. Bricker was still tilting against that windmill. *Missouri v. Holland* served the immediate goal of protecting migratory birds, but it is no longer relevant to the issue of congressional power. As for *Curtiss-Wright*, the author concludes that "if good history is a requisite to good constitutional law, then *Curtiss-Wright* ought to be relegated to history" (p. 205).

The volume concludes with an inconclusive essay on "Mr. Truman's War." Lofgren finds general agreement that the president can act, without Congress, to counter immediate threats to American security. But whether such a threat exists in a crisis situation "takes one beyond the province of constitutional law" (p. 225).

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
University of California, Santa Barbara

The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions *edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman. New York, Oxford University Press, 1986. 423 pp. $39.95.*

Susan Rose-Ackerman has edited a complex volume of economic analysis related to the nonprofit sector. The volume is one of a series emanating from Yale University's Program on Nonprofit Organizations. Rose-Ackerman divides the book into two parts, one focused on economic rationales for the nonprofit form of organization and the other on economic analysis as a tool for considering policy issues related to the status and operation of nonprofits. Within this framework, the book's twenty-one essays cover a broad range of topics from discussion of whether donations to nonprofits reduce or increase donors' welfare,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to analysis of the impact of the 1981 Tax Act on individual charitable giving, to the problem of regulating excessive fundraising. Some of the most able and recognized authorities on the nonprofit field, such as Charles Clotfelter and Lester Salamon, have contributed articles to the volume.

If there is a problem with the book, it is the result of binding together essays written for two very different audiences. The preface indicates the book is intended for faculty members building courses or introducing themselves to a new field for scholarly pursuit and to observers or managers of nonprofits who want to reflect on the field. My guess is that the latter audience will find less here than will their more academic colleagues. While several of the policy-oriented articles seem to have what it takes to appeal to a lay audience, many of the others are theoretical and technical and a good number contain mathematical formulae that only a specialized audience would appreciate. I suspect that many noneconomist non-mathematically oriented managers of nonprofits would be discouraged from pressing on through these technical chapters and some may even be put off by the academic tone of a number of the articles. This is a pity, for several of them examine very interesting questions that are likely to be the subject of intense debate in the coming years. These include the Burton Weisbrod and Jeffrey Weiss articles on the benefits that individuals and the larger society derive from the favorable treatment accorded nonprofit institutions; Henry Hansmann's and Avner Ben-Ner's essays on the rationale for the nonprofit form of organization and its relation to entrepreneurial for-profit endeavors, and Dennis Young's on motivations that drive the leaders and managers of nonprofits.

On the other hand, the book serves well as an indication of how the techniques of economic analysis can be usefully applied to an understudied and misunderstood field. Given the great importance of nonprofit organizations to our society, it is astonishing to see how little thoughtful work has been done to date. The nonprofit sector consists of over one million organizations, employing 6.5 million people with annual support of over $250 billion. It provides a tremendous amount of service to the public, and it is a component in almost every discussion of public and social welfare. It is likely to be the subject of increasing public attention as responsibility for various social roles is shifted by governmental policy, and also as a result of debate over the nation's tax policy continues. If the book helps to encourage more serious economic analysts to examine the field, and if their analysis explores in nontechnical terms questions that principals in the field have high on their agendas, it will have served its purpose. But that's a big leap from where we are now.

SUSAN V. BERRESFORD
The Ford Foundation

Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media *by Michael Parenti. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986. 258 pp. $10.95.*

A long list of writers blame the American mass media for individual, institutional, and/or societal conditions that they perceive as unhealthy, unfair, and/or undemocratic. More often than not, these critiques are housed in a communicator-dominated model of mass media

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effects. Critics look at messengers as being largely responsible for the societal condition examined. Receivers of messages, it is argued, cannot be held accountable for conditions, since they lack economic and political clout, and do not transact with messengers. The mass media are powerful while the "masses" are powerless. Though this assessment of sending messages predates Gutenberg's invention of moveable type in the fifteenth century, it fails to take seriously the role of the receiver in the communication process.

Michael Parenti joins these writers with his indictment that the mass media invent reality by distorting " . . . important aspects of social and political life . . ." (p.ix). He comes to that conclusion by foregoing quantitative social science investigative techniques in favor of "[Tracing] media performance along several *basic themes*, providing representative samples of how the press treats or mistreats a subject" (p.x, emphasis added). Parenti's selection of mass media (mainly ABC, CBS, NBC, *New York Times, Washington Post*) and basic themes (*The Big Sell; Giving Labor the Business; Creating Moods Left and Right; The Media Fight the Red Menace; The Russians Are Coming, The Russians Are Coming; Soviet Terrorists, Bulgarian Pope Killers, and Other Big Lies; Doing the Third World; and Variations on a Theme for Counterrevolution*) places him in an ideological songfest, this time sung by liberals, but with different themes also sung by conservatives.

Parenti argues that the mass media sing their tunes with a choir of corporate capitalists backing them up, and that even if his presentation of the themes is one-sided it doesn't compare to the bias in the American press. He recognizes that his method of revealing mass media distortion of events could run amuck, distorting the examination of mass media intent and content.

While the reader may agree with the proposition that the mass media may distort some events by the manner in which they pay attention to them, Parenti's polemical rendition is doctrinaire and at times begs the question. That is disappointing since he writes quite well and is committed to free press in a free society.

One may quibble with his themes, but it will be difficult to refute the distortions he exposes in the examples of press treatment of certain events, especially foreign ones. Whether these are systemic, as Parenti claims, is another matter that may not make the reliability test many social scientists would insist be part of the evaluation. Readers will perceive Parenti's ideas based on their perceptions of the mass media, their perceptions of events, and in keeping with their ideologies. For ultimately, there is a transaction between the communicator and the audience, Parenti and his readers, a transaction in which the reality is "created" by *both*. Though lacking precision and a systematic approach to the study of mass communication and politics, the book will be welcomed by readers wanting a perspective on the mass media from the political left.

SIDNEY KRAUS
Cleveland State University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Averting Catastrophe: Strategies for Regulating Risky Technologies *by Joseph G. Morone and Edward J. Woodhouse. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986. 215 pp. $17.95.*

Why has the United States not had any Bhopals or Chernobyls? Even Three Mile Island, our most visible technological disaster, has not caused direct loss of life. The authors seek to explain whether we have been lucky or smart, and whether or not we are still whistling past the graveyard, just waiting for a major catastrophe to happen. Of course, anything is possible when large, sophisticated, complex, and interconnected systems are involved; but these authors claim that the United States is evolving a risk avoidance system that makes such events increasingly unlikely.

The authors analyze five case studies—toxic materials, nuclear power, recombinant DNA research, threats to the ozone layer, and the Greenhouse threat—to conclude that American risk-avoidance systems consist of five primary strategies: protection against severe risks, erring on the side of caution, advance testing, priority-setting, and learning from error. While the authors do not give wholehearted approval of the system as it now exists, they do believe it has evolved and worked remarkably effectively in preventing civilian deaths.

Underlying the particulars of strategy in the cases is a barely articulated political and philosophical viewpoint. As students of Charles Lindblom, Morone and Woodhouse are attuned to the virtues of pluralism as a theory of politics. They note with admiration the productive roles of different groups—scientists, corporations, environmentalists, regulators—in the maintenance of an open, evolving learning system. At the philosophical level, they challenge the views of thinkers such as Jacques Ellul, Lewis Mumford, and other students of the "technology out of control" school.

The book is well-written, concise, and accessible, as far as it goes. But it also misses a great deal. Like many discussions of "systems," the account is so abstract and summary that "the system" is tautological. At this level of analysis we do not get the flavor of conflict and struggle, sometimes at great personal and institutional risk, that forces the system to respond to new or unpleasant information. Different cases, such as acid rain or the air traffic control system, might add perspective. The roles of a free press, of whistleblowers, of ad hoc environmental and citizens organizations, and of professional standards might be usefully emphasized. At the philosophical level, the relationship between a democratic culture and the control of technology should be more thoroughly explored. Finally, while the authors take the United States as their model for technological sophistication and risk management, there is a great deal to be learned about how these problems are handled, often better, in western Europe and Japan.

The choice to ignore military technology may be more important than it at first appears. Granted, there have been no major civilian catastrophes resulting from accidents with these technologies; but the strategic, political, and philosophical theses are more difficult to establish here. We cannot determine whether there is a strategic catastrophe-avoidance system in place because the military arena is distinctly not "open" and, therefore, not subject to pluralist forces in the same ways or to the same degree as the other cases discussed. A growing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number of people in this society see military technology as the embodiment of what the technological critics mean by "out of control."

DUDLEY J. BURTON
Baylor University

Policymaking Under Adversity *by Yehezkel Dror. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1986. 437 pp. $39.95.*

The capacity of governments to deal effectively with pressing domestic and international policy issues is an important research question. The premise of Yehezkel Dror's book is that serious policy predicaments, or adversity, are a pervasive feature of contemporary policy making and are likely to become even more widespread in the future. The objective of Dror is to advance general theory on policy making under adversity and to propose reforms that will improve the capacity of governments to respond to adversity. Dror focuses his attention on policy making within the executive branch and top political leadership of western democracies.

Chapters One and Two introduce and develop the concept of adversity and its relevance for understanding the problems confronting policy makers in the formation of national policy. In Chapter Three a broad survey of typical responses to adversity is presented, ranging from denial and incrementalism to periodic attempts at large-scale administrative reform and state intervention. Dror concludes that policy makers have not been effective in dealing with adversity. In Chapters Four and Five Dror presents the underlying normative and theoretical framework of his study. He argues that changes in policy making can have an important impact on the chances of responding effectively to adversity, but cautions that there are numerous obstacles to such changes. He then identifies a number of broad policy principles for dealing with adversity that emphasize the need for policy makers to adopt innovative and radical policies and for the state to adopt a very active, if not compelling role in implementation. Chapters Six and Seven expand on the idea of high-quality policy making and the obstacles to achieving it. Dror draws on the research findings of cognitive psychology and organizational theory to point out the obstacles to high-quality policy making at both the individual as well as institutional level. Particular attention is given to problems such as rigidity, short-term policy perspectives, and incrementalism. The final three chapters address the question of what types of changes in policy making are necessary to deal with adversity. Dror lists a number of very general principles and strategies to guide reform and then discusses some specific proposals. Examples are the establishment of policy planning and analysis units at the highest levels of government and the opening of a National Policy College for high-level political leaders.

Policymaking Under Adversity is an excellent survey and introduction to the important question of whether existing political institutions and processes are capable of dealing with increasingly complex public policy issues. Dror formulates a number of interesting hypotheses and arguments throughout the book. An outstanding bibliography (100 pages) is also compiled by the author.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There are, however, a number of important problems with this work. The author attempts to cover too much material in each of the chapters. The result is that a large number of issues are only briefly analyzed, and the reader is, therefore, often left wondering what points are most salient. Furthermore, there is little effort to test hypotheses systematically against available evidence. A more tightly focused study, which examined a limited number of policy issues in a sample of countries, might have helped to distinguish between strong recurring patterns of behavior and less frequent and marginal patterns. Identification of the most important and common policy-making incapacities would have also helped to sharpen the focus in the concluding chapters on what types of reform are most crucial for dealing with adversity. Despite these limitations *Policymaking Under Adversity* is a fine work likely to serve as a basic reference for further research.

PAUL HUTH
University of Michigan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reference Books and Source Materials Received

Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern *by Branko Lazitch in collaboration with Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 532 pp. $44.95.*

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1987, 2 vols. *Detroit Mich., Gale Research Co., 1987. 1606 pp. $120.00.*

County Government Finances in 1984-85 *compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 112 pp. $5.50.*

Dictionary of American Conservatism *by Louis Filler. New York, Philosophical Library, 1987. 380 pp. $29.95.*

The Dynamic Constitution: A Historical Bibliography *edited by Suzanne Robitaille Ontiveros. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO, 1986. 343 pp. $32.50.*

Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, 4 vols. *edited by Leonard W. Levy. New York, Macmillan, 1986. 2196 pp. $320.*

Encyclopedia of the Third World: Third Edition, 3 vols. *by George Thomas Kurian. New York, Facts on File, 1987. 2342 pp. $175.00.*

Judicial Staff Directory 1987 *edited by Charles B. Brownson and Anna L. Brownson. Mount Vernon, Va., Congressional Staff Directory, 1986. 736 pp. $45.00.*

Military History of the United States: An Annotated Bibliography *edited by Susan K. Kinnell. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO, 1986. 333 pp. $85.00.*

The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook *edited by Walter W. Powell. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1987. 464 pp. $45.00.*

Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Compendium, 2nd ed., 2 vols. *prepared by the International Center for Parliamentary Documentation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. New York, Facts on File, 1986. 1422 pp. $95.00.*

Political Facts of the United States Since 1789 *by Erik W. Austin with Jerome M. Clubb. New York, Columbia University Press, 1986. 518 pp. $60.00.*

The Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention to Form the U.S. Constitution *by Robert Yates. Birmingham, Ala., Linn-Henley Research Center, 1987. 308 pp. Cloth, $37.00; paper, $17.00.*

State Government Finances in 1985 *compiled by the U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 71 pp. $4.00.*

Whitaker's Almanack 1987, 119th ed. *Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1986. 1236 pp. $54.00.*

World Survey on the Role of Women in Development. *New York, United Nations, 1986. 238 pp. $11.00.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Critical Insights

Strategy
The Logic of War and Peace
Edward N. Luttwak

A landmark study, *Strategy* presents a dramatically new way of thinking about the conduct of war and the diplomacy of peace. Luttwak calls it "paradoxical logic," demonstrating how commonsense logic fails in action.

"Luttwak presents a new universal theory of strategy which will form the basis of the entire discipline, or the start of a fundamental debate."
—Les Aspin

Belknap $20.00

Population in an Interacting World
Edited by William Alonso

On the premise that local population trends cannot be understood apart from structural and historical factors —social, political, economic, cultural and religious, military, biological— this book studies the demographic interplay linking rich and poor nations.
$30.00

The Personal Vote
Constituency Service and Electoral Independence
Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina

"A landmark comparative study in the field of legislatures . . . broad in scope and rigorous in theory and method. It coherently and cogently argues and defends an important case about the motivations and behavior of legislators." —James E. Alt
$25.00

Freda Kirchwey
A Woman of *The Nation*
Sara Alpern

Freda Kirchwey, opinionmaker and feminist, was owner, editor, and publisher of *The Nation*. In this first, full-scale biography of Kirchwey, Alpern weaves the strands of gender-related issues with larger social explorations.
$27.50

Toward a New Iron Age?
Quantitative Modeling of Resource Exhaustion
Robert B. Gordon, Tjalling C. Koopmans, William D. Nordhaus, and Brian J. Skinner

This comprehensive, interdisciplinary study of the economic consequences of resource depletion focuses on one key metal, copper, and explores its prospects by drawing on geological and engineering data.
$25.00

now in paperback

Defender of the Faith
William Jennings Bryan: The Last Decade 1915–1925
Lawrence W. Levine

"[A] wealth of new material about Bryan in his later phase . . . This book will compel a major re-evaluation of the later, tragic phase of Bryan's career."
—Arthur S. Link, Princeton University
$10.95 paper

from **Harvard University Press**
Cambridge, MA 02138

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Governing Science and Technology in a Democracy
Edited by Malcolm L. Goggin

"I am delighted to see the publication of Malcolm Goggin's *Governing Science and Technology in a Democracy.* The essays, by authors from a range of disciplines, approach the many questions of governance involved in science and technology in an informed and critical way. It is an excellent and provocative book that will encourage further social science research in this important field."
—Dorothy Nelkin, Cornell University.
334 pages. $34.95

Policy Design and the Politics of Implementation
The Case of Child Health Care in the American States
Malcolm L. Goggin

"Malcolm L. Goggin has produced a major study of an important policy issue. One will learn about health care politics, the complexities of intergovernmental program implementation, and the dynamics of the policy process. The topic is carefully researched and the book is well written and organized."
—Charles O. Jones, University of Virginia.
312 pages. $29.95

The Struggle for Black Political Empowerment in Three Georgia Counties
Lawrence J. Hanks

"A useful and instructive study for scholars of southern politics and black American political empowerment."
—David J. Garrow, City College of The City University of New York.
248 pages. $22.95

Seeking Many Inventions
The Idea of Community in America
Philip Abbott

"Philip Abbott has written what is probably the most imaginative of the recent books on communitarianism. He finds communities where no one else has thought to look and invites us to reflect on how loose and limited a community can be and still serve deep human needs. *Seeking Many Inventions* will set off many good arguments."
—Michael Walzer, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.
224 pages. $19.95

Political Parties in Local Areas
Edited by William Crotty

In this pathbreaking volume, distinguished scholars examine the 1980 elections in Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, and Nashville and argue that, at the local level, parties remain the key political actors.
272 pages. $27.95

The University of Tennessee Press
Knoxville 37996-0325

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Second Annual AAAS Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security

SCIENCE AND SECURITY: NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Monday, September 28-Tuesday, September 29, 1987
Hyatt Regency Crystal City Hotel
Arlington, Virginia

Last December, the First Annual AAAS Science, Arms Control, and National Security Colloquium drew over 400 policymakers, scientists, academicians and professionals involved in the study of arms control and national security issues. This year's meeting, building on that success, will again offer you an important opportunity to be on the cutting edge of the debate over arms control and national security policy.

Again this year, policymakers from the Administration will be joined by nationally-recognized outside authorities, thus presenting a broad and balanced view of the complexities of these timely and politically urgent issues. If you have an interest in European security, SDI, or the interplay between science and technology and arms control/national security policy, you should attend this colloquium.

1987 PROGRAM

Plenary Sessions will feature top-level policy advisors, and scientific and technical analysts:

- Science and Technology: Shaping National Security Policy and American Competitiveness
- Advances in Weapons Technology and Their Impact on National Security and Arms Control
- American Nuclear Strategy and European Security
- European Security: Relationship Between Nuclear and Conventional Forces
- Growing Contributions of the Scientific Community to International Security

Smaller Group Sessions will provide an opportunity for more technical discussion and debate:

- SDI: Technical Advances and Their Relationship to the ABM Treaty
- *Emerging Technology Conventional* Weapons: Technological Advances and Projected Role
- Role of ATBMs in European Security
- Enhancing the U.S. Deterrent: Force Survivability and C^3I Requirements
- Assessment of U.S./Soviet Biological and Chemical Warfare Capabilities in Europe
- Nuclear Proliferation in Developing Countries

Two important publications are included with each registration:

A **Preconference Reader,** with more than 20 in-depth essays on European Defense Policy, Conventional and Nuclear Forces in Europe, and European Theatre Arms Control.

The **Colloquium Proceedings,** a complete transcription of plenary and smaller sessions from the colloquium, capturing the essence of addresses and discussions.

For more information about the 1987 AAAS Science, Arms Control, and National Security Colloquium, please contact: Raymond Orkwis, Projects Coordinator, Committee on Science, Arms Control, and National Security, The American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1333 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005. (202) 326-6490. Please mention this publication.

The American Association for the Advancement of Science

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Great Economic Secret is-

Land! It hardly figures into the usual economic analyses and programs, yet a Conference Board study estimates that land values are 23% of net domestic wealth in the U. S. - and this is a gross underestimate. Write us to find out why.

If land values were taxed, it seems likely that we could replace almost all the taxes now levied on workers and capital investors. What a boom that would create! And what a boon to the unemployed!

No wonder an Urban Land Institute research report concludes that the land value tax is "a golden key to urban renewal - to the automatic regeneration of the city, and not at public expense."

Tax wages or buildings and we'll have less of those things. Tax land values, and we can't have any less land, but owners will be encouraged to use their land more efficiently, thereby creating jobs.

For more on the Land Story (at no obligation) write-

COMMON GROUND

2000 Century Plaza, (238), Columbia, MD 21044

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Public-Private Partnerships
Improving Urban Life
Edited by PERRY DAVIS
1986 / 161 pp. / $9.95

The Pacific Basin
New Challenges for the United States
Edited by JAMES W. MORLEY
1986 / 179 pp. / $9.95

Control of Federal Spending
Edited by C. LOWELL HARRISS
1985 / 188 pp. / $8.95

The Soviet Union in the 1980s
Edited by ERIK P. HOFFMANN
1984 / 244 pp. / $8.95

The President's War Powers
From the Federalists to Reagan
Edited by DEMETRIOS CARALEY
1984 / 204 pp. / $7.95

National Security and Nuclear Strategy
Edited by ROBERT H. CONNERY and DEMETRIOS CARALEY
1983 / 186 pp. / $7.95

The Crisis in Higher Education
Edited by JOSEPH FROOMKIN
1983 / 177 pp. / $7.95

The Property Tax and Local Finance
Edited by C. LOWELL HARRISS
1983 / 242 pp. / $9.95

20% discount to Academy members
Credit cards honored: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
2852 BROADWAY / NEW YORK, NY 10025-7885 / (212) 866-6752

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy of Political Science

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

George T. Scharffenberger
Chairman of the Board

Harold A. Stevens
Vice Chairman

Frank J. Macchiarola
President and Executive Director

John V. Connorton, Jr.
Vice President and Treasurer

Gerald L. Curtis
Secretary

C. Lowell Harriss
Senior Adviser

Demetrios Caraley
Editor, PSQ, ex officio

Courtney C. Brown
Robert H. Connery
Victor Futter
Leland M. Goodrich
Grayson Kirk
Robert MacCrate
Thomas M. Macioce
George B. Munroe
Alfred C. Neal
Norma Pace
Russell A. Phillips, Jr.
Mary G. Roebling
Franz Schneider
Stephen Stamas

John R. Stevenson
William S. Woodside

HONORARY MEMBERS

George W. Ball
Claude T. Bissell
Arthur F. Burns
Roberto de O. Campos
Jorge Castañeda
Barber B. Conable, Jr.
John Sherman Cooper
Arthur H. Dean
Luther Gulick
Lord Harris of High Cross
Oveta Culp Hobby
Lady Bird Johnson
Mary Lasker
John J. McCloy
W. Earle McLaughlin
Charles Malik
Michael J. Mansfield
Paul Martin
Saburo Okita
N. A. Palkhivala
Gordon Robertson
Lord Roll of Ipsden, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Dean Rusk
S. M. Sikri
Margaret Chase Smith
Robert Stanfield
James E. Webb

The Academy of Political Science, founded in 1880, promotes objective, scholarly investigations of political, social, and economic problems. Through its conferences and publications it seeks to inform the public by presenting divergent views of these problems. It does not make policy recommendations.

In addition to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, the Academy publishes the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, issued twice a year. Members receive both publications.

Regular membership: one year, $25.00; three years, $58.00; student, $16.00 a year. Special membership: contributing, $35; sustaining, $45; supporting, $55; patron, $100 or more; life, $300. Foreign postage is $6 additional per year. *Contributions are tax deductible.*

Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
2852 BROADWAY / NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10025-7885 / (212) 866-6752

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED